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Abstract 
When a suspect is interviewed by the police, s/he has the right to decline 
to answer police questions and avoid self-incrimination. This is a fundamental 
procedural protection, and police are required to inform suspects of the ‘right 
to silence’, also called the ‘caution’, before beginning the interview. However, 
the way the caution is stated, both in legal texts and by police officers, is often 
linguistically and conceptually complex. This makes it less likely that suspects 
will understand their right to remain silent, especially if they are Aboriginal 
and speak English as a second language or dialect. Aboriginal people are over-
represented in the criminal justice system, and, if they do not understand the 
right to silence, this may aggravate that disadvantage. 
In Anunga (1976), the NT Supreme Court attempted to reduce this 
disadvantage, by requiring police explaining the caution to Aboriginal suspects 
to obtain evidence of “apparent understanding”. However, this has led to 
conversations about the caution which are sometimes long and unsuccessful. 
Difficulties with the caution have long been acknowledged by courts, linguists 
and others, but regulatory guidance and police language have changed little in 
20 years, and there has been no systematic study of the speech event (‘caution 
conversation’) resulting from the Anunga requirements. 
The caution originates in a legislated text but police vary its form and 
content. This thesis examines transcripts in which police explain the caution to 
Aboriginal suspects and test understanding.  It examines what is said and how 
it is expressed, and what is left unsaid in the caution. It compares the 
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transcripts with translations into Aboriginal languages, and shows that these 
further vary the caution text, revealing additional meaning. 
The caution’s meaning is partly about interaction (establishing norms for 
the interview speech activity) and partly informative (describing the 
consequences of speaking or not speaking to police). 
The linguistic analysis takes place at different levels. At the conceptual 
level, most paraphrases arguably assume knowledge, particularly about rights 
and evidence. At the conversation level, the caution conversation is a complex 
speech activity, and the extent to which suspects can understand its purposes 
and mechanisms is likely to affect understanding of the right to silence. At the 
discourse level the way police repeat and explain the caution affects its 
interpretation. Multiple versions of the caution may provide different ways to 
understand the caution, but unclear discourse relationships between 
restatements of the caution can also create confusion. At the sentence level, the 
ambiguous roles of conditional clauses may make versions of the caution 
harder to understand and relate to each other. At the word-level, police lexical 
and grammatical choices have different kinds of equivalence in Aboriginal 
languages, and suspect responses suggest that modality used by police to say 
that silence is permissible is particularly unclear. 
Analysis of existing problems in communication and alternative ways of 
expressing the caution can suggest ways to improve communication to attempt 
to demystify this aspect of the legal process. 
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1 Introduction 
Before interviewing a suspect about a crime, police are required to 
inform him/her of certain rights, most importantly the right to remain silent. 
The statement of rights, called the ‘caution’, has been extensively studied in 
different jurisdictions. It is especially difficult to communicate with Aboriginal 
suspects whose first language is not English, and other suspects from diverse 
language and cultural backgrounds. This thesis is about the ‘right to silence’ 
caution as it is communicated in the Northern Territory of Australia (NT) 
between police and Aboriginal suspects. 
Problems with the caution are prominent in the NT because of its large 
and linguistically diverse Aboriginal population. The over-representation of 
Aboriginal people in the criminal justice system is described as a “national 
crisis” by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peak Organisations (2016:11); 
and communication is one aspect of systemic disadvantage which can be 
investigated (Liberman 1981; Mildren 1999; Eades 2008). 
Responding to communication difficulties with Aboriginal suspects, the 
historic judgement of the NT Supreme Court in Anunga (1976) established 
guidelines to improve communication of the caution. Most relevant for this 
study, Anunga requires police to obtain evidence of apparent suspect 
understanding of the caution. Unfortunately, some conversations resulting from 
these requirements have been described as a “drawn-out and virtually 
meaningless formality” (Goldflam 1995:36). However, this process is recorded 
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by police, providing evidence for the study of communication, including what 
suspects say about the caution. 
Legal sources (separate from Anunga) have provided standard texts for 
the caution. Different ways of explaining the caution can be seen as textual 
evolutions modifying this original text in selective ways. The current standard 
text is: 
[The person] does not have to say or do anything but anything the person does say or 
do may be given in evidence1 
Through the study of interaction, discourse, semantics and pragmatics, 
this thesis will investigate how police explain the caution and how suspects 
might infer its meaning from police language. 
This thesis is informed by my experience as a criminal lawyer at the 
North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency in Nhulunbuy and Darwin in 
2012-15. During this time I saw and experienced a lot of troubled 
communication between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people in the legal 
process. This thesis is largely about police, but effective communication is a 
challenge for many people including me. 
                                                 
 
1 Police Administration Act (NT) s 140(a). An almost identical text is in the Evidence (National 
Uniform Legislation) Act (NT) s 139(1)(c). 
VLING Thesis Alex Bowen u5989850 
 
 
9 
1.1 Protecting rights with words 
1.1.1 The function of the caution 
In the NT, many Aboriginal suspects participate in interviews, often 
before speaking to a lawyer. It is the only time most suspects speak on the 
record about their case, in a legal process which can otherwise be critiqued as 
‘silencing’ Aboriginal people (Goldflam 1995:38; Eades 2000). Because 
confessions in interviews are often powerful evidence against the suspect, legal 
contests about the way police conduct interviews are common. If the right to 
silence caution is unsuccessfully communicated, the suspect misses the 
opportunity to consider or exercise his/her rights, and may also misunderstand 
the evidentiary purpose of the interview. 
The caution is “an essential safeguard to those suspected of having 
committed offences” (Mangaraka 1993:[25]). It reflects the legal protection 
against courts drawing an unfavourable inference from a suspect’s refusal to 
answer police questions.2 While there may be other evidence against the 
suspect, silence will not be used as evidence of guilt. A related protection is 
that police cannot compel the suspect to answer questions.3 While the law 
                                                 
 
2 Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act (NT) s 89. Section 20 provides a related 
protection concerning an accused’s failure to give evidence at trial, a protection which has 
existed in the NT since 1939: Evidence Ordinances 1939 (NT) s 9(3). 
3 Under the former common law of evidence, incriminating admissions (the likely content of the 
interview) had to be made voluntarily in order to be admissible. One way of arguing that the 
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about adverse inferences in court appears to be clear-cut, it is complicated to 
define what constitutes (unacceptable) police coercion (Heydon 2007; Grisso 
1986; Brooks 2000; Berk-Seligson 2009; Stuesser 2002; Ofshe & Leo 1996). It 
is usually against suspects’ interests to speak to police and create evidence 
which can be used against them (Leo 2008) and there is some evidence that 
understanding the caution makes suspects less likely to speak (Davis, 
Fitzsimmons, & Moore 2011), however interviews do sometimes end up 
providing evidence favourable to the suspect. A further serious problem is that 
false confessions are surprisingly common and may be related to the stressful 
nature of the interview (Leo 2008; Cutler, Findley, & Loney 2013; Berk-
                                                 
 
interview did not meet this standard was if “the will of the accused was overborne by police 
conduct”, for example where it is argued the police have not respected the suspect’s attempt to 
exercise the right to silence: R v CS [2012] NTSC 94. A confession would not be voluntary “if 
it has been obtained from the accused by fear of prejudice or hope of advantage exercised or held 
out by a person in authority, or as the result of duress, intimidation, persistent importunity or 
sustained or undue insistence or pressure – anything that has overborne the will of the accused” 
(MacPherson v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 519), even if police did not intend to overbear 
the accused’s will (Collins v R (1980) 31 ALR 257 at 307). Under the current law, if police did 
not allow a suspect to remain silent the resulting interview could be argued to be inadmissible 
on the grounds of unreliability of the resulting confession, unfairness to the suspect or 
impropriety by police: (Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act (NT) ss 85, 90 and 138 
respectively). Other improprieties justifying exclusion of evidence may include, “[t]rickery, 
misrepresentation, … or detaining a suspect or keeping him in isolation without lawful 
justification”: R v Emily Jako, Theresa Marshall and Mavis Robinson [1999] NTSC 46 at [25]. 
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Seligson 2009). It is arguable that a successful caution could make the 
interview less coercive by identifying limits on police power (Kassin et al. 
2010; Douglas 1998). 
Most people have assumptions about silence in social interaction. Failure 
to answer a question may ordinarily indicate an ulterior motive such as 
embarrassment or guilt (Heritage & Clayman 2011:24; Heydon 2007), or be 
viewed as uncooperative (Kurzon 1996). The right to silence therefore protects 
suspects from the ordinary inference about silence (Heritage & Clayman 2011). 
1.1.2 The caution as a policy 
Caution conversations in this study are strongly shaped by Anunga 
(1976) Guideline 3: 
Care should be taken in administering the caution when it is appropriate to do so. It is 
simply not adequate to administer it in the usual terms and say, “Do you understand 
that?” or “Do you understand that you do not have to answer questions?” Interrogating 
police officers, having explained the caution in simple terms, should ask the Aboriginal 
to tell them what is meant by the caution, phrase by phrase, and should not proceed 
with the interrogation until it is clear the Aboriginal has apparent understanding of 
his right to remain silent. …(emphasis added) 
Obtaining evidence of “apparent understanding” is a difficult task, and a large 
amount of police talk seems to be addressed to trying to achieve it. 
The Anunga Guidelines apply “to persons who are being questioned as 
suspects” (1976:414), meaning they apply to suspects who are ‘voluntarily’ in 
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the police station as well as those under arrest.4 It may not be clear to some 
people whether police are questioning them as a suspect or a witness. Suspects 
may incriminate themselves by things they say in interviews, whereas this is 
not expected of witnesses. Therefore suspects are protected by being told what 
they are suspected of5 in conjunction with the caution. 
The Anunga Guidelines are incorporated into Police General Orders (GP 
2015, Dumoo 1998, Douglas 1998). If police do not follow the guidelines, they 
                                                 
 
4 The practice of cautioning suspects who are not in custody (have not been arrested) is reflected 
in the 2015 translations recorded in Aboriginal languages, which include two versions for each 
language, ‘in custody’ and ‘not in custody’, reflecting the different rights that suspects have (such 
as the right to leave if not in custody and the right to contact someone if in custody). The right 
to silence is the same in each case. 
5 Once police investigation has progressed beyond general enquiries to a stage where police 
believe a particular crime has been committed by the suspect, fairness requires that any suspect 
be informed of the nature of the crime about which s/he is being questioned, because the 
suspect’s decision about silence then takes on additional importance (R v Szach (1980) 2 A Crim 
R 321 at 341, R v Emily Jako, Theresa Marshall and Mavis Robinson [1999] NTSC 46). It is not 
generally necessary for police to name the particular alleged offence, but rather to provide 
enough information for the suspect to “understand what they are being questioned about and to 
enable them to make an informed decision as to whether they should exercise any of their rights, 
including whether to speak or remain silent” (The Queen v BL [2015] NTSC 85 at [60]). In 
Gudabi v R (1984) 52 ALR 133 at 143, it was acceptable to refer to “trouble” instead of “rape”; 
the detective said that was his practice when speaking to Aboriginal people. 
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therefore breach their own orders and this is an avenue for courts to exclude 
interviews from evidence.6 
The Anunga Guidelines are an influential piece of policy which has 
shaped 40 years of practice in this area in the NT and to some extent elsewhere 
(Douglas 1998). The guidelines are expressed to be the view of the court, 
Muirhead and Ward JJ agreeing with Forster J’s judgement (Anunga 
1976:413). Forster J’s observations are “based partly upon my own knowledge 
and observations and partly by evidence I have heard in numerous cases” 
(ibid:414). There is no particular indication that Aboriginal people (or other 
experts) were consulted about the content of the Anunga guidelines, however 
some of Forster J’s remarks about Aboriginal languages closely resemble 
comments by Yankunytjatjara translator/interpreter Yami Lester (1973).7 
Forster J also suggests that “[m]ost experienced police officers in the Territory 
already” seek evidence of apparent understanding, as required by guideline 3 
                                                 
 
6 Breach of Police General Orders may be an ‘impropriety’ (Dumoo v Garner [1998] NTSC 8), 
though in R v GP [2015] NTSC 53 at [53] Barr J found it was merely arguable that breaching an 
Anunga rule in a Police General Order was improper. Impropriety triggers a discretion to exclude 
evidence under s 138 Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act (NT). More narrowly, failure 
to actually deliver the caution to a suspect who is under arrest (or de facto arrest) is always 
deemed to be improper (s 139). 
7 Lester worked as an interpreter including in the Supreme Court at Alice Springs (Lester n.d.), 
and his observations about language could possibly have been made in court, forming part of the 
evidence Forster J drew on. 
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(Anunga 1976:415), perhaps implying that guideline 3 reflected existing best 
police practice. There have been some judicial suggestions that the Anunga 
process and the language of the caution should evolve (Gudabi 1984, 
Mangaraka 1993:[25]), however enforcement of the guidelines does not seem 
to have markedly changed. 
The caution is a compromise encoded in a choice of language, balancing 
fairness to suspects and limited police resources. If suspects exercise the right 
to silence (which presumably requires understanding it), or if interviews are 
unable to be used because caution understanding requirements have not been 
met, police may have to gather more evidence to prove crimes. The Anunga 
guidelines are said to “have as their object the assistance of investigating 
officers in conducting their inquiries in such a manner as to be fair to the 
person being interviewed while at the same time serving the public interest by 
not unduly inhibiting the investigating process” (Gudabi 1984:145). It would 
be possible to tell suspects something different, or nothing, instead of the 
caution. Standard legal advice in my experience is ‘don’t talk to the police’, but 
arguably it is not the role of the caution to give advice. On the other hand it is 
arguably “wrong in principle, to recognize a … right only on the condition that 
it not be exercised very often” (Davis et al. 2011:96). The investigation of how 
the caution is explained and how it may be understood can inform 
consideration of whether it is a meaningful or appropriate compromise. 
Variations of the caution text may vary the compromise. I will argue that 
translations reveal premises which are unstated in police language. This may 
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not vary the caution’s compromise if it merely reveals information which the 
caution would ordinarily imply, however it is often not clear what information 
the law intends to be part of the caution. If an effective translation or 
paraphrase causes more suspects to understand the caution and decline 
interviews, that may increase both fairness to suspects and the demands placed 
on police resources. 
1.1.3 The two-audience problem 
Historically, police produced written records of interviews. Problems 
with written confessions (Gibbons 1987, 1990) included cases of ‘verballing’ 
(confessions falsified by police), in some cases identified by linguistic analysis 
(Eades 2013). From 1992, the NT phased in compulsory electronic recording 
of interviews with suspects,8 shedding new light on police interviews and 
probably changing the nature of interviews (Gibbons 1996; Carter 2011). This 
study includes conversations recorded between 1993 and 2015, spanning most 
of the period during which recordings have been produced. 
Most caution conversations are recorded in a police interview room, 
usually a soundproof room with a table and chairs and audiovisual recording 
equipment. Two police officers usually sit at the table with the suspect. 
Interviews are recorded by police in their entirety, including formalities like 
                                                 
 
8 Police Administration Act (NT) ss 139, 141, 142, introduced by the Police Administration 
Amendment Act (No. 2) 1992 (NT). 
VLING Thesis Alex Bowen u5989850 
 
 
16 
identifying people in the room, ensuring the suspect is not unwell or 
intoxicated, stating that everything is being recorded, and explaining the 
caution. 
The caution involves a ‘two-audience problem’, because police language 
must in theory be simultaneously intelligible to the suspect and acceptable to 
the court hearing the recording (Gibbons 2001:448; Heydon 2005:39), and 
suspect language similarly has two audiences. The objective of the Anunga 
caution is not understanding (which is impossible to measure directly), but 
evidence of apparent understanding. Those two outcomes could be more or less 
similar, depending firstly on what police accept as evidence of understanding, 
and in a small minority of cases which are contested in court, on what a court 
will accept as evidence of understanding. Supervision by the absent audience 
can motivate police to take more care with the caution (Rock 2007:233) and 
provide guidance about how to deliver it.  
Indirectly, the two-audience problem influences the interaction (Carter 
2011) because if the interview is used as evidence (of a confession it contains), 
the judge or jury will likely watch the whole interview including the caution 
exchange. The two-audience situation arguably results in a kind of textual 
transformation, because a live conversation becomes a recorded artefact 
replayable by various people, and sometimes read in transcript. This is unlike 
non-recorded conversation in which much of the discourse constructed by 
participants need not end up ‘on record’, and aspects of the discourse can never 
be fully or accurately quoted (Linell 1998). Police and (if the caution is 
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successful) suspects should therefore be conscious of the additional audience 
all the time. (I will refer to this as two-audience awareness). 
One problem related to the two audiences is the risk of suspects 
prematurely talking about the alleged crime during the recording before the 
formalities are complete.9 Perhaps wanting to avoid this, police sometimes 
state the caution briefly before completing other formalities, which can be 
described as a ‘pre-announcement’, discussed at 2.3. 
Clark (1992:106) discusses the place of ‘overhearers’ in communication, 
arguing that because speakers work with their addresses to monitor 
understanding of the discourse, addressees understand as well as they need to 
while overhearers understand as well as they are able to. The question is, at 
different times, which of the caution’s audiences is the overhearer. 
                                                 
 
9 There is a risk that confessional statements by the suspect before the caution is complete will 
make the interview inadmissible as evidence, because it may seem that the suspect has 
prematurely committed to the interview and started to incriminate him/herself, making the 
subsequent caution less meaningful. In R v Echo [1997] NTSC 177 at [13], Martin CJ found that 
“[t]he difficulty [with the caution] was compounded by the accused's commitment to take part 
in the interview prior to any proper attempt being made to caution him on that occasion”. In R v 
Inkamala [1996] NTSC 18, police also had to stop premature confessions by Inkamala, though 
these may have resulted from interpreting by the prisoner’s friend (who was not a trained 
interpreter). 
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1.2 Language in the caution 
1.2.1 Previous caution studies 
There is a history of studying the way language affects Aboriginal people 
in the Australian legal system (Eades 2013). McKay (1985) analysed the 
impact of the Anunga rules and linguistic problems with the caution. Cooke 
(1996:280) showed how a Yolngu suspect did not understand the caution and 
thought she had to answer the questions. Mildren (1997) and Cooke (1998) 
discussed the Anunga rules and proposed particular language to better explain 
the caution. Other linguistic studies of Australian cautions have focused on 
non-native speaker suspects (Gibbons 1996; Nakane 2007), while Heydon 
(2005) balances some of this research by studying police interviews with 
speakers of Standard Australian English, but does not focus primarily on 
cautioning. 
Studies have analysed caution talk (Rock 2007; Russell 2000; Rock 
2012; Cooke 1998), asked police and/or suspects about the caution (Cotterill 
2000; Rock 2007) and focused on the suitability of scripted language for future 
cautions (Gibbons 2001; Kurzon 1996). In this study, there is no opportunity to 
question participants (and many cautions took place years ago). However the 
requirement to test understanding probably means that NT police and suspects 
say more than caution participants in other jurisdictions. For example, in 
England and Wales, police are advised to explain the caution in their own 
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words if it appears the suspect does not understand it10 and some paraphrasing 
takes place (Rock 2007, 2012; Cotterill 2000; Russell 2000). New South Wales 
Police are advised to ask comprehension questions if they “feel [suspects] do 
not understand the caution”11 (Gibbons 2001:447; Eades 2010:139). Neither 
requirement seems equivalent to the need for NT police to elicit evidence of 
apparent understanding before continuing. 
Previous research into cautions has led to the Guidelines for 
communicating rights to non-native speakers of English in Australia, England 
and Wales, and the USA (Communication of Rights Group 2015), a process 
described in Eades & Pavlenko (2017). The Guidelines establish evidence-
based best practice which is relevant to aspects of this study. 
1.2.2 Intertextuality 
The caution can be viewed as a text which undergoes various 
transformations (Rock 2007). A text is a unit of language, deployed in the 
                                                 
 
10 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (UK) Code C 2014, note 10D, p 35. Section 10.7 says 
that “Minor deviations from the words of any caution given in accordance with this Code do not 
constitute a breach of this Code, provided the sense of the relevant caution is preserved”. 
11 The suggested question is “What do you understand by what I have just said?”. NSW Police 
Force (2015) Code of Practice for CRIME (Custody, Rights, Investigation, Management and 
Evidence), p 63, available from  
http://www.police.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/108808/Code_of_Practice_for_Cri
me.pdf, accessed 14 May 2017. 
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world in some situation which entails relationships with other texts and 
information (De Beaugrande 1980). No text can be independent of contexts 
(Linell 1998), but a text may be identified where speakers view a body of 
language as a unit, capable of being lifted from one context to another 
(Bauman & Briggs 1990). 
Legislation specifies the standard text of the caution (at least for suspects 
who are under arrest12 or de-facto arrest).13 The legal text has itself evolved, 
importantly replacing “you are not obliged to say anything” 14 with ‘you do not 
have to say anything’.15 However adherence to the standard text in practice is 
                                                 
 
12 Police Administration Act (NT) s 140(a), Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act (NT) s 
139(1). 
13 Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act (NT) s 139(5), also s 139(2). 
14 The standard text can be traced back at least to the 1918 English Judges’ Rules, which said 
“Do you wish to say anything in answer to the charge? You are not obliged to say anything unless 
you wish to do so, but whatever you say will be taken down in writing and may be given in 
evidence” (Home Office Circular 536053/23 of 1930, Rule 5, quoted in Abrahams 1964:18, 
emphasis added). The Judges’ Rules were, like the Anunga rules, not rules of law, but were 
adopted around Australia in various forms: McDermott v R (1948) 76 CLR 501, R v Lee (1950) 
82 CLR 133. McKay (1985:42) gives the then-current NT caution as “You are not obliged to 
answer any question unless you wish to do so, and anything you say will be written down and 
may later be given in evidence. Do you understand that?" (emphasis added). 
15 The legislated texts are in the third person and differ in the inclusion of doing as well as saying. 
“the person does not have to say anything” (Police Administration Act (NT) s 140(a)); “the 
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neither required nor sufficient, largely because Anunga Guideline 3 requires 
police to explain the caution “in simple terms” and test understanding. Police 
initially say something similar to the written caution text, transforming it into 
interactive oral language. In many cases they then transform it further by 
paraphrase. Police spontaneous caution paraphrases have been found by 
previous studies in English-speaking jurisdictions to be often unsatisfactory 
(Cotterill 2000:7; Shuy 1998:53; Baldwin 1994:67). It is not surprising, given 
identified problems with the caution, that paraphrasing it is difficult (Russell 
2000:41), and this study will investigate the effectiveness of police 
paraphrases. Translations are a further kind of transformation of the caution 
text. 
Previous studies have examined the comprehensibility of caution texts 
(Davis et al. 2011; Gibbons 1990; Gibbons 2001; Kurzon 1996; Rogers, 
Hazelwood, Sewell, Harrison, et al. 2008), and their comprehension by 
individuals or populations, particularly on psychological measures (Fenner, 
Gudjonsson, & Clare 2002; Eastwood, Snook, & Chaulk 2010; Rogers, 
Rogstad, Steadham, & Drogin 2011). Rock (2007) advances the analysis of 
comprehension and comprehensibility by highlighting the need to move 
beyond a ‘transmission’ model of text as containing inherent meaning, linking 
sender to receiver and transmitting the sender’s intentions. The transmission 
                                                 
 
person does not have to say or do anything” (Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act (NT) 
s 139(1)(c)).  
VLING Thesis Alex Bowen u5989850 
 
 
22 
view arguably imagines language without sociolinguistic context, and viewing 
the caution as “propositional information” may also ignore its “social message” 
about the “power and authority of the person using it” (Gibbons 2001:448). A 
better approach is to recognise that “readers create meaning using texts and 
their existing knowledge of texts” (Rock 2007:19). Different prior knowledge 
(context) can explain why identical forms mean different things to different 
people (Maryns 2006), and accordingly, communication is not successful or 
unsuccessful but can result in information becoming apparent to hearers in 
varying degrees (Sperber & Wilson 1995:59). Further, Goffman's (1981) 
‘participation frameworks’ reveal that there is no such thing as one sender, as 
the caution involves police saying words which are authorised and written by 
others (Rock 2007, Heydon 2005). 
Despite the need to consider sociolinguistic context, it can be difficult to 
avoid using transmission as a metaphor when talking about communication 
(Rock 2007). While this study closely examines linguistic problems which may 
be seen as ‘interfering with the signal’, I consider how these problems interact 
with context both inside and outside the conversation. Context is defined and 
further discussed at 2.2. 
1.2.3 Non-standard English 
An obvious feature of the sociolinguistic context of caution conversations 
in this study is that all suspects probably use Standard Australian English 
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(‘SAE’) as a second language (‘L2’)16 or second dialect (‘D2’).17 In many 
cases, information about suspects’ first language (‘L1’) is available, and in 
other cases suspect language and comprehension does not seem native-like 
(though it is beyond the scope of this study, and probably the quality of the 
data, to conduct forensic language assessments). Where the suspect’s L1 is not 
known, this usually means this was not discovered during the police and court 
processes, and/or that the court did not think it was necessary to include in the 
judgement.18 
SAE spoken by non-native speakers (‘NNS’) is expected to display 
effects of transfer from the speaker’s L1 (or D1). Transfer can have ‘positive’ 
or ‘negative’ effects on the language being learnt, and can affect both 
                                                 
 
16 L1 means a language spoken ‘natively’, that is acquired as a child. It is possible to have more 
than one L1. L2 means a language acquired (usually incompletely) later in life, and it is possible 
to learn more than one L2. 
17 For example, one suspect in the study (Age) is said to be a native speaker of English, though 
it is not clear how the court established this. It is beyond the scope of this study to conduct a 
language assessment, but it is possible that he was a native speaker of a variety of Aboriginal 
English. 
18 An exception is that in some cases, courts decide not to publish details including suspect’s 
language and community of origin, probably for privacy reasons. For example R v GP [2015] 
NTSC 53. 
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production and reception of language (Ellis 2015). The caution is also 
delivered to children,19 and one suspect in this study (KR) was 14 years old. 
This study considers differences between SAE and Aboriginal languages, 
however it is impractical to attempt a detailed consideration of all the suspect 
L1s in this study, and this reflects the difficulty policy-makers in the NT face 
in accounting for linguistic diversity. The translations considered in this study 
are in two languages, Djambarrpuyngu (a large ‘traditional’ language by 
Australian standards spoken by Yolngu people) and Kriol (a widely-spoken 
English-lexified contact language). Translations give an indication of language 
differences which will be relevant to some speakers, but do not account for the 
diversity of language in the NT. There is significant variation among Yolngu 
languages (Schebeck 2001)20 and Kriol (Munro 2000). So even among target 
speakers for a given translation there may be different language backgrounds 
                                                 
 
19 Fourteen is the youngest age at which children are presumed to be subject to criminal 
responsibility, however a child as young as 10 can be prosecuted if it is proved that at the time 
of the offence “he [sic] had capacity to know that he ought not to” engage in the relevant conduct: 
Criminal Code (NT) s 38. 
20 Djambarrpuyngu is the only Yolngu language included in the 2015 translations. This means 
it will be the closest available recording for many speakers whose L1 is not Djambarrpuyngu. 
Many Aboriginal people (including interpreters) are multilingual and may be able to 
communicate about the caution in various languages (Lawrie 1999). It is outside the scope of 
this study to investigate this. 
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exerting different influences on the interpretation of police language and 
translated language. 
While learner English may contain errors and transfer, L1 Aboriginal 
varieties of English and Kriol are rule-based languages (Eades 2013). Some 
suspect utterances are ‘nonstandard’ relative to SAE, and may be learner 
language or usage which is standard in another variety. Differences are 
sometimes recognised by courts: 
Care must be taken in considering the written word as found in the transcript of the 
interviews because many words in Kriol appear to be the same as, or similar to, words 
in English. On occasions, and depending upon the context, those words may have a 
quite different meaning in Kriol. (R v Roberts (2009) 158 NTR 1 at 11-12) 
This study is not an attempt to describe the Englishes spoken by suspects, and 
the limited information about their background does not support an assumption 
that they all speak the same kind of Aboriginal English (though see Harkins 
(2000) on similarities among Aboriginal Englishes). 
Speakers ordinarily design utterances to be understandable by their 
audiences (Clark 1992), though often the onus is on Aboriginal speakers to 
accommodate (adjust communication to more closely resemble another 
speaker’s language (Dragojevic, Giles, & Gasiorek 2014)) to SAE when 
speaking to non-Aboriginal people (Simpson 2013), including in court settings 
(Koch 1990). NT police undoubtedly know something about their audience 
from experience of policing (though interviews are sometimes conducted by 
federal agents who may be less familiar with NT Aboriginal people). In any 
event, living and working in the NT does not mean that non-Aboriginal people 
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share an understanding of Aboriginal people’s experiences (Habibis, Taylor, 
Walter, & Elder 2016). Even ‘light’ varieties of Aboriginal English may 
involve important differences in communicative style when compared with 
SAE (Eades 2008, 1994). When speaking to NNS in general, native speakers 
(‘NS’) may use ‘foreigner talk’ including simplifications of language (Long 
1983) and a variety of communication strategies for the negotiation of meaning 
(Tarone 1980). It is also possible to use knowledge of cultural differences to 
promote misunderstanding (Eades 2003). 
1.2.4 Legal language 
Adjusting the caution for an audience may be more difficult because it is 
legal language. Literate legal texts may be “autonomous” and 
“decontextualized”, tending to be independent of their potential audiences 
(Gibbons 2003). The impersonality of legal texts (Maley 1994) makes them 
general and can be linked to performativity, having the capacity to do 
something (Rock 2007:10). The original text of the caution is general and 
impersonal, however police in this study do considerable work particularising 
the caution text for suspects. So while the caution has textual roots in ‘written 
language of the law’, language used to “lay down the law”, in conversation it 
rapidly transitions into ‘spoken legal language’, which is language used to “talk 
about the law” (Kurzon 1997). 
Of course, legal language is widely criticised and may be difficult to 
understand for non-Aboriginal people. Findings from this study may be 
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relevant to communicating legal concepts with suspects from other 
backgrounds. 
1.3 The caution in conversation 
Below is an example of the caution as it plays out in conversation 
reflecting some of the influences and requirements discussed above. 
Extract (1): Dumoo (1996) 21 
1. Lindsay: Now Basil do you agree that before we started this talk I took the plastic 
off these three cassette tapes? 
2. Dumoo: Yeah. 
3. Lindsay: And I put them in that machine. 
4. Dumoo: Yes. 
5. Lindsay: And do you agree this machine’s now working? 
6. Dumoo: Yeah. 
7. Lindsay: Now I advise you Basil that our conversation is being recorded on this 
machine and when we’re finished I’ll give you one of the tapes. Do you 
understand that? 
                                                 
 
21 This is perhaps the least serious case in this study, about bringing alcohol into a “protected 
area” (alcohol is banned in many Aboriginal communities in the NT). The structure of the caution 
conversation does not obviously differ from more serious cases, but it is possible that Lindsay 
was less thorough in testing understanding of it because the crime was not very serious. This 
case was nevertheless appealed to the Supreme Court, which found that failure to comply with 
Anunga guideline 3 (which was included in a relevant Police General Order) meant the interview 
was improperly obtained and should be excluded from evidence: Dumoo v Garner [1998] NTSC 
8. 
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8. Dumoo: Yes. 
9. Lindsay: Now Basil I want to talk to you about some grog, some liquor that was 
taken into the restricted area on Wednesday night. Do you understand that? 
10. Dumoo: Yeah. 
11. Lindsay: Before we go any further I’ll advise you that you don’t have to talk to 
me if you don’t want to. Do you understand that? 
12. Dumoo: Yeah. 
13. Lindsay: So do you have to answer my questions? 
14. Dumoo: No. 
15. Lindsay: Okay. Now if - if you don’t want to answer my questions, or if you don’t 
want to answer one question, you tell me - you tell me that you don’t want to 
answer it. Okay. 
16. Dumoo: Yeah. 
17. Lindsay: And anything that you do say will be recorded on this machine and may 
later be used as evidence in court. Do you understand that? 
18. Dumoo: Yeah. 
19. Lindsay: Who might listen to these tapes in court? 
20. Dumoo: Judge. 
21. Lindsay: Judge. Now when the Judge listens to these tapes and he - that Judge will 
hear what you’re saying now. Now if he thinks that you’re guilty what can he do 
to you? 
22. Dumoo: Lock me up. 
23. Lindsay: Yeah. What other sort of things can he do? Could he make you pay a 
fine? 
24. Dumoo: Yeah. 
25. Lindsay: Or make you do that work? 
26. Dumoo: Yeah. 
27. Lindsay: What’s that work called? 
28. Dumoo: (No reply). 
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29. Lindsay: The community work? 
30. Dumoo: Community. 
31. Lindsay: Do you want to answer my questions Basil? 
32. Dumoo: Yeah. 
33. Lindsay: Okay. What can you tell me about Wednesday night? 
34. Dumoo: Went to Daly, brought 6 carton, drinking all night and had one carton left 
and Paul came along and maybe a dozen left. 
Lines 1–8 are about the recording of the conversation, but the fact that 
they are said also shows Linsday’s attention to the second audience: it would 
be strange in normal conversation to ask Dumoo to confirm events which have 
just happened. Dumoo goes along with these questions, and this could be 
because he recognises they are for the recording, or because he recognises 
police authority in the interview. 
The caution is typically explained in two parts: the ‘right to silence’ 
(‘you do not have to say or do anything’ in the standard text) and the 
‘consequences of speaking’ (‘but anything you do say or do will be recorded 
and may be used in evidence’). Lindsay explains the right to silence at line 11, 
then after Dumoo’s superficially correct answer at line 14, discusses the 
consequences of speaking in more detail. Dumoo produces one-word answers 
(except for line 22), but Linsday seems to accept these answers as evidence of 
apparent understanding. We see in line 34 that Dumoo is capable of producing 
a complete utterance in SAE in response to a non-caution question. 
If formalities including the caution are successful, police typically 
proceed directly into the substantive interview in one continuous recording. 
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Line 31 above is unusual for this study, marking Dumoo’s opportunity to make 
a decision about silence (if he understood the caution) before Lindsay asks 
about the crime in line 33. In other cases police do not mark the end of the 
caution as clearly. However Police seem to treat the caution and the following 
interview differently. Although police say ‘you don’t have to answer 
questions’, they do not seem to view this as applying to questions about 
understanding during the caution, sometimes insisting that suspects answer 
those questions.22 
1.4 Data 
This study includes two kinds of data. The first is 33 caution 
conversation transcripts, most of which are incomplete. Information about 
these conversations is summarised in Appendix 6.3, where the following 
information is given for each transcript where known: suspect name, source 
                                                 
 
22 In some cases, (including Jako 1997 and Cumaiyi 2003) suspects fail to respond to questions 
about whether they understand the caution, or give answers which might mean that they do not 
want to answer. Police sometimes insist on answers and/or continue to ask comprehension-
checking questions, implying they may not view these incidents as attempted exercises of the 
right to silence. This could be because the ‘questions’ which do not require answers are seen to 
be substantive questions about the crime, not comprehension questions. This thesis focuses on 
how police explain the caution, rather than how they test comprehension. Evaluation of different 
kinds of evidence about suspect understanding, including attempted exercises of the right to 
silence, is a topic for further analysis. 
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document, interview date and location, suspect age and L1, charge(s), and the 
court’s decision about the caution. 
The second kind of data is broadly described as ‘translations’ of the 
caution, and consists of 10 complete paraphrases, front-translations or 
translations plus other sources which contain aspects of paraphrase relevant to 
the caution. These sources and related documents are summarised in 
Appendix 6.4. 
1.4.1 Transcripts of cautions in recorded interviews 
This study examines transcripts of recorded cautions from (public) court 
judgements where the caution was in issue. Judges are sometimes required to 
decide whether recorded interviews containing confessions should be admitted 
as evidence in a criminal trial against the suspect, and the content of the 
caution conversation is frequently relevant to this decision (Douglas 1998). 
Accordingly, court decisions often reproduce transcripts of the caution 
conversation. The extent to which the caution and other exchanges are included 
reflects the judge’s assessment of what was relevant. 
This study is unlikely to involve a representative sample of caution 
conversations with Aboriginal suspects who encounter the criminal justice 
process, because cases contested in court (and therefore examined in this study) 
tend to involve serious offences (in which the evidence is examined more 
carefully), and/or cautions which appeared to defence lawyers to be defective. 
Linguists or other experts are occasionally involved in these cases, but only if 
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engaged by lawyers.23 Two police officers appear to each be involved in more 
than one caution in this study (though this is not entirely clear), which could 
make the sample somewhat less representative of police practice. 
Thirty three transcripts are studied, but many include only parts of the 
caution. It is not always clear whether published transcripts start from the 
beginning of the caution, but this can be identified where there is a transition 
from another topic to the caution. I also study three complete cautions 
transcribed for Conversation Analysis by McLaughlin (1996). Cautions in this 
thesis relate to cases in the NT Supreme Court, NT Court of Summary 
Jurisdiction (now called the NT Local Court) and the NT Youth Justice 
Court.24 
Police explain rights and information other than the right to silence, 
which could be described as ‘cautions’, for example whether the suspect is 
under arrest or not, the right to notify someone, the right to have a ‘prisoner’s 
friend’ in the interview, and so on. These matters are not the focus of this study 
                                                 
 
23 Examples of expert linguist involvement in cases in this study include Todd, Anthony and 
Moonlight (1995), all of which were described by McLaughlin (1996) after some involvement 
in the legal process, and Rankin (1998). A recent example from outside the NT is WA v Gibson 
[2014] WASC 240. 
24 Some additional rules apply in the Youth Justice Court but these do not obviously affect the 
analysis of conversations in this study: see eg Youth Justice Act (NT) ss 15, 18. The most 
prominent requirement is that the youth must not be interviewed without a support person 
present. 
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because they are less critical to the interview process and less frequently 
reported by courts. 
Suspects’ rights are also discussed outside the interview room. Shortly 
after arrest police deliver a “section 140” caution,25 containing the right to 
silence, usually recorded on a handheld recorder in a cell. This caution may be 
less thorough than the main caution delivered with the interview, but in some 
cases, section 140 conversations are considered by courts (and reported, 
making their way into this study) because they are relevant to suspects’ 
understanding of the caution. 
A problem for the close study of language is that the quality and origin of 
court transcripts is unclear. Legal and police transcripts have been criticised for 
omitting hesitations and disfluencies (Eades 1994:243), and being inaccurate 
(Bucholtz 2000). Many transcripts in this study do record hesitations and 
incomplete sentences, perhaps reflecting the careful linguistic analysis that 
courts engage in. In some cases, judges comment on gesture and potential 
inaccuracies in transcripts. However it cannot be assumed that all transcripts 
have been carefully made. Transcripts generally exclude gesture, eye gaze, 
intonation, and pauses, all of which can be important for the interpretation of 
interaction and speech. The three transcripts from McLaughlin (1996) are more 
                                                 
 
25 Because it is intended to comply with section 140 of the Police Administration Act (NT). 
Section 141 requires recording of the conversation. 
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detailed and reliable (transcription conventions are reproduced in 
Appendix 6.2). 
The focus of this study is on what police say in English, however some 
cautions in this study involve interpreters or interpreting by another person 
such as a ‘prisoner’s friend’ (a support person, often a family member of the 
suspect). There is now a professional NT Aboriginal Interpreter Service, but 
untrained interpreting can create doubt about the accuracy of the interpretation 
and ambiguity about whether the interpreter is advising and supporting the 
suspect or conveying what police say (Cooke 2009a).26 The nature of the 
transcripts does not allow interpreting to be examined (though back-
translations are sometimes included), and I will avoid assumptions about what 
was said in languages that are not transcribed. 
Quotes from cautions will be identified by the italicised name or initials 
of the suspect, and the year of the interview. In many cases the interview 
happened in a different year to the court decision, and quotes from judgements 
will be identified with the (italicised) name attached to the judgement, and the 
year in which it was delivered. Speaker names are included in transcripts, or if 
not known, initials are used for suspects and P for police. I have also corrected 
spelling errors in the transcripts where no phonological insight is affected. 
                                                 
 
26 Anunga (1976:414) suggested that an interpreter might be a suitable prisoner’s friend, but this 
was decades before a professional interpreter service existed (see Lawrie 1999). 
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1.4.2 Translation: linking text and audience? 
A second type of data considered in this thesis is what can broadly be 
called ‘translations’ of the caution. A recommended alternative to spontaneous 
paraphrase (Communication of Rights Group 2015:3) is a pre-written 
paraphrase, addressing known difficulties based on some approach to language 
and communication. Related to written paraphrase is “front-translation” 
(Cooke 1998:312), an English text designed to be suitable for translation into a 
target language or language group, and possibly, easier for speakers of that 
language to understand in English (ARDS, NAAJA & AIS 2015). 
This study examines written paraphrases, front-translations and 
translations of the caution designed for Aboriginal people in the NT. Unlike 
caution conversations, these are not spontaneous language but recorded oral 
texts or written texts. This study is about how police explain the caution, and 
uses translations for comparison, rather than to evaluate whether translations 
are effective for communicating with actual suspects in actual conversations. 
Any transformation of a text involves choices of language and decisions 
to include and exclude content. Converting legal language to plain English 
arguably requires it to be more precise and exposes ambiguities (Adler 
2012:71). Translations of the caution are consistently longer than the original 
text, and seem to reveal content which is implied by the caution but which 
translators may consider was not obvious to the target audience. Translators 
may have insight from knowledge of Aboriginal languages (and in some cases 
being Aboriginal people), and potentially from testing the translations during 
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their development. Additional content and language may be required because 
when cultures are very different and lack a shared “conceptual framework”, 
paraphrastic explication may not be possible and communicators may have to 
resort to explanation (Cooke 1998:63). 
Making the caution available in Aboriginal languages is probably the 
best way to improve its accessibility. It might be expected that good 
translations (plus versions of the caution in English) will make police 
explanation redundant, however this does not appear to be the practice. Most 
translations or recordings of the caution are called ‘preambles’, because police 
will still administer the caution themselves in compliance with Anunga 
guideline 3 (Cooke 1998:194; Aboriginal Interpreter Service 2017; Robinson 
2010). Over-reliance on recorded translations could “gloss over the problem of 
understanding” and “merely legitimise the charade of the Caution” 
(McLaughlin 1996:55). It is not possible to produce a perfect translation or 
explanation of the caution or a version which will guarantee understanding 
(Cotterill 2000), particularly given variation within and between Aboriginal 
languages. 
The 2015 translations, currently in use, are recordings in 18 Aboriginal 
languages which can be played on police iPads, with English subtitles. They 
aim to increase suspect understanding and reduce the frequency of legal 
challenges of interviews (Aboriginal Interpreter Service 2017). 
Many translation sources, in addition to text or a recording in an 
Aboriginal language, include English text. It is not always clear whether 
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English texts are front-translations (used to produce the translations) or back-
translations (a translation from the other language back to English). In some 
cases I have included and identified my own back-translation. In quotes from 
translations, I gloss Djambarrpuyngu language following Wilkinson (1991) and 
Greatorex & Charles Darwin University (2014). Kriol glosses follow Lee 
(2014). 
1.5 Unsuccessful cautions as a window on equality of 
outcomes 
1.5.1 Putting suspects in an equal position 
The caution, required to be said to every suspect before interviewing, 
potentially ensures a basic level of equality in awareness of rights. The 
justification for the right to silence in Australian law is unclear (and it is not a 
constitutional right, unlike other jurisdictions), however it is arguably related to 
(among others) the presumption of innocence and the privilege against self-
incrimination (O’Sullivan 2007). The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights links these two ideas with equality before the law.27 
                                                 
 
27 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res 2200A (XXI), UN GAOR, UN 
Doc A/6316 (1966), entered into force 23 March 1976, Article 14: “1. All persons shall be equal 
before the courts and tribunals... 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right 
to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. … everyone shall be entitled to 
the following minimum guarantees, in full equality: … (g) not to be compelled to testify against 
himself, or to confess guilt”. 
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The variability of context between speakers and situations is a problem 
for the law’s expectation that the same information can be delivered “again and 
again” by the caution (Rock 2007:25). NT law does not assume that the same 
treatment is appropriate for all suspects; the Anunga Guidelines require 
significantly more of police when explaining the caution to NNS Aboriginal 
suspects and “are designed simply to remove or obviate some of the 
disadvantages from which Aboriginal people suffer in their dealings with 
police” (1976:415). There is a history of Aboriginal people being punished 
under laws they may be uninformed about, potentially being unaware of their 
rights under those laws (Coombs 1985). Anunga probably established a 
‘difference’ approach to communication in the legal system, recognising that 
different communication strategies are often required with Aboriginal suspects 
and perhaps making institutions more “hospitable to diversity” (Rampton 
2001). 
Failure to successfully adjust institutions’ communication practices in 
recognition of sociolinguistic variation may aggravate disadvantage that 
suspects already face. For example, attempts by US interviewees to invoke 
rights using hedged language such as “I think I will talk to a lawyer” are often 
deemed legally ineffective (Ainsworth 2008:9). Hedging is more likely to be 
used by people who are relationally powerless (ibid), which may mean that 
socially disadvantaged people face additional barriers to benefiting from legal 
protection, because of ways that US courts interpret language. 
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The ‘difference approach’ to Aboriginal people in the legal system has 
been critiqued as ignoring or even obscuring power relations as a factor in 
communication (Eades 2008:32). Studies of interaction can reveal the 
negotiation and exercise of power (Heydon 2005; Haworth 2006), and some 
critical sociolinguistics approaches argue that small-scale interactional power 
relations constitute and are the same thing as larger structural power dynamics 
(Eades 2008). The caution is concerned with limiting power (to require 
answers to questions) in the interview room, and this study investigates how 
the caution may achieve that outcome, also noting ways in which suspect 
perceptions of the role and authority of police might influence understanding of 
the caution. 
Broad questions about what the caution is supposed to achieve are 
exposed by the study of meaning and inference, because it is not clear what 
content the caution is intended or required to convey. These policy questions 
can be informed by linguistic analysis, but also require consideration of the 
objectives of the caution and the legal system as they apply to Aboriginal 
people. 
1.5.2 Cautions in this study 
The study of relatively unsuccessful cautions in this study may reveal 
whether mitigating inequality through language is a realistic strategy. 
Undoubtedly, for some suspects (Aboriginal or not) the caution presents few 
difficulties and the conversation in which it is explained may be short and 
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straightforward. However if the caution’s role is to place suspects in a 
reasonably equal position, then it needs to work for suspects who are 
disadvantaged, including by linguistic and cultural distance from the Anglo-
Australian justice system. Otherwise, the caution and the right to silence may 
benefit ‘professional criminals’ (Leng 1994) and native English speakers, while 
feeding the “accumulation of disadvantage” Aboriginal people face in the 
justice system (Cunneen 2001:35). Of course, problems identified in relation to 
Aboriginal suspects may also apply to non-Aboriginal English-speaking 
suspects (Heydon 2005), though not always to the same extent. 
The caution process may be acceptable if unsuccessful cautions cause 
rejection of interviews, however this requires an effective and consistent 
mechanism to test understanding. Only a small number of caution cases are 
actually tested by courts, and there is some evidence that even when it is 
doubtful a suspect understands his/her rights, police may take a chance and 
interview the suspect anyway because if the interview is ultimately excluded 
police are no worse off (Criminal Justice Commission (Qld) n.d.:669). 
However it is also my experience that NT police sometimes terminate 
interviews recognising that the caution could not be communicated 
successfully. This was seen in Rankin (1998), where the first interview was 
abandoned at the caution stage and an interpreter engaged. 
Police may not know at the outset whether a suspect will readily 
understand the caution, so this study may discover strategies that police use to 
explain the caution generally. In unsuccessful cases, police may then try more 
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variations on the caution language hoping to overcome miscommunication. It 
is in these difficult cases that better approaches to caution language are most 
needed. 
1.6 Structure 
This thesis attempts to understand how police explain the caution and 
how suspects understand it. Police explanations of the caution are produced in 
an interactional context, and Chapter 2 considers the caution as a speech 
activity. It investigates the relationship between suspects’ understanding of 
‘what is happening’ in the conversation and understanding the meaning of the 
caution, as well as the context available to suspects to develop that 
understanding. 
In conversations, police produce numerous utterances about the caution, 
which have relationships with each other and together build up some meaning. 
Chapter 3 examines the iterative process through which police paraphrase and 
explain the caution, and asks how meaning evolves across discourse. 
Having examined the interactional and discursive setting in which police 
language is used, Chapter 4 considers the meaning of specific language used to 
explain the caution and how suspects may infer the caution’s meaning from 
that language. This analysis reveals some evidence about what suspects 
understand, as well as identifying meaning underlying the caution and 
evaluating how effectively different paraphrases may express that meaning. 
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2 Context, purpose and interaction  
2.1 An uncooperative activity? 
The caution is an attempt to get things done with language. It can be 
considered an activity, meaning “work that is achieved across a sequence or 
series of sequences as a unit or course of action … a relatively sustained 
topically coherent and/or goal-coherent course of action” (Heritage & Sorjonen 
1994:4). This definition does not presuppose that goals are shared between the 
participants in the activity or that the work to be achieved is equally 
meaningful to them. It is often claimed that communication is ‘cooperative’, 
however this should be distinguished from more technical claims that hearers 
interpret utterances based on an assumption that the speaker intends to be 
cooperative (Davies 2007). These claims are often about everyday 
conversation, but the caution activity may be different for three reasons: it is 
institutional, (in this study) it involves NNS suspects, and it has two audiences. 
Grice (1989:26) argues that “each participant recognizes … to some 
extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted 
direction.” As a result, speakers will be expected to make their “conversational 
contribution such as is required … by the accepted purpose or direction of the 
talk” – the ‘Cooperative Principle’ (ibid). Grice recognises that the extent to 
which purposes are shared will vary, and (ibid:39) that speakers can opt out of 
the Cooperative Principle. Clark argues that speakers in everyday conversation, 
in order to contribute to discourse, “try to establish for each utterance the 
mutual belief that the addressees have understood what the speaker meant well 
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enough for current purposes” (1992:144). While Clark’s speakers act 
unilaterally, they produce utterances aimed at accumulating “common ground”. 
Clark acknowledges (1992:140) that participants can be more or less sincere in 
performing the acceptance of contributions. Both approaches involve a degree 
of purpose which speakers orient to, however some critiques argue that 
accounts like Grice’s do not describe communication in situations such as 
police interviews where there is a power imbalance (Harris 1995). 
In contrast, Relevance Theory provides an account of the interpretation 
of utterances without assuming that participants in communication necessarily 
have a Gricean common purpose or mutually accepted direction (Sperber & 
Wilson 1995:161), arguing instead that the only purpose communicators need 
to share is “to have the communicator’s informative intention recognised by 
the audience”. Shared knowledge of a purpose is, for Sperber & Wilson, only 
one contextual factor, but one which makes understanding easier by creating 
shared contextual assumptions. Communicators are normally interested in 
knowing whether their informative intention has been fulfilled, and if this 
interest is recognised by participants, it may create an expectation that the 
hearer will provide some response about his/her understanding (1995:62). 
Relevance Theory argues that interpretation of utterances is driven by 
relevance, which is achieved by balancing the cognitive effort required for 
interpretation with the cognitive outcomes (changes to the hearer’s 
assumptions about the world) resulting from interpretation (Sperber & Wilson 
1995:125). 
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I will adopt a Relevance Theory approach and question, rather than 
assuming, whether there is a mutually accepted direction or purpose against 
which speakers measure understanding. This approach is particularly 
appropriate for institutional interaction, where professionals and lay people 
start with different understandings. Professionals have institutional goals, and 
are likely to develop standard practices through repetition of activities (Drew & 
Heritage 1992), but habituation may mean it is not obvious to them that 
outsiders are unaware of institutional purposes, and/or that institutional 
language may be difficult to interpret without a knowledge of those purposes. 
A meaningful question is whether the suspect collaborates with the progression 
of routinised institutional interaction, or resists (Drew & Heritage 1992:44). 
Suspects have no real choice about the caution’s direction, and some of them 
may accept that direction and collaborate, or resist (Newbury & Johnson 2006), 
while in other cases the required direction may not even be understood. 
For a NNS communicator, shared understanding may be reduced and 
institutional goals may be even less obvious. NS-NNS communication has 
been argued to require a higher degree of cooperation to overcome linguistic 
limitations and construct utterances as part of a coherent text (Knox 1994). 
However Foster-Cohen (2004) points to evidence in NS-NNS communication 
that speakers engage in individual efforts to solve problems or pursue 
individual goals rather than necessarily pursuing joint goals, arguing that 
Relevance Theory can account for these individuals’ communicative efforts 
without presupposing cooperation, in contrast with Clark’s approach. 
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A further reason why participants in the caution may not share goals is 
the ‘two-audience problem’, which introduces tension between the policy 
objective of actual suspect understanding and what courts will accept as 
evidence of apparent understanding in conversation. Aside from 
communicating with each other, participants (if they have two-audience 
awareness) may be motivated by how the conversation will appear on the 
recording. If police could induce the suspect to say things that create the 
appearance of comprehension, this might be a rational (if not ethical) way to 
meet their objectives. 
So the question is whether the caution exchange transitions from an 
institutional activity whose objectives and practices are familiar to police to a 
joint activity whose goals are known to suspects, giving them the possibility of 
collaborating with those goals. Understanding the activity is likely to affect 
suspects’ ability to infer how individual utterances relate to the progress of the 
activity, and therefore suspects’ ability to contextualise the meaning of those 
utterances and the meaning of the caution.  
2.2 Context and relevance 
Given that police start with the knowledge about what the caution is and 
how its steps unfold, we can ask to what extent police share that knowledge 
using language. Police can choose to say things which increase the amount of 
context accessible to suspects for interpreting the caution. Context can be 
defined as a set of premises used to interpret an utterance, a subset of the 
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hearer’s assumptions about the world (Sperber & Wilson 1995:15). It is likely 
that every utterance is linguistically underdetermined (Carston 2002), so 
hearers use context to interpret every utterance they encounter. Context is not 
limited to ideas which a speaker has in mind but includes facts which are 
manifest, meaning perceptible or inferable from observation or existing 
knowledge (Sperber & Wilson 1995). The set of facts manifest to a person is 
that person’s cognitive environment (ibid:39). Clark (1992), instead of focusing 
on individual cognitive environments, models communication in terms of 
“common ground”, meaning knowledge, beliefs and suppositions that speakers 
share. The question of how speakers can determine what is shared between 
them is critical, and they may take common ground to include, for example, 
previous utterances in the conversation, information available due to physical 
co-presence (such as objects in the immediate environment), and community 
membership (Clark 1992:69). 
Of course, speakers will never share exactly the same assumptions about 
what their common ground is (Clark 1992:68), and contexts are ambiguous and 
overlap with each other both inside and outside the discourse (Linell 1998). 
Sperber & Wilson argue that it can be manifest that particular information is 
shared, including when it is part of the immediate physical environment, and 
such information is “mutually manifest” or part of a “mutual cognitive 
environment” (1995:41). Arguably, every person’s cognitive environment 
overlaps to greater or lesser degree with every other person’s (Carston 
2002:68), assuming that at minimum they share “background”, knowledge 
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common to humanity about matters such as walking and eating (Searle 1980). 
However information can be more or less manifest and more or less relevant 
(Sperber & Wilson 1995). Important questions for the caution include the 
extent of shared context between the participants, mechanisms for determining 
what is shared, and how common ground is accumulated. The caution does not 
seem to draw on easy sources of shared context: not much is physically 
observable in the interview room other than the participants and the recording 
equipment, and the participants are not members of the same community. 
Sperber & Wilson (1995) recognise that hearers have multiple, contexts, 
which may be organised and retrieved in ‘chunks’, some more accessible than 
others. One way of modelling different kinds of context is hierarchical levels 
like those proposed by Cronen, Johnson, & Lannamann (1982). 
Table (2): hierarchy of context (adapted from Cronen et al. 1982) 
Cultural patterns: broad patterns of social order orienting individual 
experiences and legitimising ways of knowing and acting. 
Life scripts: a participant’s concept of self. 
Relationship: participants’ sense of the relationship between them, perhaps 
reflecting their experience of past interactions. 
Speech events (episodes): sequences of interaction which participants see as 
bounded, composed of speech acts. 
Speech acts: each performance of an utterance with a recognisable intention. 
Content: what is said as part of individual speech acts. 
 
Cronen et al (1982) argue that these levels of meaning can provide context for 
each other, in ways which will differ among individuals. For example a warm, 
friendly relationship may form context for an episode of teasing, leading a 
hearer to interpret the intent of a particular speech act as humorous rather than 
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insulting, an interpretation not attributable to the words or manner of delivery 
of that speech act itself. Conversely, an episode may jeopardise a relationship 
between two people because one reinterprets the other’s past actions in light of 
that episode (ibid). Ultimately, events and relationships are constituted by 
individual speech acts (and behaviour), so it must be the case that these smaller 
units can build up context for higher levels. However a single unusual speech 
act is unlikely to cause an immediate re-evaluation of a long-standing 
relationship for example, so it may be that speakers reconsider higher levels of 
context incrementally or only when countervailing context accumulates a 
particular weight. 
Even if levels of context are interpreted loosely, it is useful to model 
context as residing at different levels of generality, potentially predicting how 
long different types of context will remain relevant. There will be many speech 
acts in a speech event and many speech events in a relationship between two 
people, whereas life scripts and cultural patterns may remain somewhat 
constant context for many relationships, events, and so on that a person 
experiences. Assumptions held by speakers at higher, more general levels may 
be more resistant to dislodgement by contradicting context. 
In relation to the sharedness of context, everything from the relationship 
level down to the content should be characterised by historical co-presence of 
the participants, so this may be assumed to be shared context, subject to 
language and action having been understood, as measured by techniques for 
monitoring the accumulation of common ground. Some cultural values, on the 
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other hand, are often incorrectly assumed by speakers to be universal, though 
many speakers have experience of other cultures. It is arguable that some 
Aboriginal people would need ‘bicultural competence’ to participate in a police 
interview (McLaughlin 1996). NT police on the other hand likely have some 
experience of Aboriginal cultures. 
The recognition that context includes social and personal factors like 
relationships, identity and culture may also help to avoid over-rationalisation 
which could otherwise result from modelling communication in terms of 
‘premises’ and ‘inferences’. Separate consideration of different levels of 
context can help to identify factors which may be relevant to the caution. For 
example, in some cases there may be no relationship history between the 
suspect and questioner. In other cases, they may have had previous interactions 
or the suspect may have been apprehended and arrested by the questioner hours 
before the interview. Alternatively, a suspect might consider past interactions 
with the police institution as forming relationship-type context (cf Anderson et 
al. 2008) and use that experience to interpret interactions with new police 
officers. On the other hand, police institutional processes, values and rules 
might be considered a kind of police cultural pattern. 
Most importantly, I will argue that the caution is concerned with context 
at the level of the episode or speech event. One police officer put it this way: 
Extract (3): Inkamala #2 (1995) 
Lade: You might think up here, “I don’t want to talk to that policeman about that 
trouble”. That’s your choice. Do you understand that? So you’ve just got to remember 
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that all the time that, “I don’t have to talk to this policeman. He can’t make me talk to 
you - to him”.  
Lade suggests the desired outcome of the caution is some thinking which 
should be remembered “all the time”. A suspect who keeps a version of the 
caution in mind all the time may use it as context for each speech act (question) 
which follows in the speech event (interview). Rather than speech acts being 
interpreted as ordinary questions which to some extent require answers, 
questions should be interpreted as subject to the right to silence such that 
answering is optional. To achieve this, the content of the caution, usually 
spread across multiple speech acts, must be accepted by the hearer as providing 
context for the interview speech event. 
The contents of a hearer’s context or cognitive environment also 
determines what is relevant for that hearer, because a relevant interpretation is 
one which generates positive cognitive outcomes (changes to context) for the 
hearer, with a reasonable investment of cognitive effort (Sperber & Wilson 
1995). 
In ordinary conversation, inability to find a relevant interpretation with 
an acceptable investment of cognitive resources might lead a hearer to request 
clarification (Heritage & Clayman 2011:22); however suspects have limited 
opportunities to do this in police interviews because police initiate adjacency 
pairs, with rare exceptions (Heydon 2005:97). Among many factors, the stress 
of the police interview (Davis et al. 2011) may reduce the cognitive resources 
available to process utterances. If a hearer thinks a message contains 
“deliberate and unnecessary obscurity”, the hearer may doubt genuine 
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communication is intended and justifiably refuse to make the processing effort 
(Sperber & Wilson 1995:157). Ordinarily the hearer expects the speaker to 
avoid this outcome by being informative. 
However, assumptions about relevance may operate differently in 
difficult intercultural situations. Interpretation of implicature in English by 
NNS has been found to differ from NS interpretation, especially where 
knowledge of culture was identifiably involved in the implicature (Bouton 
1992, 1988). More specific to the kind of speakers involved in this study, 
studies of interactions between NT Aboriginal people and medical staff have 
found serious miscommunication which was under-recognised by medical staff 
(Lowell et al. 2012; Anderson et al. 2008; Cass et al. 2002). These medical 
studies are instructive because there are relatively few accounts of what 
Aboriginal people actually think about interactions with non-Aboriginal 
professionals (Habibis et al. 2016). Some patients thought staff were 
deliberately withholding information about their health (Anderson et al. 2008) 
even speculating that staff were ‘hiding the stories’ because they would make 
more money if sickness got worse (Lowell et al. 2012:206). 
The inference that staff were ‘hiding the stories’ is, on one view, 
predicted by Sperber & Wilson (1995:274): where it is mutually manifest that a 
speaker is knowledgeable about a topic, but the speaker produces an utterance 
which is not as informative as it could be, this generates a (non-Gricean) 
implicature that the speaker is reluctant to reveal more information and may 
express “a refusal to cooperate”. The informativeness of the utterance depends 
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on how it is targeted to the hearer’s context; and in the studies above, medical 
staff overestimated patients’ knowledge about non-Aboriginal biomedicine 
(Lowell et al. 2012; Anderson et al. 2008; Cass et al. 2002), suggesting 
relevant information was left out. If it appeared that speakers were 
uninformative and uncooperative, it is perhaps not surprising that Aboriginal 
patients speculated about ulterior motives for withholding information. 
When an utterance is produced, it carries a presumption of relevance, an 
implied assertion by the speaker that to the best of the speaker’s knowledge, it 
is worth processing (Sperber & Wilson 1995:156). Accordingly, hearers will 
ordinarily work quite hard to find a relevant interpretation of the utterance. 
However if new information cannot be connected to any currently accessible 
context, it is ‘irrelevant’ and there is no point, and no pathway, to interpreting 
it. For NNS, inability to process language may make it harder to find a relevant 
interpretation. In addition, experience of unsuccessful communication may 
shape a hearer’s relationship with speakers and institutions (relationship-level 
context), potentially affecting the hearer’s expectations about the 
informativeness of future language, and how hard the hearer will work to 
interpret future language from those sources. Sometimes, hearers may end up 
with no relevant interpretation of an utterance. 
In caution conversations suspects do not seem to speak freely enough to 
reveal what kinds of context affect their interpretations. However ARDS 
(2007) reported that Yolngu people had significant distrust of the non-
Aboriginal legal system and police, and felt that non-Aboriginal people lacked 
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respect for Yolngu people and law. This kind of distrust could affect suspects’ 
assumptions about how informative police intend to be, similar to the above 
mistrust towards medical staff. ARDS (2007) also found significant 
misunderstandings about legal concepts including the caution. We can also ask 
how much police know about suspects’ cognitive environments. Police may 
know little about a suspect at the start of an interview (Rock 2007), and have 
limited opportunities to find out, though police ask some questions about 
suspects’ backgrounds, and comprehension checks attempt to find out what 
suspects know about the caution. Police may wrongly estimate how difficult 
utterances are for suspects to process and whether suspects have sufficient 
context to interpret utterances. 
I will now consider ways in which police can, and to some extent do, 
provide context for the caution. 
2.3 Framing and announcements 
One way police may provide context for the caution is by framing it 
(Goffman 1974, 1981). By marking the beginning of the caution and also 
saying something about what they are about to say, police can set up 
“structures of expectations” (Tannen 1993:16). Rock (2007:224) found that 
framing may be used for “marking, dividing and solemnifying” a caution. 
Police in Rock’s study believed that this function was meaningful for suspects, 
marking an “official starting point”. 
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Topics that police must address (including the caution) are dictated by 
requirements and procedures determined outside the interview (discussed 
at 1.1). The caution may have no identifiable connection to the topic which 
precedes it. While police may have the interactional licence to disjunctively 
change topic (Heydon 2005:111), a sudden transition into the caution might 
leave the caution in an unmanageably ambiguous position in the discourse. 
Russell (2000:41) suggests that police felt the need to “announce” the caution 
with metalanguage because they lacked confidence in its illocutionary force, 
noting that they employed “read-aloud” delivery which may sound “unnatural” 
and therefore may make the intention of the caution unclear. An announcement 
may provide a link into the caution and orient the suspect to features of the talk 
which will follow. 
The following example, already seen in extract (1), includes two 
‘announcements’: 
Extract (4): Dumoo (1996) 
1. Lindsay: Now Basil do you agree that before we started this talk I took the plastic 
off these three cassette tapes? 
2. Dumoo: Yeah. 
3. Lindsay: And I put them in that machine. 
4. Dumoo: Yes. 
5. Lindsay: And do you agree this machine’s now working? 
6. Dumoo: Yeah. 
7. Lindsay: Now I advise you Basil that our conversation is being recorded on this 
machine and when we’re finished I’ll give you one of the tapes. Do you 
understand that? 
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8. Dumoo: Yes. 
9. Lindsay: Now Basil I want to talk to you about some grog, some liquor that was 
taken into the restricted area on Wednesday night. Do you understand that? 
10. Dumoo: Yeah. 
11. Lindsay: Before we go any further I’ll advise you that you don’t have to talk to 
me if you don’t want to. Do you understand that? 
12. Dumoo: Yeah. 
The announcement in line 11 suggests that the interview cannot “go any 
further” until the ‘advising’ (the caution) is complete. Notably, Lindsay uses 
the future tense to refer to ‘advising’ which he then does straight away. This 
can be contrasted with the announcement in line 7 which does not have a 
before clause and where advise is in the present tense. Perhaps in line 11 
Lindsay anticipated the caution continuing over multiple turns, whereas the 
advice in line 7 was contained in one turn and Lindsay did not intend it to take 
any longer. The qualification “before we go any further” probably implies that 
Lindsay will not proceed with his intention to “talk to you about some grog” 
(line 9)28 until the advising is complete. Lindsay’s three ‘do you understand?’ 
tags may also foreground that understanding is a goal of the caution, further 
discussed at 2.3.2. 
                                                 
 
28 To be precise, Linsday said “I want to talk to you”, expressing volition. If he had said “I will 
question you”, this could be criticised for suggesting that the questioning is inevitable and 
obscuring Dumoo’s right to make a choice before questioning happens. So on one view of the 
regulatory framework, Lindsay’s wording was the most appropriate, even though it was not 
explicit about the intention to ask the questions in the near future. 
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Conversation (4) shows that Lindsay revealed something about the 
structure and goals of the caution at its outset. This does not guarantee, 
however, that Dumoo then knew what to expect. Dumoo only responds with 
“yes” or “yeah”, exercising no apparent agency and merely consenting to the 
progress of steps in the caution. 
Some cautions include pre-announcements: 
Extract (5): Todd (1995) 
1. P1: we- we’re gonna ask you some questions/ .. ok? 
2. Todd: {[low]yeah]  
3. P1: ==alright/  
 and ah,. .I’ll I’ll go into it a bit more but  
 .. yo-you don’t have to answer  
 =any of our questions/  
 .. unless you wish to do so 
 ==do you understand that as well?  
 .. .I’ll explain that a bit more to you  
 in a minute too//  
 ... um, .. (are) you currently / .. *drunk?  
 <3.2> at this particular moment? 
4. Todd: ==nah:: [shake] 
In line 1 of (5), P1 identifies a future step in the conversation. Extract (5) may 
contribute to framing the caution because P1 says “I’ll go into it a bit more” 
and “I’ll explain that a bit more to you”, foreshadowing detailed explanation. 
However, the pre-announcement in line 3 is brief and disjunctive. P1 asked 
about Todd’s understanding but then moved on without an answer to ask “are 
you currently drunk?”. Questions about intoxication and health are another 
component of the Anunga guidelines (to ensure the suspect is in a fit state to 
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undertake an interview), and (5) shows how police must manage numerous 
topic changes before they can start the substantive interview. As in (4), P1 
reveals something about the caution, but it is doubtful whether this is enough to 
orient an unfamiliar suspect to what will happen. 
2.3.1 Understanding vs formality 
Other announcements in this study are varied but reveal two broad 
patterns: an explaining–understanding frame and a formality–requirement 
frame.  
Of the transcripts in this study involving a clear transition from another 
topic to the caution, only three did not include a clear announcement. In those 
cases, the first speech act containing the caution was introduced with now. In 
18 conversations, there was a clear announcement. 
As seen in lines 9-11 of (4), announcements typically follow a statement 
about the topic of the interview in a separate turn. Announcements typically 
have three elements: 
Table (6): Announcements 
Orientation to 
structure of 
interview 
Allusion to 
requirement or 
formality 
Description of speech 
act or required 
outcome 
Source 
but before we can 
talk to you about 
that, 
I need to give you that caution 
again. 
Lawrence 
#1 (2016) 
before either myself 
or Agent Adams 
speaks with you or 
ask you any 
questions, 
you must understand that BM #2 
(2014) 
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 I’ll just also 
formally 
advise you that Age #1 
(2010) 
now before – um – 
myself or constable 
Cox talk – ask you 
any questions in 
relation to the – um 
– the matter that 
matter – the death of 
– ah – Matthew 
Walker, 
I’m obliged to tell you that Age #2 
(2010) 
but before we do that  I need to make sure that you 
understand your right 
as a person, ok, very 
important, alright 
Jawrarla 
(2006) 
but before I get you 
to talk to me about 
that 
I’ll explain to you that Cumaiyi 
(2003) 
Before we go any 
further 
I’ll advise you that Dumoo 
(1998) 
now before you 
make any other 
comment  
I have to advise you again as 
you were advised last 
night that 
Spencer #2 
(1998) 
before I ask you any 
questions about that 
matter 
I have to tell you that Jako 
(1997) 
well again – um – 
Howard, 
we'll have to  inform you that Echo #2 
(1996) 
now before we talk 
about that  
I want you to know some 
very important things. 
You’ve got to listen 
very carefully to what 
I say next. okay? all 
right? now you 
listening to what I’m 
saying? 
Inkamala 
#2 (1995) 
now before I ask you 
any questions about 
these matters  
I have to  caution you that Marrmowa 
(1994) 
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and before we go 
any further, 
I must tell you that Mangaraka 
#2 (1994) 
 
The relative uniformity of the above announcements over 22 years is 
surprising. There appears to be no requirement in law or in Police General 
Orders to announce the caution, however police may be following a ‘script’, a 
written plan for the interview including the caution, which may be an aide-
memoire or have some status as a police-internal policy. This is not transparent 
to the researcher. 
Most announcements focus on the speaker and the speech act (“I have to 
tell you”), however some focus on the suspect and the outcome (“you must 
understand”). Speech act verbs used in announcements range from tell 
(nonspecific) to advise, which suggests that the caution contains useful 
information, and explain which suggests the police intend to convey 
information effectively. Many announcements use modals (have to, must, need 
to), which will be further discussed at 4.1, and some use the future tense (‘ll) 
which may have some modal meaning. As discussed above, future tense may 
foreshadow the expected duration of the caution, hinting at the complexity of 
the activity. It is notable that future tense was also used with Age and Echo 
where there was no before qualification. 
“I want you to know some very important things [etc]” leaves little doubt 
for Inkamala that the caution is important and the speaker wants Inkamala to 
understand it. However a larger number of announcements included statements 
like “I’m obliged to tell you that”, describing procedural requirements, and 
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potentially distancing police from investment in the explanatory exercise. 
Heydon (2005:49), using Goffman’s (1974, 1981) participant frameworks, 
reasons that the phrase “I must inform you that” indicates that a police officer 
was animator only of the caution. That is, despite saying the words, the police 
officer is neither the author of the caution text nor the principal requiring its 
use and taking responsibility for its content. This may establish a contrast 
between the first presentation of the caution, preceded by an announcement, 
and subsequent reformulations in which police can assume authorship (Rock 
2007:144). 
The idea that police deliver the caution because it is required could be 
interpreted to mean that the speaker is disinterested and the caution is a mere 
formality. Chief Justice Martin said of the conversation below that “[t]he 
attempted caution was cast in the mould of an afterthought, some formality that 
must be undertaken” (Echo 1996:[10]). 
Extract (7): Echo #2 (1996) 
1. Baird: Okay. Now, are you happy or do you want to tell us about the - some other 
things that happened? 
2. Echo: (inaudible). 
3. Baird: Partake in a - in another interview? 
4. Echo: Yeah. 
5. Baird: Sorry? 
6. Echo: Yeah. 
7. Baird: Okay. Aright. Well again - um - Howard, we'll have to inform you that - 
that you don't have to because as - as -  as Senior Constable Blanch did.  Okay. 
Anything you do say will be recorded and may later be used in evidence.  Do you 
understand that? 
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Line 7 announces the caution, incompletely refers to a previous caution, and 
delivers an “attempted caution”, failing to express the right to silence. The 
‘mere formality’ interpretation is supported by Baird’s apparent lack of focus 
on the caution and the incompleteness of his language, as well as the 
procedural announcement “we’ll have to inform you that”. The manner of oral 
delivery may also contribute to whether the caution is heard as a mere 
formality (Davis et al. 2011). 
Other announcements and cautions are more sincere and careful than 
Baird’s, and an alternative interpretation of announcements is that the caution 
is required because it is important, and it has something to do with external 
authority. There is no obvious evidence about how suspects understand 
references to formality in announcements. There is only one reference by 
police in this study to the existence of an external authority, which was not in 
an announcement: 
Extract (8): Marrmowa (1994) 
Potts: ... Okay I’ll explain the caution to you again, right, the law says that when you 
speak to police you don’t have to answer any of their questions that they ask. Okay, do 
you understand that? 
While it may be assumed by some suspects that police speak for the law when 
they deliver the caution, this depends on knowledge about the legal system 
(which suspects may lack, see 4.1.3). Potts alone among police in this study 
considered it worthwhile to clarify that the caution is about the law. 
The indirectness of police references to authority can be contrasted with 
front-translations, which make clear that the law is involved in the caution on 
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up to four different levels, set out in the table below. Though no single 
translation in this study refers to the law in all four ways, they are all 
reasonably accurate. 
Table (9): Roles of the law in the caution 
 Translation references to law Summary 
1 “Police think that maybe you broke the law. 
The police will ask you questions about this 
trouble.” (ARDS, NAAJA & AIS 2015) 
The reason for and subject of the 
interview is a possible offence 
against the law. 
2 “The law says that when police officers want 
to ask a suspect about breaking the law, the 
police officers must warn the suspect to think 
carefully about telling his story.” (ARDS 
2015, English text) 
The law requires the caution to 
be said. 
3 “Australian law says you can be quiet. You 
can sit and not talk.” (Mildren 1997:11) 
The caution contains information 
about the law. 
4 “the judge and other people in court … will 
listen to your words to decide if you did 
break the law or you didn’t break the law.” 
(ARDS et al. 2015, also English subtitles to 
2015 translations) 
The court process decides 
whether a crime has in fact been 
committed, potentially using the 
interview as evidence. 
 
Police announcements refer indirectly to the second level, however the 
requirement to say something does not by itself make that utterance important 
or anything more than a formality. The information in levels 3 and 4 makes it 
clear that the caution is important, and Potts’s clarification in (8) is about level 
3. It might be possible to infer relationships between the levels, for example 
that the law requires the caution to be said because it contains legal rules which 
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are relevant. However suspects may need to be familiar with non-Aboriginal 
law to make this kind of inference. The references to law in the above front-
translations provide context missing from police language which may make the 
‘unimportant formality’ frame a less likely interpretation. 
The clarification in (8) is one of many examples where police add 
additional context in later reformulations of the caution. Context is not limited 
to the announcement or the initial delivery of the caution, however these are 
key opportunities to frame the activity before confusion sets in. Introducing 
information later on may lead to uncertainty about its relationship to earlier 
statements, especially if the first version of the caution is viewed as carrying 
particular ‘authority’. This will be investigated further in Chapter 3. 
2.3.2 You understand. Do you understand? 
Police talk a lot about understanding. The two-audience problem means 
that some understanding talk may assist the suspect and some may be aimed at 
labelling evidence of apparent understanding for the recording. 
In conversation (4), Lindsay ended each of lines 7, 9 and 11 with “Do 
you understand?”. Understanding questions may not frame the caution in the 
sense of projecting expectations forward, but they are arguably frequent 
enough to form context by continually foregrounding understanding as a goal 
of the activity, consistent with some announcements. 
Another meaning of ‘do you understand?’ is shown by the following 
example: 
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Extract (10): Anthony (1995) 
1. P:  =d=-do you have to talk to me?  
2. Anthony: .. only if you want to// 
3. P:  sorry?  
4. Anthony: ah you ... [{high} yeah] 
5. P:  <2.2>do you have to talk to me?  
6. Anthony: ==sure<l.4>[{low} ah]  
7. P:     ... yes?  
  == no? alright// 
  d-do you understand, 
  .. do you understand 
  what I've told you? 
8. Anthony:  yeah// 
At line 2 Anthony appears to demonstrate confusion about the content of the 
caution. At line 6 Anthony not only answered the question incorrectly, but 
probably misunderstood it, giving an uncertain answer about agreement or 
intention when the question attempted to test his knowledge about obligation. 
Then at line 7, P asks “do you understand what I’ve told you?”. It is clear 
Anthony does not understand, and making him admit or deny it is probably 
face-threatening (Rock 2007) and unlikely to help Anthony’s comprehension. 
From 92 “do you understand” questions in this study there are only three clear 
negative answers,29 suggesting that they are not useful for actually 
                                                 
 
29 BM and Age said “no” or “nah” respectively in response to “do you understand that” questions 
followed by a proposition. Cumaiyi said “no” to “do you understand that?” at the end of a police 
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investigating understanding (Rock 2007:206; Mildren 1997; Eades 2010:137). 
The intention of line 7 is more likely to be about increasing the salience of 
understanding: ‘are you focusing on the issue of whether you’ve understood 
what I’ve told you?’. Given this pragmatic interpretation, P’s question has 
some potential to progress P’s goals (presumably to obtain evidence of 
apparent understanding). 
The above pragmatic interpretation may also explain the use of ‘you 
understand’ preceding a formulation of the caution, foregrounding 
understanding as the topic or desired outcome of the utterance. 
Extract (11): Cumaiyi (2003) 
1. Butcher: You sure you want to talk? 
2. Interpreter: (language)30 
3. Cumaiyi: (language) 
4. Interpreter: yeah 
5. Cumaiyi: Yeah 
6. Interpreter: I'll talk 
                                                 
 
turn. Rankin answered “no” to “Have you been – you understand what the job of the court is?”, 
but she could have been answering the partially expressed question ‘have you been to court’. 
There are also numerous inaudible or zero responses to ‘do you understand’ questions. In 
Russell’s (2000) study, all police said “do you understand” and all suspects said “yes”. In Rock’s 
(2007:206) study, 97% of detainees gave positive answers to this question and (unlike this study) 
none admitted complete incomprehension. 
30 In many transcripts, “language” means that something was said in a language other than 
English. 
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7. Butcher: Okay Dominic you understand that by asking you that I'm not making 
you talk, okay. If you wanna' talk its gotta be your free choice, your own will. 
In line 7 Butcher appears to be reconfirming that Cumaiyi’s willingness to talk 
is voluntary. The inclusion of “you understand” makes Butcher’s assertion that 
“I’m not making you talk” less overbearing: rather than asserting a state of 
affairs she focuses on Cumaiyi’s understanding of that state of affairs. Line 7 
appears to contain two declarative statements, but untranscribed intonation may 
have made them questions. 
Extract (12): Spencer (1998) 
1. Kelly: Okay. Now before you make any other comment I have to advise you again 
as you were advised last night that you do not have to say anything about any of 
this trouble unless you wish to do so. Do you understand that? 
2. Spencer: I do understand. 
3. Kelly: So you understand that you have a right to be silent and you don't have to 
answer questions from police? 
Line 3 reformulates the right to silence, but it may also claim to 
summarise what Spencer understands. Importantly, it is prefaced with so, 
which in police interviews can have a specialised role of evaluating and 
labelling previous discourse and leading the topic to its next logical phase, 
potentially combining pragmatic meaning with so’s semantic meaning of 
identifying a causal link between utterances (Johnson 2002). So in line 3 may 
suggest a causal link from Spencer’s claim of understanding to Kelly’s claim 
that Spencer understands the additional information in line 3, helping to 
construct Kelly’s turn as a confirmation-seeking question rather than an 
information-seeking question (Jones 2008; Newbury & Johnson 2006). The 
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repetition “Do you understand”, “So you understand” also helps to link Kelly’s 
two turns textually. 
Extract (13): Echo (1996) 
1. Baird: Okay. So can I if you don't want to say anything do you have to say 
anything? 
2. Echo: No. 
3. Baird: So you understand your right you don't have to say anything if you don't 
want to is that right? (Echo) 
In line 3 Baird uses so, and similar to Kelly’s utterance in (12), claims to 
draw a logical conclusion from prior talk. Both Kelly and Baird’s so-prefaced 
turns could be classified as upshots (Candlin & Maley 1994) because they go 
beyond summarising the previous utterance, calling on it to introduce new 
content. Baird appears to claim, on the basis of Echo’s answer “no”, that Baird 
understands ‘his right’ (a claim not supported by evidence).31 Baird’s 
positioning of the claim as being about Echo’s understanding, rather than the 
truth of the right in general, may contextualize Baird’s talk but it may also be a 
claim for the recording. 
So police references to understanding may have a range of overlapping 
functions in discourse, including asking suspects to focus on understanding, 
framing utterances about understanding rules rather than the existence of rules, 
and summarising upshot claims about understanding, claims which may be 
                                                 
 
31 Echo’s ten preceding answers were monosyllabic. This interview was rejected by the court on 
the basis that the right to silence was not understood. 
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intended for the audience of the recording. Talk about understanding can be a 
way to label and close interactional tasks (Lindwall & Lymer 2011), and some 
references to understanding may be attempts to complete a step in the caution, 
negotiating the tension between wanting the suspect to understand and wanting 
to move on. 
Of course, it is possible to identify understanding as an objective while 
avoiding assertions and questions about understanding. This is sometimes seen 
in announcements, and in the second example below an understanding question 
follows. 
Also I need to make sure, this is really important Gerard, this is the important bit, 
your rights. That you understand you don’t have to talk to me about this ganga 
(Jawrarla 2006) 
Potts: I want you to understand you don’t have to talk to me, right, if I, if I say 
something, if I ask you a question, you don’t have to give me an answer. Do you 
understand that? (Marrmowa 1994) 
It is arguable that by saying “I want you to understand … Do you 
understand”, Potts also frames the caution activity as being about teaching and 
then testing (discussed at 2.4). There is no particular evidence about how 
suspects interpret this. 
2.3.3 What is outside the frame 
The decision by some police (or police policy) to announce the caution 
implies an intention to convey something, to frame the caution to some extent. 
Frequent ‘do you understand?’ questions may provide additional context about 
the purpose of the caution activity. 
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However there are other ways of framing the caution which police do not 
seem to adopt. NT legislation requiring the caution to be given uses various 
speech act verbs: “caution”,32 “inform”,33 “warn”,34 and “give the person in 
custody the information”.35 Police use of the word caution in this study is rare, 
unlike Russell's (2000:40) study where it appeared in the majority of 
announcements. The word caution is unlikely to be helpful unless police have 
clearly told the suspect what it means (Rock 2012). Rock (2007:150) gives an 
example of a suspect not understanding a reference to “that caution” even after 
being told in two different ways what it meant. 
Police in this study also did not speak in terms of warning. Cotterill 
(2000) found tension in whether British police viewed the caution as warning 
or advice. One reason for warning may be that the Anglo-Welsh caution 
contains additional negative consequences: “it may harm your defence if you 
do not mention when questioned something which you later rely on in court”.36 
                                                 
 
32 Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act (NT) s 139(1)(c). Caution is used as a verb: 
“caution the person that the person does not have to…” 
33 Police Administration Act (NT) s 140. 
34 Police Administration Act (NT) ss 140, 141 section headings. Note that these headings do not 
form part of the Act for the purposes of interpretation (Interpretation Act (NT) s 55(2)) so the 
references to ‘warning’ do not have legal status but perhaps reflect the assumptions of drafters. 
35 Police Administration Act (NT) s 141. 
36 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (UK) Code C (2014) s 10.5 sets out the standard 
English caution: “You do not have to say anything. But it may harm your defence if you do not 
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The US equivalent of the caution is called the ‘Miranda warning’, and its 
original form refers to the possible use of evidence against the suspect.37 In this 
study, police occasionally refer to the use of evidence ‘against’ suspects 
(see 4.3.2). 
The lack of focus on warning in this study may also reflect Anunga’s 
focus on achieving apparent understanding. However the lack of warning 
contributes to a situation in which the caution is generally not framed as 
something which affects suspects. While saying something ordinarily 
constitutes a claim that it is relevant (Sperber & Wilson 1995), the 
announcements in (6) do not suggest how the caution is relevant to suspects. 
Some of them suggest that explaining and understanding the caution is a 
requirement before questioning can proceed, but do not say that the caution 
will affect the interview, that it establishes rules which are fundamental to the 
speech event. An arguable exception, not in an announcement, was seen at 2.2 
in extract (3), asking Inkamala to remember the caution “all the time”. 
                                                 
 
mention when questioned something which you later rely on in Court. Anything you do say may 
be given in evidence.” It also specifies a Welsh language text. 
37 “Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that 
any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him”: Miranda v Arizona (1966) 
384 U.S. 436 at [444]. However wording used to deliver the Miranda warning is diverse and 
varies from state to state, and courts have declined to regulate its wording closely (Rogers, 
Rogstad, Steadham, & Drogin 2011). 
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Further, despite numerous references to understanding, there is no 
example of police clearly explaining the mechanism for measuring this goal, 
namely comprehension-checking questions. Rock points out that police may 
“signal whether cautioning is in the frame of informing or testing, for example; 
if they do not, detainees must figure this out for themselves” (2007:223). The 
testing function of the caution will be discussed below. 
Police announcements of the caution therefore tend to frame only 
immediate steps in the activity. They perhaps address what is most salient at 
the start of the caution, explaining why a significant topic change is happening 
(because it is required) and framing the forthcoming turns as being about 
understanding. Slightly more distant steps including the need to ask questions 
to test comprehension, the future transition to the interview speech event and 
the fact that the right to silence applies (and is fundamental) to that speech 
event, are not signposted by police; however this is seen in translations. 
Translations of the caution, written or recorded, cannot engage in 
comprehension testing so may not be expected to announce it. However the 
relevance of the caution to the interview and the suspect can be made clear at 
the outset with a statement that the caution constitutes rules that apply in the 
interview:38 
                                                 
 
38 The differing numbers of rules or laws are because some translations explain additional rights 
such as the right to contact someone while under arrest, the right to have a ‘prisoner’s friend’ 
present in the interview, etc. 
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Balanyamirriy  ŋunhi   dhu  bilitjuman-dhu  nhuna-ny 
at.the.time   TEXD  FUT police-ERG   2SG.ACC-PROM 
 
dhä-birrka’yun  ŋunhi-ŋuwuy   mari-puy,   rom  ga 
question  TEXD-ASS    trouble-ASS law IMPV 
 
barraŋga’yun  walal  dhu  bilitjuman-dhu  walal  malthun 
instruct  3PL FUT police-ERG  3PL follow 
 
ḏämbumiriw-gu  gämurru-w.  Dhiya-ŋ       dhäwu-y   ŋunhi  
four-DAT  lesson-DAT PROX-INSTR   story-INSTR TEXD 
 
ŋarra ga   lakaram,  dhu  ga  dhawaṯ-maram  dhuwal 
1SG IMPV  tell  FUT IMPV come.out-CAUS PROX 
 
mala  gämurru  nho-kal,  yurr  Djambarrpuyŋu-kurr. 
PL lesson 2SG-OBL but Djambarrpuyngu-PERL 
‘During the time when the police are going to ask you about that trouble the law 
says that the police will follow four rules. This story that I’m telling you will bring 
out these rules, but in Djambarrpuyngu language.’ (1998 Djambarrpuyngu 
translation, English in original) 
 
When the police talk to you about this trouble, the police must follow two laws 
carefully. 
Listen carefully to these two laws. 
Law number one says this: … (subtitles to 2015 in-custody translations) 
 
 
Police could say something like the above when they begin the caution, and 
also explain that they intend to ask questions to find out if the suspect has 
understood what is said. 
2.4 The teaching–testing function 
The caution conversation starts with an announcement and perhaps a 
distinct initial statement of the caution, but then seems to transition into an 
open-ended pattern of explaining and comprehension testing, until 
comprehension evidence is satisfactory. This can be described as a teaching–
testing cycle. Police do not announce the nature or purpose of this speech 
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activity, though announcements seen at 2.3.1 variously suggest that police will 
tell, inform, advise, or explain. Procedurally, police need to ask 
comprehension-testing questions to elicit evidence revealing whether the 
suspect understands the caution, required primarily for the audience of the 
recording. Below is a conversation involving teaching and testing. 
Extract (14): BM #1 (2014) 
1. Hall: Ok, mate. Do you understand, mate, that before you say anything to me that 
you do not have to say anything to me? 
2. BM: No. 
3. Hall: Ok. And that anything you do say may be given in evidence? 
4. BM: Yes, sir. 
5. Hall: Ok. So wh, explain that to me what that means? 
6. BM: Ah - I don’t know to s, how it happened. 
7. Hall: Ok, no, not about that, mate, about that caution I just gave you, that you 
don't have to say anything but anything you do say may be given in evidence. Can 
you explain that to me? What does that mean to you? 
8. BM: Um - I haven’t a clue. 
9. Hall: Ok. If you don’t wanna’ talk to me, do you have to talk to me? 
10. BM: Only in your presence. 
11. Hall: Ok. If I put questions to you and you don’t wanna’ answer them, does that 
mean you can be quiet? 
12. BM: No. 
13. Hall: Ok, mate. So, if I ask a question, do you have to answer me? 
14. BM: Yes, sir. 
15. Hall: Alright. But if I ask a question, you don't have to answer me, you have the 
right to remain silent. Ok? 
16. BM: Yes. 
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17. Hall: So if I ask you a question and you don’t wanna’ answer, you don't have to 
tell me, ok? 
18. BM: Yep. 
19. Hall: So what, so if I ask you a question, do you have to, do you have to, do you 
have to tell me the answer? 
20. BM: No. 
21. Hall: Ok. And if you do tell me, who might hear that one? Who’s gonna’ hear that 
evidence? 
22. BM: Evidence. 
23. Hall: Yep. Will the Magistrate listen to that stuff? 
24. BM: Nup. 
25. Hall: Ok, if you do tell me something, ok. 
26. BM: Yeah. 
27. Hall: …if you do decide to speak to me, that can be given as evidence, that means 
like the magistrate will hear it or the jury, or other people will hear it. Do you 
understand that? 
28. BM: Yes, sir. 
29. Hall: Ok. Do you want anyone notified that you’re here? 39 
                                                 
 
39 Extract (14) is from BM’s ‘section 140’ conversation, which normally happens shortly after 
arrest and not in the interview room, contrasting with other cautions which take place as part of 
the same recording as the substantive interview. This is why, in line 29, instead of going on to 
interview BM, Hall asks if he wants someone notified of his arrest, which is a right that detainees 
have. In cautioning BM, Hall may have accepted a lower standard of comprehension because 
this was not part of the main interview and because the caution would be repeated at the start of 
that interview. However given that Hall went through the caution process, there was every 
possibility that (14) would affect BM’s understanding of the caution on future occasions. This 
conversation was examined by the court because it was relevant to understanding. 
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Hall begins this conversation optimistically, all but ignoring BM’s 
disclaimers of understanding at lines 2 and 8 and testing knowledge of the 
caution at lines 5, 9, 11 and 13. Hall begins to allocate more talk to teaching at 
line 15, which is a statement and also includes new language about the caution, 
“you have the right to remain silent”. BM gives an apparently correct answer at 
line 20, causing a topic change to the use of the interview in evidence. Further 
questioning turns including lines 21 and 23 are suggestive, followed by another 
overtly teaching turn at line 27 after unsatisfactory answers from BM. 
This comprehension-checking process perhaps aims for what Clark 
(1992) describes for ordinary conversation as the accumulation of ‘common 
ground’. Clark argues that speakers and hearers must “mutually accept” that 
the hearer has understood the speaker’s reference40 “before they let the 
conversation go on” (1992:115). 
Importantly, Clark’s speakers work with hearers until the hearer has 
understood the speaker’s meaning sufficiently for present purposes. This 
describes to some extent what police appear to do, however it is still unclear to 
what extent suspects can infer the purposes of the caution as a whole, or 
teaching–testing steps in particular. Rock (2007:152) argues that cautioning 
police shift footing (Goffman 1981) from investigator to teacher, and if this 
                                                 
 
40 Clark limits this discussion of reference to Noun Phrase reference. 
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footing shift is not recognised, the caution’s pragmatic intent may be clouded.41 
In particular, the comprehension-testing process involves asking suspects to 
talk about knowledge (the caution) which may appear to ‘belong’ to police and 
in which police are the experts, in other words police ‘epistemic territory’ 
(Heritage 2012). Rights to know and articulate information can be negotiated in 
interaction (ibid), possibly by signalling a shift in footing. Some police 
utterances such as “tell me what you think all that means to you” (Todd 1995) 
may give suspects a degree of permission to talk about the meaning of the 
caution. 
Meanwhile, police goals are affected by the two-audience problem. 
Police probably work with suspects until they produce acceptable evidence of 
understanding, rather than understanding itself (which is also impossible to 
measure directly). It is doubtful whether the ongoing checking of reference in 
the conversation is actually mutual. In (14), Hall had minimal grounds to be 
confident that BM understood what was being said, noting (as discussed above) 
that asking ‘do you understand?’ is unlikely to be effective for checking mutual 
reference. The contrast between Hall’s use of “mate” and BM’s use of “sir” is 
some evidence of a power difference in the interaction, and it also has the 
effect that it is unclear whether BM’s “Yes, sir” answers indicate agreement, 
                                                 
 
41 After the caution, police presumably shift footing back to investigator, and we can ask how 
clearly this is signalled, but this is not directly relevant to this thesis. 
VLING Thesis Alex Bowen u5989850 
 
 
77 
confirmation of understanding, or submission. Perhaps the equivocal evidence 
of understanding was sufficient for Hall’s purposes. 
There are a number of ways in which suspects could potentially infer the 
teaching–testing purpose which is central to the caution activity. However they 
are somewhat circular, and it seems clear that the best way for police to make 
sense of this would be to explicitly tell the suspect at the outset that they will 
ask questions to find out if the suspect understands the information. 
Suspects could infer the purpose of the comprehension-checking activity 
from the nature of speech acts or sequences. Gumperz (1982:131) argues that 
“contextualization cues” including (relevantly) conversational openings and 
sequencing strategies can signal “what the activity is, how semantic content is 
to be understood and how each sentence relates to what precedes or follows”. 
Hearers can recognise cues and discourse patterns if they share relevant 
conventions or previous experience with speakers (ibid). Recognition of the 
teaching–testing pattern in the caution might pre-orient suspects to its goals 
(precise explanation followed by testing, rather than for example negotiation of 
meaning). Otherwise, discourse strategies may fail where there is a mismatch 
of expectations about “each participant’s rights and obligations within the 
discourse” (Reeders 2008:105). 
Some comprehension-testing questions such as “Tell me what that means 
to you” (Todd 1995, Mangaraka #1 1993) give some indication of a testing 
purpose. Beyond individual turns, the caution displays patterns of informing 
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followed by testing, which can be more clearly structured than those seen in 
(14): 
Extract (15): Dumoo 
1. Lindsay: Before we go any further I’ll advise you that you don’t have to talk 
to me if you don’t want to. Do you understand that? 
2. Dumoo: Yeah. 
3. Lindsay: So do you have to answer my questions?  
This three-part structure (delivery of information, minimal receipt, so-
prefaced comprehension check) can be seen in 14 interviews in this study, 
though there are many other comprehension checking forms. Heydon 
(2005:28) argues that in police interviews, by “formulating the gist of prior 
talk, and obtaining agreement to formulations, participants are able to check 
their mutual understanding of the talk’s intended meaning”. Exchanges like 
(15) match this description to some extent. If Dumoo recognised the structure, 
he might infer that Lindsay was attempting to test comprehension of line 1. 
Another way Dumoo might understand line 3 is by understanding the purpose 
of the interaction and awareness of the two audiences. 
2.4.1 Co-construction and consensus 
Another kind of activity that might be suggested by police speech acts is 
a negotiation of consensus about meaning or action. Reeders (2008:121) 
observes in relation to Yolngu information-giving exchanges that many 
participants contribute to explanations, and “[a]ny new topic goes through a 
process of collaboration and consensus and the goal seems to be to reach a 
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collectively ratified version rather than to merely hand over knowledge.” This 
contrasts with typical non-Aboriginal “explanation as one person telling 
someone else about something that they know” (ibid:108), which somewhat 
inevitably describes police explaining the caution. Consensus may fill a role 
equivalent to ‘checks and balances’ in Yolngu governance (Morphy 2007; 
ARDS 1994:86), and the caution is a check on state power, but one which 
works in a very different way (see 4.2.2). Liberman (1981) describes traditional 
Aboriginal approaches to deliberation through consensual exchanges involving 
repetition and affirmation of previous utterances in which direct contradiction 
of ideas is avoided, but alternative ideas can be raised in due time. This 
consensual approach can be linked to Liberman’s (1981) description of 
gratuitous concurrence, a strategy of accommodation to non-Aboriginal 
speakers by agreeing with them, (which is now well-recognised in the NT legal 
system). Some studies of narrative in Aboriginal languages have found that co-
construction including cross-speaker repetition is a prevalent or even 
“canonical” discourse style and that “collaborative narratives are highly 
interactive, despite the fact that often many of the participants have only 
secondary knowledge of the events, or even no knowledge at all” (Hill 
2010:240). 
Comprehension checking invites suspect formulations of the caution and 
can involve co-construction in the sense that police sometimes repeat parts of 
suspect responses: 
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Extract (16): Todd (1995) 
1. P1:  wh-what do you reckon that means t- 
 .. as far as you're concerned/ 
2. Todd: I don’t (answer) it’s okay, 
3. P1:  it’s okay/ 
 .. alright/ 
Extract (17): Moonlight (1995) 
1. P:  ... what what can a judge do/  
 to someone that's done something wrong?  
 what can a judge do for them?  
2. Moonlight: ah yeah, lock up // 
 =(x) .. (x)= 
3. P:  they =can lock= ("h") im up, 
4. Moonlight: yeah// 
5. P: or fine him? 
 or::/ 
6. Moonlight: ==or give him fine, 
7. P: ==yeah  
8. Moonlight: ... or bond  
9. P: ==or bond yeah  
 ok, 
Extract (16) shows P1 repeating part of Todd’s probably correct 
answer,42 and (17) shows both speakers repeating parts of previous utterances, 
at lines 3, 6 and 9. Police repetition of (parts of) suspect answers could signal 
confirmation (Schegloff 1996:180), or “adopt” language and coordinate 
                                                 
 
42 This conversation is also discussed at 2.4.2 and 3.2, in extract (22). 
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perspective between interlocutors (Bean & Patthey-Chavez 1994:211). This 
can be contrasted with oral proficiency interviews, where bare repeats of 
interviewee language have been analysed as conveying minimal 
acknowledgement without alignment (Kasper & Ross 2003:90). Oral 
proficiency interviews are institutional talk like the caution, however 
interviewees taking a test are likely to understand the objectives of that 
interaction. In the caution it is unclear how suspects may interpret police 
‘adoption’ of their language, however they may infer that police aim for a 
degree of consensus by accepting suspect contributions into a negotiated 
version of the topic under discussion. 
Suspect attitudes consistent with negotiation can be most clearly seen in 
answers to the common question ‘do you have to answer?’. In a number of 
cases this question seems be interpreted as a negotiation of whether the suspect 
will answer, rather than a comprehension test about a rule. 
Extract (18): Lawrence #1 (2015) 
1. Miller: … if we ask you a question, do you have to answer that, do you have to 
say anything? 
2. Lawrence: Yeah, it’s ok.  
Extract (19): BM #1 (2014) 
1. Hall: … if I ask a question, do you have to answer me? 
2. BM: Yes, sir. 
Extract (20): Anthony (1995) 
1. P: do you have to talk to me?  
2. Anthony: ==sure 
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Extract (21): Age #1 (2010) 
1. Walters: So if I ask you a question do you have to tell me answer. 
2. Age: Yeah I answer it. 
The suspects above may be saying that they will talk, rather than whether they 
have to talk. This possibility was recognised by Riley J in Thomas (2006:[10]): 
The accused was then cautioned again and when asked whether he had to talk to police 
he responded: “Yeah. I have to tell the truth”. It is unclear whether, in the context of 
the conversation, he was saying that he was obliged to talk with police or whether he 
was indicating a desire to voluntarily tell the truth. 
The comprehension-testing intention of ‘do you have to talk’ questions is 
inconsistent with an interpretation about whether suspects will talk. Suspects 
give a variety of answers to these questions including ‘yes’ and ‘no’, but polar 
answers generally do not reveal how suspects have interpreted the question. If 
suspects understood the teaching–testing purpose, they should interpret these 
questions differently. At 4.1 I will investigate the possibility that the above 
interpretation is also influenced by linguistic ambiguity in the modal 
expression have to. 
In a classroom setting, when the student’s answer is followed by teacher 
feedback, this establishes the teacher’s “epistemic supremacy”, revealing that 
the teacher was knowledgeable about the subject of the question (Heritage & 
Clayman 2011:28). If police identifiably evaluate suspect responses, this may 
clarify that police have adopted a teacher–assessor role and the purpose of the 
activity is testing knowledge. 
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2.4.2 Police feedback: right and wrong answers 
Police can respond to the content of suspect utterances, and/or to 
utterances themselves as steps in an activity (Bakhtin 1986). By responding to 
content, police may provide feedback (eg Hewings 1992) about whether the 
suspect’s understanding is (apparently) correct. However many 
acknowledgement tokens appear to respond to the progress of the activity 
rather than the content of suspect responses. The much-studied three-part 
sequential structure in teaching or instructional interaction can be labelled 
initiation–response–evaluation (‘IRE’) (Zemel & Koschmann 2011) or 
initiation–response–feedback43 (Coulthard & Brazil 1992). 
Feedback from police may help to establish the purpose of the 
comprehension-checking activity (if the purpose has not previously been made 
explicit). If suspects understand the teaching–testing purpose and discourse 
structure, the interpretation of feedback in individual turns may then allow 
them, like students, to ‘learn’ whether interpretations of the caution are correct 
or incorrect. However this requires feedback to clearly distinguish different 
types of answers. 
Ambiguous police feedback has already been seen. In (14), BM gave a 
series of answers to comprehension checks which were incorrect, inappropriate 
or disclaimed understanding. Hall’s responses at lines 3, 5, 9, 11, 13 and 15 
                                                 
 
43 Coulthard & Brazil propose renaming the third step “follow-up”, arguing it should be defined 
on exchange-structural rather than semantic grounds (1992:70-71). 
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began with “ok” or “alright”. These receipt tokens may mark BM’s responses 
as (minimally) acceptable steps in the activity. BM’s answers do not suggest 
correct understanding or allow Hall to progress the activity, however they do 
represent good-faith responses to the questions, completing adjacency pairs and 
continuing the interaction. The core function of okay in police interviews may 
be to express agreement or acknowledgement, however non-core uses of okay 
for discourse management may include expressing ‘positive’ meaning related 
to “the effective, cooperative accomplishment of interactional tasks” (Gaines 
2011:3312).44 There is little evidence of how BM interpreted the ok tokens, 
particularly as intonation is not transcribed. 
Hall’s “ok” and “alright” responses may serve to keep the interaction 
moving through unsuccessful question–answer sequences. This could be 
consistent with a police approach of progressing the caution activity one step at 
a time, rather than announcing and then tracking its structure, (see 2.3.3). 
BM eventually gave a superficially correct answer at line 20, bringing the 
sequence of reformulations to an end: 
19. Hall: … do you have to tell me the answer? 
                                                 
 
44 An example is when the suspect makes “a statement which the interviewer does not agree with 
or cannot support, but if, in the interest of moving on to the next question, the interviewer inserts 
okay, this task management use, while not specifically communicating agreement or support, is 
an indication of having taken a satisfactory step in the process” (Gaines 2011:3312). It should 
not be assumed that okay as a receipt token indicates approval of the content of the previous 
utterance (Beach 1995). 
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20. BM: No. 
21. Hall: Ok. And if you do tell me, who might hear that one? … 
This ‘correct’ response is received with “Ok. And”. And-prefacing may 
indicate topic shift to the next step of an activity (Heritage & Sorjonen 1994). 
In line 21 Hall did move to the next step (explaining the consequences of 
speaking), and along with and, this seems to be the the only way BM’s 
‘correct’ answer was distinguished from ‘incorrect’ answers.45 
Extract (14) also contains an unusual (for this study) example of a ‘third 
position repair’ (Schegloff 1992; Kitzinger 2012): 
5. Hall: Ok. So wh, explain that to me what that means? 
6. BM: Ah - I don’t know to s, how it happened. 
7. Hall: Ok, no, not about that, mate, about that caution I just gave you, that you 
don't have to say anything but anything you do say may be given in evidence. Can 
you explain that to me? What does that mean to you? 
In most unsuccessful comprehension checks, the problem is in the answer, but 
line 6 appears to show complete misunderstanding of the question, which relied 
on anaphoric “that” to ask about BM’s understanding of the caution. Line 7 
reflects normal practice for instructional contexts, where “the instructor sees 
his or her own initiating query as the source of the trouble”, then redesigns the 
question and re-initiates the IRE sequence (Zemel & Koschmann 2011:476). 
                                                 
 
45 Line 3 of (14) also begins with “Ok. And” and follows a denial of understanding, however and 
appears to be a syntactic conjunction in this case (joining line 1 “Do you understand, mate, that 
…” and line 3 “And that …”) rather than a discourse marker. 
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Line 7 is identifiable as a third-position repair because Hall explicitly rejects 
the topic, saying “no, not about that, mate”, then clarifies what the question is 
“about”, re-initiating the sequence. A likely reason for the repair was concern 
that BM was speaking prematurely about the incident under investigation, 
which would disrupt Hall’s topic management, display BM’s lack of 
orientation to the comprehension checking exercise, and detract from evidence 
of understanding. This repair contrasts with other turns where Hall gave no 
clear signal that BM’s answers were inappropriate or that Hall’s preceding turn 
had been misinterpreted. 
Problematic feedback can also be seen below:  
Extract (22): Todd (1995) 
1. P1:  ok/ now now do you understand 
 .. what it means when I say I'm gonna ask you questions 
 ==but you don't have to answer (them)/  
2.    [nod] <3.0> 
3. P1:  wh-what do you reckon that means t- 
 .. as far as you’re concerned/ 
4. Todd: I don’t (answer) it’s okay, 
5. P1:  it’s okay/ 
 .. alright/  
 so,.. if yo- if I ask you a question/  
   [nod] ... and you don't wanna answer it/ 
 ... do you think that I can force you to answer that question?  
6. Todd: <3.2> I don't understand/  
7. P1:  .. alright/  
 what if you do an-understand the question  
 ==do you think you can be forced to answer it?  
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8. Todd: ==I think so,  
9. P1: ==you *do?  
10. Todd: yeah  
11. P1:  ==alright/  
 ==as as I say  
 <2.0>I-I can't force you to answer the questions/ [nod]  
 [8 turns omitted, during which P1 and P2 express some frustration, and neither 
‘forcing’ nor ‘understanding the questions’ are mentioned] 
12. P2: …what’d I just say then/ 
13. Todd: you just told me that um .. that I don't have to answer any questions  
 unless you .. don't force me and I understand what you're talking about or 
 something like that 
14. P2: alright/  
 y- you're on the mark there ok/ 
 .. what it means is that 
 .. if.. you know what the policeman’s job is? 
 [7 turns omitted] 
15.  P2:  ..so when the policeman says to you/ 
 do you *have to answer these questions/  
 .. what's your answer?  
16. Todd:<3.4> I'll answer (a few questions)  
 if I .. understand/  
17. P2:==ok/ .. alright/ 
Todd’s apparently correct statement of the caution “I don’t answer it’s 
ok” was acknowledged in line 5 with a partial repetition of his turn “it’s okay”, 
and with “alright”. The repetition of Todd’s “it’s ok” is somewhat unusual in 
this conversation, and together with “alright” this is some evidence that P1 was 
‘accepting’ it, though it is unclear how Todd understood this reponse. Todd’s 
denial of understanding at line 6 was also met with “alright”. Hall’s response to 
VLING Thesis Alex Bowen u5989850 
 
 
88 
Todd’s apparently incorrect answer at line 8 was “you *do?”, probably 
suggesting disbelief, but not explicitly enough to cause Todd to change his 
answer in line 10, which was then accepted with “alright”. 
Todd’s incorrect statement in line 13 was also met with “alright”, 
followed by “you’re on the mark there ok”. It is impossible to fully monitor 
talk in real time, and P2 may have focused on the correct part of Todd’s 
utterance “I don’t have to answer any questions”; but line 14 could have been 
interpreted as an affirmation of Todd’s incorrect and overcomplicated 
interpretation of the caution. This could be part of the reason why he persisted 
in thinking that “if I understand” was a relevant answer at line 16. That 
response, also incorrect in that it failed to address the question about 
compulsion, was met with “ok/ .. alright/”. Alright has a function related to 
okay though there is debate about what the difference is (Filipi & Wales 2003; 
Beach 1993). P1 and P2’s numerous alrights left little to distinguish for Todd 
which of his ideas were correct (except the explicit encouragement following 
his most problematic statement at line 13). The meaning of conversation (22) is 
discussed further at 3.2. 
There is also a temporal element to (for example) teacher feedback. 
“Roughly, positive evaluations are produced ‘on time’, that is, within normal 
turn-transition durations. And negative evaluations routinely show a delay or 
temporizing in their production” (Macbeth 2011:446). (22) includes 
transcription of pauses by McLaughlin (1996), and there are no apparent 
examples of delayed responses suggesting negative evaluations by police. On 
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the contrary, lines 9 and 17 were both latched to (followed immediately after) 
problematic statements by Todd. 
A contrasting example of frank police feedback in Age’s interview does 
not seem to have been successful. The Court found that after Age expressed the 
view that he “had to speak to police”,46 police failed to “retrieve the situation” 
(Age 2011:[25]-[29]). 
Extract (23): Age #1 (2010) 
1. Walters: Alright. Steven, I’ll just also formally advise you that you don’t have to 
say anything. Anything you do say can be recorded and may be used in court at a 
later date. Do you understand that? Yep – so if I ask you a question do you have 
to tell me answer? 
2. Age: Yeah. 
3. Walters: No. Okay, that’s – that’s the thing with this caution. Okay. If I ask you 
a question you can sit quiet if you want to. Do you understand that? 
4. Age: Yeah. 
5. Walters: So if I ask you a question do you have to tell me answer. 
6. Age: Yeah I answer it. 
7. Walters: Yeah no – no. you – you – you don’t have to tell me anything you can sit 
quiet if you want. 
8. Age: No (inaudible) 
9. Walters: alright. so if – if I ask you a question do you have to tell me the answer? 
10. Age: yeah. 
11. Walters: no you don’t. okay do you – do you understand that you don’t have to 
answer my questions? 
                                                 
 
46 This conversation and have to will be examined again at 4.1.2.1. It is likely that Age was 
saying he intended to talk, rather than whether he had to. 
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12. Age: nah – (inaudible) 
13. Walters: okay. alright. so if I ask you a question do you have to tell me anything 
about that question? 
14. Age: mm – yeah. 
15. Walters: no. 
16. Age: no worries. 
17. Walters: okay. that’s –that’s the thing Steven you don’t have to answer my 
questions. okay. alright. so if I ask you what colour’s your shirt do you have to tell 
me? 
18. Age: yeah. 
19. Walters: no you can sit quiet. you don’t have to tell me what colour your shirt is. 
you don’t have to answer anything I say alright. so again just to make sure that 
you’re (inaudible) with how this works. alright. if I ask you a question you don’t 
have to tell me anything. okay. so if I ask you a question do you have to tell me 
anything? 
20. Age: yeah well I tell you the truth. 
Age gives an ‘incorrect’ answer at line 2. Walters indicates the answer 
was unsatisfactory with “no”. Walters also identifies trouble by saying “that’s 
the thing with this caution”. Walters then reformulates the information central 
to the question “do you have to tell me answer” by stating “If I ask you a 
question you can sit quiet if you want to.” Age again gives a clearly incorrect 
answer at line 6 (suggesting he will answer, not whether he has to answer). 
Walters’s response again makes clear that this was wrong, and repeats the right 
to silence using language that has already been used. There are three further 
cycles of comprehension checks, incorrect polar answers, and “no” receipts 
from Walters. We may expect meaningful feedback to establish Walters’s 
“epistemic supremacy”, implying that each preceding question was not a ‘real’ 
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information-seeking question (Heritage & Clayman 2011:28), and potentially 
constructing individual turns as providing feedback. However, it is not clear 
that Age understands a teaching–testing IRE exchange to be happening, or that 
he understands negative feedback in individual turns. Age does not revise his 
interpretation of the ‘do you have to talk’ questions, shown by his consistent 
answers at lines 6, 10, 14, 18 and 20. 
Feedback can be threatening to the learner, which may explain why the 
IRE structure is rare in adult-adult interactions (Coulthard & Brazil 1992), and 
particular interactional work is required to diminish what could be described as 
a threat to positive face (Brown & Levinson 1987). Comprehension-testing 
questions could also make suspects uncomfortable because the caution is the 
questioner’s ‘epistemic territory’ (Heritage 2012) and the suspect might feel a 
lack of authority to talk about it. Police may be concerned that appearing 
critical of suspect responses could discourage the suspect from participating. 
However there is no evidence that negative responses discouraged Age from 
further responding or cooperating, possibly because of police interactional 
authority in the interview. 
If Age did understand the feedback, it does not follow from getting an 
answer wrong that Age will necessarily expect the next utterance to rephrase 
the same content, however other language or the purpose of the activity may 
suggest this (these inferences will be discussed at 3.1). Walters may have failed 
to communicate the caution because s/he continued to repeat it using “don’t 
have to”. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
Suspect understanding of the caution depends on context, and two 
important kinds of context are the purposes of the caution speech activity and 
the steps involved in that activity. The caution interaction is significantly 
affected by the two-audience problem, and it is unclear to what extent suspects 
are aware of this. 
Police provide some context, perhaps framing understanding as one of 
the conversation’s purposes. However police often appear to move through the 
caution in small steps without alerting suspects to what these steps are about, 
what their purpose is, or what will happen next. Police could frame the caution 
as something which affects suspects because it will set the rules for the 
interaction immediately following, but police do not consistently do this. 
Police also do not explicitly describe the comprehension-checking 
activity which they engage in, and opportunities for suspects to independently 
infer its purpose may be limited. Some suspect responses to comprehension-
checking questions are inconsistent with an accurate understanding of the 
purpose of the activity. 
In unusual cases where police provide clear ‘feedback’ about incorrect 
suspect interpretations of the caution, this does not guarantee that suspects will 
know the purpose of that feedback, and they may miss the opportunity to 
‘learn’ from their correct and incorrect answers. 
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3 Meaning in discourse 
The previous chapter argued that the conversation in which the caution is 
discussed is a complex activity and some suspects may not have enough 
context to understand what is happening. The caution’s ‘meaning’ or ‘content’ 
can only be communicated as part of that conversation, and in this study the 
caution is usually not explained in a single utterance but in steps in a discourse 
that police build up across the conversation. 
This chapter will explore problems that may arise when the caution is 
explained across multiple repetitions and formulations. When the caution is 
repeated and restated, the relationships between repetitions may not be obvious 
and suspects may not necessarily realise that only one caution (in two parts) is 
under discussion. It is not predictable which versions of the caution suspects 
will absorb and how suspects will combine them. There is also evidence that 
suspects understand some versions of the caution as being subject to 
conditions, which may result from the interpretation of conditional clauses.  
Extract (14) involves police restating and reformulating the caution 
multiple times, and is reproduced below. 
Extract (14): BM #1 (2014) 
1. Hall: Ok, mate. Do you understand, mate, that before you say anything to me that 
you do not have to say anything to me? 
2. BM: No. 
3. Hall: Ok. And that anything you do say may be given in evidence? 
4. BM: Yes, sir. 
5. Hall: Ok. So wh, explain that to me what that means? 
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6. BM: Ah - I don’t know to s, how it happened. 
7. Hall: Ok, no, not about that, mate, about that caution I just gave you, that you 
don't have to say anything but anything you do say may be given in evidence. Can 
you explain that to me? What does that mean to you? 
8. BM: Um - I haven’t a clue. 
9. Hall: Ok. If you don’t wanna’ talk to me, do you have to talk to me? 
10. BM: Only in your presence. 
11. Hall: Ok. If I put questions to you and you don’t wanna’ answer them, does that 
mean you can be quiet? 
12. BM: No. 
13. Hall: Ok, mate. So, if I ask a question, do you have to answer me? 
14. BM: Yes, sir. 
15. Hall: Alright. But if I ask a question, you don't have to answer me, you have the 
right to remain silent. Ok? 
16. BM: Yes. 
17. Hall: So if I ask you a question and you don’t wanna’ answer, you don't have to 
tell me, ok? 
18. BM: Yep. 
19. Hall: So what, so if I ask you a question, do you have to, do you have to, do you 
have to tell me the answer? 
20. BM: No. 
21. Hall: Ok. And if you do tell me, who might hear that one? Who’s gonna’ hear that 
evidence? 
22. BM: Evidence. 
23. Hall: Yep. Will the Magistrate listen to that stuff? 
24. BM: Nup. 
25. Hall: Ok, if you do tell me something, ok. 
26. BM: Yeah. 
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27. Hall: …if you do decide to speak to me, that can be given as evidence, that means 
like the magistrate will hear it or the jury, or other people will hear it. Do you 
understand that? 
28. BM: Yes, sir. 
29. Hall: Ok. Do you want anyone notified that you’re here? 
In (14) the right to silence is stated and/or tested eight times, and the 
consequences of speaking are stated and/or tested five times. All formulations 
of the caution by police, including questions, potentially contribute to the 
suspect’s interpretation. For example, line 3 draws on line 1 and situates the 
consequences of speaking as a complement clause to a ‘do you understand that’ 
question. It is both a question and a restatement of the information. Line 11 is 
another question, but rephrases the right including, for the first time, “you can 
be quiet”. The information is in the suggestive form of a polar question, and the 
likely conversationally preferred answer ‘yes’ (Pomerantz & Heritage 2012; 
McLaughlin 1996; Reeders 2008) would be the correct answer. Line 11 has the 
potential both to inform BM about the caution by reformulating it, and to elicit 
desired evidence of comprehension. 
The utterance below syntactically combines informing and questioning: 
Extract (24): Lawrence #2 (2015) 
1. Miller: … So if we ask you something you can stay silent - ah - you could say, ‘no 
comment’. […] So if we ask you something and, and you don’t want to answer 
that, you could sit there quietly or what could you say if you don’t wanna’ answer 
the question? 
2. Lawrence: No comment. 
3. Miller: No comment. Yep, thanks. Now this recording, this goes to court and used 
as evidence, who would listen to this recording? 
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4.  Lawrence: The magistrate. 
While the syntax of line 1 is complex, Lawrence correctly answers the 
embedded question “what could you say”, which appears to be conjoined with 
the declarative “you could sit there quietly” and qualified by three conditional 
clauses. This may be an example of police scaffolding (Cooke 1996) the 
question with relevant context, and shows the close relationship between 
informing and testing. 
3.1 Repetition and paraphrase 
The examples above involve repetition of parts of the caution. Repetition 
can be formal (repeating the same words) or functional (repeating the same 
content) (Johnstone & others 1994), and the latter may be described as 
“reformulation” (Merritt 1994; Blakemore 1993) or “paraphrase” (Schegloff 
1996:179). 
Some suspects have prior exposure to the caution, meaning a new caution 
is a form of repetition. Records of prior cautions are sometimes used by 
prosecutors as evidence that a suspect has understood the caution previously 
(Douglas 1998). Unfortunately repeated exposure to US Miranda warnings 
may not improve accurate recall; rather the interpretive memory task may be 
complicated by recalling past exposures, both accurate and inaccurate (Rogers 
et al. 2011). Chief Justice Martin in Mangaraka (1995:[23]) commented in 
relation to caution misunderstanding that “[t]he difficulty is compounded the 
more frequently the traditional form of warning is given”, though it was not 
clear what aspect of the traditional form His Honour considered to be 
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problematic. If the suspect correctly understands the caution from previous 
experience, there should be no difficulty and effective comprehension checks 
should demonstrate understanding (unless new police language detracts from 
that understanding). 
Within a single conversation, the procedural reason for police 
reformulating the caution is clear: following unsatisfactory suspects responses 
about the caution, the police questioner cannot progress the interview until 
evidence of apparent understanding is achieved. Speakers generally may use 
reformulation where they recognise that “the original formulation was not an 
appropriate means of achieving communicative success” (Blakemore 
1993:101); but in the caution explicit rules require police to stop and pursue 
understanding. Reformulations may introduce redundancy (Kaur 2012), and 
may give suspects more time to absorb information (Merritt 1994:33), although 
police reformulations may also increase cognitive load by requiring suspects to 
interpret more language and respond to questions. 
Police scope to reformulate may be limited by the availability of 
linguistic resources for NNS suspects. In situations where “ideas are complex 
or words are insufficient”, formal or close repetition may be used to invite the 
hearer to make “interpretive efforts to make more of what is said” (Knox 
1994:198). I argued at 2.3.2 that ‘do you understand?’ can have a similar 
refocusing intention, but this is not usually combined with repetition. So police 
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vary linguistic forms, perhaps operating within what they estimate47 to be the 
range of language appropriate for their interlocutor. For example, in (14) Hall 
used varying language to mean the same thing: “say anything”, “talk to me”, 
“answer me”, “tell me the answer”. 
While police repetitions may call for suspects to make more effort to 
interpret caution language, questions of how suspects recognise and interpret 
repetition are complex. 
3.2 Recognising repetition 
Suspects may not recognise that reformulations and comprehension 
checks are intended to be versions of the same text and test the same, 
invariable, information. They may misunderstand the purpose of repetitions in 
the discourse or think that multiple topics are under discussion rather than a 
single caution. Becker (1994:165) argues that in a foreign culture where fewer 
prior texts are shared, “the hardest thing to know in a foreign language is when 
and how someone is repeating”. Relationships between versions of the caution 
can be marked by police, or suspects may recognise that repetition is 
happening because utterances resemble each other. 
                                                 
 
47 The question of how police assess suspect language proficiency is complex and will not be 
addressed in this study. However when police make decisions about language use (or decisions 
about whether to use an interpreter), these necessarily must be based consciously or otherwise 
on an assessment of suspect English proficiency, and such decisions should be made in a way 
which is justifiable. 
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In (14), Hall expresses the right to silence at lines 7, 9, 11 and 13, 
however there is little to show that these reformulations are related to each 
other: 
Extract (14): BM #1 (2014) 
7. Hall: Ok, no, not about that, mate, about that caution I just gave you, that you 
don't have to say anything but anything you do say may be given in evidence. Can 
you explain that to me? What does that mean to you? 
8. BM: Um - I haven’t a clue. 
9. Hall: Ok. If you don’t wanna’ talk to me, do you have to talk to me? 
10. BM: Only in your presence. 
11. Hall: Ok. If I put questions to you and you don’t wanna’ answer them, does that 
mean you can be quiet? 
12. BM: No. 
13. Hall: Ok, mate. So, if I ask a question, do you have to answer me? 
Hall’s ok tokens at 9, 11 and 13 were discussed at 2.4.2 and may indicate 
minimally acceptable steps in the activity; they do not seem to signal that 
repetition is happening. At line 13 Hall uses so, which seems to have the 
function of moving the discourse on logically, seeking to draw a causal link 
between previous discourse and the new question. This may be a hint that line 
13 reformulates previous information. 
Otherwise, BM may recognise that Hall’s utterances resemble each other. 
Line 11 does not obviously resemble line 7 (unless their meaning is 
understood, in which case there may be no need for repetition). However 
“don’t have to” is repeated from line 7 to line 9, and “don’t wanna” is repeated 
from line 9 to line 11, with similar verbs “say”, “talk” and “answer”, and BM 
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may recognise these connections. Even recognising that a reformulation is 
related to a previous utterance propositionally is not the same as inferring how 
that repetition is relevant in the discourse (Gallai 2013:104). In this case, 
repetitions are intended to give BM additional opportunities to understand the 
caution and correctly answer comprehension questions, and it is unclear 
whether BM understood this. 
Individual reformulations can be linked using expressions like ‘in other 
words’ which can be loosely classed as “apposition markers” (Blakemore 
1993). Police mark textual connection between formulations in various ways: 
Extracts (25) 
Mora: So in other words, you don't have to answer our questions in relation to what 
we want to talk about but if you do answer those questions, they'll be recorded and 
might be heard in court, all right? (KR 2015) 
Lee: oh well what – what it means like the first part I said to you so do you – do you 
have to answer my questions and you said no and you said it’s your choice to - to say – 
talk to me or sit quiet. The same thing is, I’m just asking you in another way. Do – 
do you have to say anything to me? You can either talk to me or sit there and be quiet.. 
(Age #2 2010) 
P:  ==you can't understand alright/ 
er I-I'll rephrase it different way/  (Todd 1995) 
Heymans: Do you want me to repeat it for you? I'll tell you again okay? (Mangaraka 
#1 1993) 
Hall: Okay. So what that means, mate, is that anything you tell me will be recorded 
on this machine and the magistrate or jury or other people might be able to hear it, 
okay. Do you understand that? (GP 2014) 
In the last example, as well as signalling a reformulation, Hall may 
indicate that s/he does not assume authorship of the caution but merely 
VLING Thesis Alex Bowen u5989850 
 
 
101 
explains what it means, perhaps preserving a distinct official status for the 
initial caution. Hall’s reformulation appears to be a summary (Blakemore 
1993:105) because it is ‘about’ another utterance (using the anaphor “that”) 
rather than just propositionally similar to another utterance. It is possible that 
suspects interpret reformulations differently if they appear to carry different 
authority. At 2.3.1 I discussed the possibility that the requirement to deliver the 
caution makes police the animator only of the initial caution. Heydon (2013) 
argues that miscommunication in police interviews could be reduced by police 
adopting a “professional police voice”, taking ownership of institutional 
discourse and adapting it to the interaction at hand. In participation framework 
terms (Goffman 1981) this would make police principal as well as author of 
institutional utterances. 
Generally, police in this study have no hesitation in taking ownership of 
caution language, unsurprisingly given their difficult communicative task. 
Hall’s use of “what that means” may be an exception, suggesting that the 
formulation following has less authority than the original caution. If this is the 
case, it is more important that the initial caution is carefully worded. Other 
apposition markers in (25) suggest that what follows is ‘the same as’ the 
preceding caution, or a ‘repetition’ of it ‘in other words’, implying equal status 
between versions while making explicit that they aim to convey the same 
content. 
Perhaps related to the possibility that formulations of the caution 
sometimes have unequal status in the discourse, it is difficult to predict how 
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suspects will accumulate understanding when they hear multiple formulations 
of the caution. 
3.3 Suspect interpretations of multiple formulations 
The way Hall used multiple formulations in (14) may reveal assumptions 
about how those formulations worked. After numerous ‘incorrect’ answers, 
BM produced a ‘correct’ answer at line 19 and Hall moved on at line 20 to the 
second part of the caution. This decision implies either that BM suddenly ‘got 
it’ at line 19 and therefore produced a correct answer, or that he understood the 
caution earlier but something about the language of questions and answers 
concealed this understanding until line 20. In fact, the language in (14) was 
interpreted by Blokland J as evidence that BM had difficulty understanding and 
police should have taken more care when the caution was repeated in the 
subsequent interview (BM 2015:[66]). Conversely, Lawrence’s answers “no 
comment” and “the magistrate” in (24), his second interview, led Grant CJ to 
conclude that “it would seem that the accused understood his right to silence at 
that time. That provides at least some basis from which to infer that he also 
understood the concept at the time of the first interview.” (Lawrence 
2016:[58]). This inference is cautious, perhaps because it is difficult to justify 
preferring one piece of language over another (such as the first interview) as 
evidence of a state of mind. Chief Justice Martin pointed out that “[i]t would be 
quite unjust to latch upon an occasional indication from the accused of an 
awareness of her rights as a person in custody charged with murder in the face 
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of so much other evidence that would negative such a proposition.” 
(Mangaraka 1993:[22]). Wong (2000:408) argues that linguists historically 
tended to ignore repetition in language, assuming that the speaker “ended up 
saying” what s/he meant. 
While it is the suspect’s state of mind at the end of the caution that 
matters, that state of mind will be affected by the interpretation of multiple 
utterances. In situated discourse, it is not possible to ‘say the same thing twice’ 
(Rock 2007), because minimally, a repetition will have its prior version as part 
of its context, affecting the interpretation of the repetition. The study of 
intertextuality reveals complex relationships between texts inside and outside a 
given discourse (Rock 2013), and it is difficult to predict how hearers will 
contextualise a sequence of repetitions. 
Unfortunately, in most cases including (14) there is limited evidence 
about what suspects think, however (22) allows some glimpses of Todd’s 
evolving interpretation of the caution and is reproduced below: 
Extract (22): Todd 
1. P1:  ok/ now now do you understand 
 .. what it means when I say I'm gonna ask you questions 
 ==but you don't have to answer (them)/  
2. [nod] <3.0> 
3. P1:  wh-what do you reckon that means t- 
 .. as far as you’re concerned/ 
4. Todd: I don’t (answer) it’s okay, 
5. P1:  it’s okay/ 
 .. alright/  
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 so,.. if yo- if I ask you a question/  
   [nod] ... and you don't wanna answer it/ 
 ... do you think that I can force you to answer that question?  
6. Todd: <3.2> I don't understand/  
7. P1:  .. alright/  
 what if you do an-understand the question  
 ==do you think you can be forced to answer it?  
8. Todd: ==I think so,  
9. P1:  ==you *do?  
10. Todd: yeah  
11. P1:  ==alright/  
 ==as as I say  
 <2.0>I-I can't force you to answer the questions/ [nod]  
 [8 turns omitted, during which P1 and P2 express some frustration, and neither 
‘forcing’ nor ‘understanding the questions’ are mentioned] 
12. P2:  …what’d I just say then/ 
13. Todd: you just told me that um .. that I don't have to answer any questions 
 unless you .. don't force me and I understand what you're talking about or 
 something like that 
14. P2: alright/  
 y- you're on the mark there ok/ 
 .. what it means is that 
 .. if.. you know what the policeman’s job is? 
 [7 turns omitted] 
15. P2:  ..so when the policeman says to you/ 
 do you *have to answer these questions/  
 .. what's your answer?  
16. Todd: <3.4> I'll answer (a few questions)  
 if I .. understand/  
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17. P2:  ==ok/ .. alright/ 
At line 4 Todd gives what appears to be an accurate statement of his right 
to silence “I don’t answer it’s ok”. This could mean ‘if I don’t answer, it’s ok’: 
a hypothetical clause followed by an evaluation. This interpretation is 
supported by the unmarked tense of don’t, contrasting with the statement about 
intention “I’ll answer” in line 16. 
P1 then uses so at line 5, asking Todd to apply this knowledge to infer 
that police ‘can’t force him’ to answer questions. Although Todd at line 6 
seems to say that he doesn’t understand P1’s comprehension question about 
forcing, P1 somewhat unhelpfully reformulates the question at line 7 as 
contingent on Todd understanding “the question”, apparently referring to “a 
question” and “that question” introduced in line 5, in other words the future 
question to which P1 says the caution will apply. Line 7 seems unresponsive to 
Todd’s (unusual) admission of non-understanding, and this difficulty may be 
exacerbated because interpreting line 7 requires reference tracking using 
definiteness. ‘The question’ is likely to refer to a previously introduced 
reference, whereas ‘a question’ (line 5) is likely to be the first time this 
reference has been introduced. However this type of reference tracking may be 
unfamiliar for speakers of Aboriginal languages which do not track reference 
using words like the and a (eg Stirling 2008; Kim, Stirling, & Evans 2001). 
At line 11 P1 says “As I say, I can’t force you to answer the questions”. 
This is the first time this has been stated rather than asked, which may reveal 
another problem with complex sequences of paraphrase, the difficulty of 
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monitoring what has been said. Speakers may think they can “can remember 
verbatim what they and others have said”, but are more likely to remember the 
gist (Coulthard 1994:420). In any event, Todd appears to recall some of this 
preceding language when he states his understanding at line 13.48 He seems to 
have correctly understood that police recognise the undesirability of two 
situations: police forcing Todd, and Todd not understanding questions. Line 13 
suggests an inference that if these undesirable situations occur, the rules about 
answering are different. 
If Todd correctly understood the right to silence as unconditional at line 
4, P1’s subsequent talk about forcing and understanding may have made his 
interpretation less accurate. Perhaps, rather than interpreting the discursive 
intention of lines 5 and 7 as reinforcing and applying Todd’s knowledge, he 
understood them as revising or correcting his understanding and possibly 
making the right to silence conditional. Line 13 is not an acceptable expression 
of the right to silence: it suggests that in the likely situation where police ask a 
                                                 
 
48 It is possible that line 11 had the positive effect of correcting a belief Todd held at line 8 that 
forcing was allowed, and that this is reflected in his answer in line 13. However this forensic 
interpretation of line 8 is doubtful. At line 5 Todd was asked “do you think that I can force you 
to answer that question?” and he replied “I don’t understand”. Line 7 was a complicated version 
of the same question, using passive, agentless modality “do you think you can be forced” to mean 
(presumably) ‘do you think we are allowed to force you’. Todd’s answer at line 8 repeated the 
syntactic frame of the question and not its content: “Do you think …?” “I think so”. So it is not 
clear that Todd at any point thought forcing was allowed. 
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question which is not overtly coercive, and Todd understands it, he must 
answer. Conditional interpretations of the caution are further discussed at 3.5. 
Following line 13, we can again ask how police language affected Todd’s 
understanding. Todd’s answer at line 16 comes after a significant amount of 
talk about the right to silence including several ‘do you understand’ tags but no 
conditional clauses similar to ‘if you understand’. The intervening explanations 
of the right to silence do not seem to have displaced Todd’s belief that ‘if I 
understand’ was relevant to answering the question “do you have to answer”. 
However line 16 may be a less meaningful reflection of Todd’s understanding 
because it is about whether he will answer rather than whether he has to (also 
discussed at 2.4 and 4.1). 
So, while it is impossible to know what was in Todd’s mind, there is 
some evidence suggesting that a correct interpretation (line 4) was replaced 
with an inaccurate conditional interpretation (line 13), then part of that 
interpretation may have persisted (line 16). Police should not assume that 
reformulating the caution repeatedly will improve suspect understanding, 
indeed there may be a kind of ‘law of diminishing returns’ (Kurzon 1996). 
There is no reason to expect that suspects filter out confusing influences and 
only accumulate accurate interpretations of the caution, unless police have an 
effective mechanism for testing suspect interpretations and providing feedback, 
as discussed at 2.4.2. 
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3.4 Hypothetical clauses 
Todd’s inaccurate interpretation of the caution at line 13 of (22) involved 
(semantic) conditions expressed in (grammatical) conditional clauses. I will 
now consider what conditional clauses may mean, at the sentence level. 
Conjunctions like if and unless, which introduce conditional clauses, may 
have two roles: encoding relationships between clauses, and implying that the 
proposition in a clause is hypothetical, contrasting with declarative clauses 
which may suggest that the speaker projects a proposition as true. The 
following examples involve conjunctions which simultaneously deal in 
hypothetical meaning and create relationships between clauses. 
Miller: … it’s your choice if you answer our questions (Lawrence #2 2015) 
Kelly: And it could get you in trouble if you say something. (Spencer #2 1998) 
P2: what will happen if you answer the questions .. do you think later/ (Todd 1995) 
P2: so this man .. might start asking you some questions about that trouble now / 
[cough] .. its up to you if you want to answer him/ (Todd 1995) 
It is necessary to the meaning of these utterances in context that the clause 
introduced by if is hypothetical. Maintaining the epistemic uncertainty of ‘if 
you say something’ is essential; the whole point of the caution is to explain that 
whether the suspect says something is not predetermined, but is for the suspect 
to decide. Existing guidance recommends avoiding if and unless because they 
lack exact equivalents in many languages (Communication of Rights Group 
2015), or being explicit about hypothetical meaning which is sometimes 
encoded using if (Aboriginal Interpreter Service 2016). There is overlap in 
Standard English between if and when, however they can distinguish whether 
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the speaker commits to the truth of the proposition in the clause. If may “set up 
a new mental space distinct from … the speaker’s assumed construal of 
‘reality’” (Dancygier & Sweetser 2000:121), while distancing the speaker from 
“full commitment to the contents of the if-clause”; whereas when commits the 
speaker to the reality described in its clause (ibid:125).  
Elwell (1979:267) reports that in English used at Milingimbi (an 
Aboriginal community), if was sometimes used in same semantic domain as 
SAE when or after. The translated caution closest to languages spoken at 
Milingimbi is in Djambarrpuyngu. In the 2015 Djambarrpuyngu not-in-custody 
translation a hypothetical clause is marked as follows: 
Ŋunhi nhe  ga    yaka  djäl-mirri-yirr      waŋa-nhara-w wo milku-nhara-w 
TEXD 2SG IMPV  NEG desire-PROP-INCH   talk-IV-DAT     or  show-IV-DAT 
 
walalaŋ-gal ŋula      nhaku,   ŋunhi-ny   manymak. 
3PL-ASS INDEF  what.DAT  TEXD-PROM good 
‘If you don’t want to say anything to them or show them anything, that’s ok.’ 
(subtitles in original)  
 
Here ŋunhi creates a conditional clause similar to English if. Ŋunhi can also be 
translated as when, or be indeterminate between the two English meanings 
(Wilkinson 1991:659). Perhaps ŋunhi introduces a proposition which is irrealis 
(not said to have happened). It can also refer deictically to such a proposition, 
as seen in its second appearance above, and another way to translate this 
sentence would be ‘that you don’t want to talk…, that’s ok’. The issue for 
accurate expression of the caution is whether the speaker suggests that the 
proposition is or will be true, or merely poses it as a possibility. Ŋunhi does not 
obviously distinguish between these two possible stances in the way that would 
VLING Thesis Alex Bowen u5989850 
 
 
110 
be encoded by some interpretations of English when and if, suggesting some 
speakers could adopt either of these interpretations of SAE if. 
If the distinction sometimes encoded between if and when is unclear for 
some Aboriginal speakers there is a risk that they will interpret utterances as 
suggesting that police expect suspects to answer (‘what will happen when you 
answer the questions?’). There is no evidence pointing to this possibility as a 
specific cause of suspect misunderstandings, however it has the potential to 
contradict the right to silence, as well as other police statements about the 
caution. This possibility is most obviously applicable to conditional clauses 
which are about future actions (such as answering), rather than states of mind 
(such as wanting). The example below shows an alternative way of making 
clauses hypothetical, but it also shows that talk about wanting may be talk 
about answering, because the speaker implies that if “you like talk”, some talk 
will happen and will be written down. This caution is said to have been used in 
1935 in Alice Springs with an Aboriginal suspect. 
Suppose you no like talk, all right. Suppose you like talk, me puttem along paper, 
takem paper along Court. (Courier-Mail 1935)49 
Suppose indicates that the following clause is hypothetical and the 
listener will be asked to think about the hypothetical and its consequences. 
Some police appear to recognise that if by itself may not reliably convey that 
                                                 
 
49 It is not clear what language(s) the Aboriginal person actually spoke, or whether this was a 
good translation into Pidgin (or Kriol) that was spoken at the time. 
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what follows is hypothetical. It is possible to join clauses using if while 
clarifying that the speaker does not presuppose that the event in the if-clause 
will happen: 
Miller: … So if you do choose to say something, then that’s recorded on that machine 
and those disks then go to the courthouse, and the magistrate will listen to those disks, 
lawyers, and that’s the evidence. Ok? (Lawrence #1 2015)  
Miller’s inclusion of “do choose to” suggests Miller does not presuppose 
that Lawrence will say something. Do implies a contrast with ‘if you don’t 
choose’, and along with choose (further discussed at 4.2.1.3), may suggest that 
the contents of the if-clause are only one possible choice. 
If a speaker is understood to assert propositions as likely to become true 
(because if is interpreted as something like when), this could suggest that police 
are discussing a series of expected situations, rather than mere possibilities. 
This could make the discourse relationship between versions of the caution less 
clear, obscuring the intention to present multiple versions of a single text. 
Possible interpretations like ‘when I ask a question, do you have to answer?’, 
‘when you don’t want to talk to me, do you have to talk to me?’, and ‘when you 
want to answer my questions you can’ may suggest (more strongly than if the 
clauses were understood as purely hypothetical) that each statement or question 
is only about situations where the condition is satisfied. This could also 
contribute to interpretations of the right to silence as subject to conditions. 
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3.5 Conditional interpretations 
We can now return to Todd’s ‘conditional’ interpretation of the caution 
seen in (22): 
13. Todd: you just told me that um .. that I don't have to answer any questions unless 
you .. don't force me and I understand what you're talking about or something like 
that 
This appears to involve conditional clauses (a grammatical category) limiting 
the meaning of the caution to situations in which particular (semantic) 
conditions are satisfied. Todd’s first condition “unless you don’t force me” 
uses language that was not presented by police in a conditional clause, but in 
declarative clauses such as “I can’t force you…” (line 11), and questions. 
Todd’s second condition “[unless] I understand…” reflects P1’s conditional “If 
you do understand” (line 7). 
The right to silence is always the same, and the answer to “do you have 
to answer?” is always ‘no’. However conditional clauses may be used to 
highlight when the right becomes relevant. Hall produced these if-clauses in 
(14): 
If you don’t wanna’ talk to me, do you have to talk to me? 
So, if I ask a question, do you have to answer me? 
If I put questions to you and you don’t wanna’ answer them, does that mean you 
can be quiet? 
The right is salient when a police officer asks questions, and even more so if 
the suspect doesn’t want to answer them. The clauses above are probably 
intended to contextualise the questions, and putting them at the start of 
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sentences may create temporal iconicity, putting ideas in chronological order 
(Kurzon 1996). However they could be interpreted as limiting the meaning of 
the questions by making them logically conditional. A suspect might think that 
what is under discussion is a diversity of rules which apply in different 
situations, and this interpretation is more likely if the relationship between 
formulations of the caution is also unclear. 
Anthony received a caution with a different condition: 
Extract (26): Anthony  
1. P: =alright=,  
== but before I ask you any .. *questions, ... in relation to *that, 
.. I must *tell you that/ .. you don't have to talk to me  
 ==unless you want to,  
[9 turns omitted] 
2. P: =d= –do you have to talk to me?  
3. Anthony:.. only if you want to// 
4. P: sorry? 
It must be noted that Anthony failed to adjust the pronoun you to I in his 
restatement at line 3, while he did correctly process the negation (from “don’t 
… unless” to “do … only if”).50 This suggests he reproduced language which 
                                                 
 
50 The Plain English Legal Dictionary (Northern Territory Criminal Law) (ARDS et al 2015:11) 
avoids unless because it tends to put clauses in reverse chronological order. This is the case here: 
P’s language in line 1 puts talking before wanting, but in reality, (not) wanting to talk must 
precede a decision to (not) talk. Anthony’s statement in line 4 suggests he correctly processed 
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he had incompletely processed. However he accurately restated the caution as 
given by P: it follows logically from line 1 that ‘you have to talk to me if you 
want to’. To derive the canonical caution from this, Anthony would have to 
infer that there is in fact no compulsion because it is a contradiction to compel 
someone and give them a choice. It appears Anthony did not make this 
inference, possibly because he had not processed the language. Therefore he 
may have thought that this information only applied in situations where the 
condition was satisfied (whatever that might mean), and he may not have 
linked this language, at that time, with other understanding he had of the 
caution as a general statement. 
In contrast, an apparently meaningful condition is seen in the exchange 
below. 
Extract (27): RR (2009) 
1. Richardson (police): If he doesn't want to answer my questions or tell me any 
story, what, what can he do? 
[discussion between interpreter and suspect, not transcribed] 
2. Parry (interpreter): He said that he’s not going to say anything. 
3. Richardson: He’s what sorry? 
4. Parry: He’s not going to say anything. 
5. Richardson: Ok, and that’s his choice. 
                                                 
 
this clause structure, though this may not be the same as understanding the meaning inside the 
clauses. 
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RR’s lawyers argued that this conversation represented an attempted 
exercise of his right to silence. This would imply that he did not directly 
answer the question in line 1 about what he ‘can’ do, but meant to state what he 
was ‘going to’ do. Justice Riley found that the answers meant that “in 
circumstances where he did not want to answer questions or tell his story he 
was not going to say anything”.51 
It is difficult to analyse what RR may have meant because a lot is 
unknown about the interpreting,52 and the meaning of question and answer 
depends on subtleties of modality (“can” in line 1 and perhaps “not going to” in 
line 2). Justice Riley’s interpretation is consistent with the question. In any 
event, the interpretation in which line 2 is hypothetical and not a declaration of 
actual intention depends on treatment of the if-clause as a condition limiting the 
meaning of the question and answer. Because the answer is about what will 
                                                 
 
51 R v RR (2009) 25 NTLR 92 at [62]. Justice Riley based this interpretation on “hearing the 
whole of the recorded discussion and taking the answer in context”, not all of which is available 
here, and on RR’s subsequent offer to tell his story. It is possible the subsequent offer to talk 
represented a renegotiation by RR. 
52 Conversation in the other language is not transcribed and would not have been understood by 
Richardson. However, Richardson could have improved the clarity of this exchange by talking 
to the suspect, not the interpreter (‘If you don’t want to answer my questions or tell me any story, 
what can you do?’), which might have generated a more transparent answer in the first person 
from the interpreter. Further, Richardson chose to confirm the answer by asserting “that’s his 
choice”, but he could have asked about the answer in a different way to clarify whether the 
answer was about the nature and existence of RR’s choice or an actual exercise of it. 
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happen, it matters whether it is constrained by the condition. If the answer had 
been ‘I can say nothing’, its interpretation would not be affected by the 
condition. 
This contrasts with the informed interpretation of the same condition in 
the common formulation “if you don’t want to answer any of our questions, 
you don’t have to” (Lawrence #1 2015). This is logically equivalent to “you 
don't have to talk to me unless you want to” seen above in (26), and successful 
processing of the if-clause should lead to meaning which is not limited by the 
condition (i.e. you don’t have to answer, whether you want to or not). 
It appears that in processing an utterance with an if-condition, the hearer 
must start by applying the condition. In some cases, modality (discussed at 4.1) 
or related semantics such as force (see 4.2.1.4) in the if-clause interacts 
semantically with modality in the main clause and the condition can be 
recognised as non-limiting. In other cases, such as (27) where the relevant 
clause (“he’s not going to say anything”) is in the future tense, the condition 
continues to limit meaning. It is possible that the suspect language in (26) and 
(27) above shows suspects at a stage of incomplete processing, further 
evidenced by Anthony’s failure to adjust pronoun deixis. At 4.1 I will discuss 
evidence that modality in the caution is difficult for suspects to interpret, and in 
some cases suspects may never interpret these conditions correctly. 
This analysis does not explain why Todd appeared to create a condition 
in (22) from language about forcing which did not originate in a conditional 
clause. At 3.3 I argued Todd may have recognised the undesirability of two 
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situations: police forcing Todd, and Todd not understanding questions. His 
expression of both situations using conditional clauses may not have been 
carefully thought out, or it may suggest that he thought the purpose of the 
discourse was to identify conditions which constrain or shape the right to 
silence. 
It is unclear how the conditional suspect utterances above would affect 
suspects’ ability to derive a coherent interpretation of the caution. However the 
complex variations of the caution they imply would be difficult to make sense 
of or operationalise as relevant to the interview speech event. Conditional 
interpretations may contribute to inaccurate interpretations of other clauses, for 
example the interpretation of “If you don’t wanna’ talk to me, do you have to 
talk to me?” as ‘if you don’t wanna talk to me, will you talk to me?’. Evidence 
of the latter interpretation was seen at 2.4, and this interpretation gives a clear 
role to the conditional clause: it is a question about what the suspect will do if 
that condition is fulfilled. The correct interpretation requires the suspect to 
process the condition as non-limiting context. 
Conditional interpretations of the caution mean suspects are doing 
redundant work, trying to interpret and apply logical conditions when the right 
to silence is actually unconditional. This problem may be avoided by providing 
better initial context for the caution and clarifying the status of reformulations, 
as well as by avoiding difficult modality (see 4.1). 
Two topics could be included in the caution’s initial context: what is 
under discussion is one rule (so reformulations of the caution are ways of 
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saying the same thing, not different things), and the caution is something which 
becomes relevant when questions are asked in the interview. 
Davis et al. (2011:92) in designing a caution comprehension study 
included a sentence “to alert suspects to the fact that they would receive two 
important pieces of information that they needed to understand” because 
learning and memory are aided by categorisation, while the suspect is 
“typically on the receiving end of a seamless stream of instructions and 
questions from the police”. Once again, police could introduce the caution 
using a clear announcement similar to the current translations: 
When the police talk to you about this trouble, the police must follow two laws 
carefully. 
Listen carefully to these two laws. 
Law number one says this: (subtitles to 2015 in-custody translations) 
In 2.3.3 I argued that police announcements tend to suggest the caution is 
something which must be completed before the interview, rather than 
something which will apply during questioning. If the latter was explained, it 
might clarify the contextualising purpose of clauses like ‘if I ask you 
questions’. The above translation also clarifies that the laws apply “when the 
police talk to you about this trouble”. 
3.6 Conclusion 
No utterance stands alone in discourse, and when police produce many 
utterances about the caution it is difficult to predict how suspects will 
understand those utterances to relate to each other and to the police message. 
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There is limited evidence about how suspects interpret police discourse, but 
that evidence suggests police reformulations of the caution can feed confusion 
as well as improving understanding. 
Conditional clauses used by police to contextualise caution utterances 
have the potential to complicate both the meaning of individual utterances and 
their relationships with other information about the caution. Some suspect 
responses suggest they may interpret caution language as containing 
propositions constrained by conditions. Conditional interpretations of the 
caution are inaccurate, and also increase the risk that suspects will not realise 
that only one caution is under discussion. 
Caution conversations could be clarified by explanation at the outset that 
only one caution is under discussion and may be explained in different ways, 
and that the caution will affect the subsequent interview. Otherwise, complex 
discourse sequences might be avoided by explaining the caution in the clearest 
possible way from the beginning, rather than relying on a ‘scattergun’ 
paraphrase approach. The next chapter will attempt to identify the best ways to 
explain the caution. 
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4 What does the caution mean? 
In this chapter I will investigate how police express the caution, how 
suspects may interpret police language, and the possibility of gaps between 
readily inferable information and information that suspects need to derive a 
reasonable interpretation of the right to silence in their individual contexts. 
A core linguistic issue for the standard text of the caution is that modal 
expressions, especially don’t have to, are unreliable in communicating the 
caution to suspects in this study. Numerous paraphrases of the right to silence 
are present in police language and translations. Analysis suggests that some are 
more likely than others to be effective. 
Police separately address the ‘right to silence’ and the ‘consequences of 
speaking’. Arguably, it is also necessary for the caution to address the 
consequences of silence, which are not mentioned in the original text, but can 
perhaps be inferred from the right to silence. Meanwhile, the meaning of “used 
in evidence” is complex and seems to be neglected. 
4.1 The semantics of modality 
4.1.1 Problems with modal meaning 
Police usually start the caution conversation with a roughly canonical 
version of the caution involving the words ‘don’t have to’. The following is 
typical: 
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Miller: … before we can talk to you about that, I need to give you that caution again. 
Ok? So you don’t have to say anything today, but if you do choose to say something, 
then that can be used as evidence in court. Ok? (Lawrence #1 2015) 
Of the 21 conversations examined in this study where the transcript appears to 
start from the beginning, in 18 police first expressed the caution using don’t 
have to (or do not have to), reflecting the standard text. This is despite 
longstanding recommendations that don’t have to should be avoided in the 
caution for Aboriginal speakers (Mildren 1997:11; Cooke 1998:187; see also 
McKay 1985). In the other three interviews, police first used not obliged, 
which was historically a standard formulation,53 though its use attracted 
specific criticism from Blokland J in BM (2015), and obliged is low-frequency 
lexis (Davis et al. 2011). For some suspects, a standard version of the caution 
may be comprehensible without any further explanation. However any suspect 
would need to make some inferences to conclude that remaining silent is a 
legally accredited option which will not attract negative consequences. 
4.1.1.1 Identifying modality 
Don’t have to is one of a number of constructions in English which deal 
in modal meaning. Modality can be defined as “the grammaticalization of 
speakers’ (subjective) attitudes and opinions” about a proposition (Palmer 
1986:16). Another (Palmer 1986:34) criterion for identifying modal verbs is 
that they cannot be made imperative, despite having agentive subjects. SAE 
                                                 
 
53 The history of the caution text was discussed at 1.2.2. 
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modals whose meaning is contentious in this study include (don’t) have to, can, 
and want to. 
Modal meaning is traditionally divided into epistemic (relating to 
speakers’ claims of knowledge and belief) (Lyons 1977:793) and deontic or 
root modality (“concerned with the necessity or possibility of acts performed 
by morally responsible agents”) (Lyons 1977:823). Coates (1983) analyses 
modal auxiliaries from corpora of British English and shows how each modal 
auxiliary has both epistemic and deontic meanings, and that it can be very 
difficult to determine which meaning applies to a given usage. Language 
merely provides hypotheses for inferential interpretation (Sperber & Wilson 
1995), and hearers distinguishing between modal meanings need context. 
Interpreting modals may be difficult for NNS hearers, and ARDS, NAAJA & 
AIS (2015:10–11) produced plain English definitions of legal terms avoiding 
could, would, should, (don’t) have to, can and need largely because of the 
ambiguity of their modal meanings. 
Perhaps unconventionally, I will include want and wish (when they take a 
propositional complement) in my consideration of modality, because in this 
study there is no sound basis to distinguish volition from other subjective 
attitudes and opinions which modify propositions. Coates (1983) includes 
volition as one meaning of would, will and shall. Eades (1983) describes 
several modals in Southeast Queensland Aboriginal English having something 
to do with the predictability of a future action, which depends on factors 
outside the agent’s control (prediction of which is epistemic) and factors within 
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the agent’s control (volition). Might in Aboriginal English means that a future 
action depends on factors beyond the speaker’s control, unlike SAE where it 
suggests indecision (ibid:268) when used with a first person subject. 
Aboriginal English will is used mostly by first person agents (who can better 
perceive their own volition) and means a future action is predicted with some 
definiteness (ibid:271). Gonna is used for future actions with little certainty, 
whereas wanna is used to express firm intention in relation to a predictable 
future action (ibid:287). In Kriol, the volitive marker wana expresses 
“immediate future” (Schultze-Berndt, Ponsonnet, & Angelo in prep.).These 
meanings differ from SAE in the way they balance elements of volition and 
prediction, possibly reflecting different assumptions about the agency of 
individuals. 
Volition can also be related to deontic modality. Coates (1983:20–21) 
argues that the category of deontic modality is too narrow if defined by 
obligation and permission, and that a peripheral meaning of this type of 
modality is in fact “it is important that…”. Mildren, identifying don’t have to 
as a problematic formulation for the caution, suggested some Aboriginal 
speakers may interpret have to as want to (1997:11). People may ‘want’ to do 
something because they have to do it. Police often state that they ‘want’ to 
question someone about a particular incident, but they ‘want’ to do this to 
satisfy a bundle of institutional rules and objectives requiring them to collect 
evidence in a particular way. 
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Suspects in this study are probably acting as learners of SAE as a L2 or 
D2. Epistemic and deontic modality are said to be present from early in second 
language acquisition (Dittmar & Terborg 1991), probably because adult 
speakers need both for basic communication (Stephany 1995), though Elturki 
& Salsbury (2016) found that Arab learners of English acquired can and will 
first, and “periphrastic” modals (such as have to) later. Modality in a second 
language is hard to master and poses considerable challenges for second 
language teaching (Tyler 2008), including for Aboriginal students (Moses & 
Wigglesworth 2008:139). 
The caution importantly uses modality to create deontic meaning, about 
who is and isn’t allowed to do what. If don’t have to is interpreted with a 
meaning other than the permissive meaning police intend, even by some 
Aboriginal suspects, this is a serious problem. As with many difficulties in the 
caution, modality may be problematic for native English speakers: don’t have 
to (Kurzon 1996) and may (Cotterill 2000, 2005) have been identified as 
containing difficult modal meaning in English. Rock (2007:56) argues that an 
epistemic reading of “the police may question you without a solicitor” could 
suggest the police have “unregulated power”. Strategies to reduce ambiguity 
which will be discussed below may be relevant for many suspects. 
4.1.1.2 Obligation and future meaning 
A key problem with have to in the caution is that it may not be clear to 
some suspects that its meaning is primarily about obligation rather than future 
tense. Links between these two meanings can be seen in modals in Aboriginal 
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Englishes and Kriol (remembering that the boundary between these varieties is 
not clear), especially the modals gotta, garra, and gada. McKay (1985) noted 
that gotta often has simple future meaning in Aboriginal English. These 
meanings of gotta, possibly shared with gonna, are also noted by (Harkins 
1994:88) in Alice Springs Aboriginal English. In SAE, Gonna may be used for 
simple future, unlike gotta (although the boundary is not absolute, for example 
‘we gotta go’ likely means that we will go in the near future). 
In Kriol, gada (also garra) primarily expresses future meaning, but 
obligation is also a frequent meaning (Schultze-Berndt et al. in prep.). Gona 
can be used for future tense but is less common than gada (ibid). Translations 
of the caution suggest that garra/gada is the most relevant Kriol modal for 
expressing the meaning usually contained in (positive) have to, as well as other 
meaning. The 1997 Kriol translation of the caution displays a range of 
meanings of garra as well as labda: 
Wanim  yu     garra  dum?   Yu    labda  jinggabat  miselp  na. 
What     you   will  do?   you   must  think  REFL  now 
‘What will you do? You must think for yourself now’  
yu  na  garra  jinggabat wanim  yu  garra  dum 
you   now must  think  what  you will  do 
‘Now you must think about what you will do’ (my translations) 
 
Although Labda is etymologically from ‘will have to’, it normally expresses 
practical necessity (Schultze-Berndt et al. in prep.), and its use above seems to 
be more about the practical need to think (because a choice must be made), 
than a specific obligation to think. The first line involves garra expressing 
simple future. In the second line, “Yu na garra jinggabat” seems to involve 
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garra expressing obligation. This is consistent with the possible collapsing of 
gonna and gotta discussed above (noting that in SAE, ‘you will now think 
about…’ could imply obligation similar to ‘you must now think about…”). In 
contrast, “wanim yu garra dum” appears to refer to what the suspect will 
ultimately do, which appears to be about future tense and not obligation, like 
gonna. 
Some speakers of Kriol or Aboriginal Englishes hearing the caution in 
SAE may interpret have to as similar to garra, with the potential to express 
either obligation or future. We will see that this may explain some suspect 
responses. 
4.1.1.3 Modal negation 
A further complication for suspect understanding of don’t have to is the 
meaning of negated modals in SAE. A distinction can be drawn in SAE 
between negation of the modal and negation of the main proposition. 
1. (a) You must [not answer the questions] = (b) You must [remain silent] 
2. (a) You [need not] answer the questions ≠ (b) You need to remain silent 
In the first sentence, must expresses the speaker’s attitude that you are obliged 
to do the thing that follows. The proposition can be negative ‘not answer the 
questions’ or have a similar meaning without negation ‘remain silent’. 1(a) and 
(b) express roughly the same sentence meaning, showing that the meaning of 
must is unchanged by negation. In the second example, it is the attitude (that 
you need to do the thing) which is negated, and attempting the same 
substitution as in 1 generates a different sentence meaning. Whereas the 
VLING Thesis Alex Bowen u5989850 
 
 
127 
speaker of 2(a) deems it appropriate for you to answer questions, the speaker of 
2(b) does not. Don’t have to has the same negative scope as need not, 
seemingly independent of word order or the fact that it can only be negated 
using an auxiliary (don’t). Though some weaker deontic modals such as may 
and can can negate in both ways, most English modals (unlike modals in some 
other languages) appear to select from the two types of negation based on a 
semantic property of each modal (De Haan 1997). This means there are 
unlikely to be grammatical clues if a NNS suspect intends ‘nonstandard’ 
negation. 
There is evidence that for some Aboriginal speakers of English, don’t 
have to may have a meaning different to SAE. Cooke (1998:146–47) gives a 
clear example of a Yolngu speaker who says “I don’t have to talk about my 
brother” meaning ‘It is inappropriate for me to talk about my brother’ (for 
cultural reasons). The speaker appears to remain oblivious of the SAE 
meaning, even though the questioning non-Aboriginal lawyer explicitly seeks 
clarification on this point (ibid). It appears the meaning he attributed to have to 
was consistent with SAE, however the way he intended the negation was not, 
following instead the way must negates in SAE. Further evidence is that the 
same speaker later said “Have to respect older brother” (ibid:147), using have 
to without negation consistently with its SAE meaning. 
In Kriol, the common negative of both gada and labda is gan (from 
English can’t), which semantically merges impossibility and negative future 
(Schultze-Berndt et al. in prep.). Negation of gada is rare, but if used would 
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mean something like ‘never again’ (ibid). These negative meanings, perhaps 
ranging between SAE can’t and won’t, do not seem consistent with the 
permissive meaning of don’t have to. A caution understood to mean “you must 
not answer the questions” (Cooke 2009a) would be very strange and maybe 
uninterpretable, and would not at all convey that the suspect is entitled to 
remain silent.54 
4.1.2 Modals in the caution conversation 
4.1.2.1 Suspects’ modals 
The data in this study does not allow a definitive analysis of what 
Aboriginal suspects ‘mean’ or ‘understand’ by English modals, however it 
does provide some examples of suspects using English modals inconsistently 
with their SAE meanings. 
Extracts (28): Spencer #1 (1998) 
1. Spencer: Can't contact any legal aid, I can't hey, contact any interpreters. I can 
speak with my own weight. 
2. Sullivan: So you don't want legal aid contacted? 
3. Spencer: No thankyou. 
4. Sullivan: And you don't want any interpreters? 
5. Spencer: I will not contact any interpreters. 
                                                 
 
54 An interpretation that ‘you must not answer the questions if you don’t want to’ may seem 
reasonable to some suspects. However it may then be unclear what police mean when they say 
‘you don’t have to answer’ without the condition ‘if you don’t want to’.  
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Spencer #2 (the following day) 
6. Kelly: Okay. Anything you do say from now, from now on will be recorded on 
this tape or another tape and that may later be used in evidence in court. Do you 
understand that? 
7. Spencer: Yeah. 
8. Kelly: Do you know what happens in court? 
9. Spencer: Yeah I know. They, the tape has to be shown to the judge. 
Spencer #3 (later that day) 
10. Kelly: Can you just explain in your own, do you understand that you don't have 
to answer my questions? 
11. Spencer: (inaudible) answer it. 
12. Kelly: Right ho. 
13. Spencer: (inaudible) I can answer. 
14. Kelly: Okay, so but you understand if you. 
15. Spencer: It's my ability to. 
16. Kelly: Yep. So if you don't want to answer you don't have you know that? 
17. Spencer: No I don't have to answer. 
Spencer’s use of modality is, from a SAE perspective, nonstandard. His 
use of can’t in line 1 to express negative future (later expressed as “will not” in 
line 5) is consistent with the description of Kriol gan. There is no indication 
that Spencer spoke Kriol (his L1 was Warlpiri), however it is possible he spoke 
a form of Aboriginal English as an L2. When Spencer says “the tape has to be 
shown to the judge” in line 9, he may mean simple future, consistent with the 
meaning of gada. There is nothing (else) to suggest he thinks that there is a 
requirement to show the tape to the judge, and he has just been told that the 
tape “may later be used in evidence in court” (line 6). Spencer appears to 
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demonstrate understanding of the right to silence at line 17, and Spencer’s 
caution was judged acceptable by the Court. While the single example of 
Spencer saying “has to” is only slight evidence, the ambiguous modality used 
by police and Spencer mean it is uncertain what he means when he says “I 
don't have to answer”. There is no clear evidence about how Spencer might 
understand the negation of have to. 
Age appears to interpret questions involving have to as meaning simple 
future. 
Extract (29): Age #1 (2010) 
1. Walters: So if I ask you a question do you have to tell me answer. 
2. Age: Yeah I answer it. 
3. Walters: Yeah no – no. you – you – you don’t have to tell me anything you can 
sit quiet if you want. 
4. Age: No (inaudible) 
5. Walters: Alright. So if – if I ask you a question do you have to tell me the 
answer? 
6. Age: Yeah. 
7. Walters: no you don’t. okay do you – do you understand that you don’t have to 
answer my questions? 
8. Age: nah – (inaudible) 
9. Walters: okay. alright. so if I ask you a question do you have to tell me anything 
about that question? 
10. Age: mm – yeah. 
11. Walters: no. 
12. Age: no worries. 
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13. Walters: okay. that’s –that’s the thing Steven you don’t have to answer my 
questions. okay. alright. so if I ask you what colour’s your shirt do you have to 
tell me? 
14. Age: yeah. 
15. Walters: No you can sit quiet. You don’t have to tell me what colour your shirt 
is. you don’t have to answer anything I say alright. So again just to make sure 
that you’re (inaudible) with how this works. Alright. If I ask you a question you 
don’t have to tell me anything. okay. So if I ask you a question do you have to 
tell me anything? 
16. Age: Yeah well I tell you the truth. 
Justice Blokland interpreted this conversation as indicating that Age 
thought he had to speak to police (his interview was ultimately rejected by the 
Court), however it is not clear that Age was speaking about obligation at all. 
The question at line 1 is intended to be about obligation, but Age’s answer 
appears to be about intention or prediction. The preceding discussion of 
modality in Aboriginal English and Kriol suggests that an interpretation of 
have to as similar to garra could invoke either obligation or future meaning, 
with future a more common meaning in Kriol. Age is said to be a speaker of 
English, though there is little detail about this in the judgement, and he could 
be a speaker of Aboriginal English. 
For Age, the questions ‘do you have to tell me…’ could have an 
interpretation ‘will you tell me…’. Like any hearer deciding between possible 
meanings, Age would call on context to look for a relevant interpretation. 
Hearers start with the most accessible context, seeking to make a reasonable 
investment of cognitive effort to obtain cognitive effects by applying utterances 
to context (Sperber & Wilson 1995). Relevant context might include Age’s 
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understanding of the objectives of the speaker who is asking the question, and 
Walters repeatedly suggests that s/he intends to ask Age questions. The 
question ‘will you tell me the answer?’ would be consistent with an objective 
of negotiating whether Age will answer those questions in the interview which 
is about to happen (discussed at 2.4.1). It would also be an interpretation that 
relates to the personal interaction between the two speakers, rather than a 
general discussion of ideas. The simple future interpretation may appear most 
relevant to what Age understands to be happening, which could explain Age’s 
answers about whether he will answer. 
The intended meaning of ‘do you have to tell me…’ is a question about 
Age’s understanding of information, a purpose which may be less obvious, as 
discussed at 2.4. If Age had been told that the right to silence was a rule that 
would apply to the interview, it might be clear that understanding the right was 
at least as immediately relevant as deciding whether Age would answer 
questions, making it easier to see why Walters would ask about that 
understanding. If Age had been told that questions would be asked for the 
purpose of checking his understanding of the caution, this could have made a 
comprehension-checking interpretation of the question even more salient.  
At line 6, Age gives a polar answer “yeah” to the same ‘do you have to’ 
question (and again at lines 10 and 14). Any of these answers taken alone 
might be interpreted as ‘yeah I have to’, but an interpretation consistent with 
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line 2 would be ‘yeah I will’.55 Numerous reformulations (all involving don’t 
have to, though Walters also says “you can sit quiet”) failed to address the 
miscommunication, evidenced by Age’s final answer at line 16, which is 
probably still about intention. 
The meaning of Age’s unusual admission that he did not understand is 
unclear. If Age could not understand the language, he might guess the answer 
to the questions from the negative statements. If Age heard ‘you don’t 
(something). Do you (something)?’ the answer ‘no’ might be a reasonable 
guess, especially after several repetitions of the question (and negative 
feedback, discussed at 2.4.2, including Walters’s rejection “no you don’t” in 
line 7). But Age appears not to have manipulated negation in this way, 
suggesting the question had some meaning for him and he thought that 
promising to answer was a desirable response. An alternative explanation of 
Age’s denial of understanding is that he could not identify a relevant 
interpretation of Walters’s don’t have to statements. Noting the potential for 
nonstandard interpretation of negated modals, it is difficult to predict how these 
statements might have been interpreted, but possibilities include ‘you must not 
talk’ and ‘you will not talk’, both of which would be difficult to make sense of 
                                                 
 
55 It is possible that Age did not understand these questions and the “yeah” answers were 
gratuitous concurrence (see 2.4.1), however there is evidence against both of these possibilities: 
Age was able to interpret (incorrectly) the similar question in line 1, and he gave a dispreferred 
answer “nah” in line 8. 
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in the discourse. It appears Age believed the topic was whether he would 
answer, and he may have failed to derive anything from Walters’s language 
which would affect his decision about answering. 
“Yeah well” in line 16 may be further evidence of rejection of Walter’s 
preceding contribution, perhaps because it did not seem relevant. In line 16 
Age reasserts what he believed to be the desirable response. He strengthens his 
commitment with an additional promise to tell the truth, perhaps implying he 
thought that his previous commitment to answer was not firm enough and the 
question of whether (and how) he would answer was still under negotiation. It 
seems that Age did not diverge at any time in (29) from his understanding that 
the questions were about whether he would answer. Evidence that other 
suspects appear to have similar interpretations was seen at 2.4.2: 
Extract (18): Lawrence #1 (2015) 
1. Miller: … if we ask you a question, do you have to answer that, do you have to 
say anything? 
2. Lawrence: Yeah, it’s ok.  
Extract (19): BM #1 (2014) 
1. Hall: … if I ask a question, do you have to answer me? 
2. BM: Yes, sir. 
Extract (20): Anthony (1995) 
1. P: do you have to talk to me?  
2. Anthony: ==sure 
The interpretation of the caution as a negotiation of ‘will you talk to me’, 
apparently shared by several suspects, is a complete misunderstanding of the 
caution activity and the caution meaning. The analysis in preceding chapters 
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suggests it is not straightforward to correct this kind of misunderstanding once 
it arises. 
4.1.2.2 Police modals 
Modals other than don’t have to are used by police in versions of the 
caution. Modals have already been seen in police announcements of the caution 
at 2.3.1, typically indicating that police are required to deliver the caution. 
Below, other modals are highlighted and possible intended meanings are noted, 
following Coates (1983:26). 
Extracts (30) 
Lee: … You can either talk to me or sit there and be quiet (Age #2 2010) – deontic 
possibility 
Richardson: Nothing that we can do can force you to tell us that story” (RR 2008) – 
deontic possibility, deontic possibility 
Miller: … So if you don’t want to answer any of our questions, you don’t have to. 
Ok? So if we ask you something you can stay silent - ah - you could say, ‘no 
comment’. (Lawrence #1 2015) – volition, obligation, deontic possibility, hypothesis 
Butcher: … Dominic if you do say anything what you say is gonna' be recorded on 
these tapes as I explained before. One of these tapes can be used as evidence in Court. 
Who might listen to that in court? Who would listen to the tape? (Cumaiyi 2003) – 
prediction, deontic possibility, epistemic possibility, hypothesis 
Kelly: And it could get you in trouble if you say something. (Spencer #2 1998) – 
deontic possibility 
Pfitzner: Now, if you don’t wanna say anything to us, that’s perfectly all right, okay?  
You don’t have to say anything.  If you want to say your story, you can say your 
story too. That’s okay as well. Do you understand that? (Rankin #1 1998) – volition, 
obligation, volition, deontic possibility 
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The semantic descriptions noted above represent an attempt to 
distinguish senses of each modal using context. These descriptions probably do 
not capture the contextualised meaning of each modal. The difficulty of 
distinguishing meanings of don’t have to is illustrated by this example. 
Mora: Alright too easy. Mate you seem pretty switched on I don't have to explain it 
that much for you (KR) 
Mora’s don’t have to may be about practical necessity (‘It’s not necessary for 
me to explain it that much because you seem to understand it’), but this is 
difficult to distinguish from (deontic) obligation (‘I am not obliged to explain it 
to you further because your level of understanding meets the requirements’), 
noting that Mora would not be explaining the caution at all of it were not for 
various requirements. Coates (1983:55) concludes that have to expresses the 
unitary meaning ‘it is necessary’. 
To reduce the need for fine distinctions between modal senses, I propose 
to analyse modal language with a version of Papafragou’s (2000) modal 
domains, which can describe the meaning of modal utterances focusing on the 
context they invoke, applying Relevance Theory. This involves identifying a 
proposition P, a modal domain D, and a relationship between them. This 
analysis reveals that there are up to five main domains represented in police 
language: 
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Table (31): Modal domains in police language 
 Modal utterance Modal description Nature of domain 
1 “I have to caution you 
that…” 
“I don’t have to explain 
it that much” 
P[I caution you] is 
entailed by D1 
P[I explain it a lot] is 
not entailed by D1 
D1: rules about the 
caution speech event 
2 “you don’t have to 
answer” 
“you can either talk to 
me or…” 
P[you answer] is not 
entailed by D2 
P[you talk to me] is 
consistent with D2 
D2: rules and 
projected roles in 
the substantive 
interview56 
3 “tapes can be used as 
evidence in court” 
 
“it could get you in 
trouble if…” 
P[tapes are used as 
evidence in court] is 
consistent with D3 
P[you get in trouble] is 
consistent with D3 
D3: expected legal 
process after the 
interview 
4 “if you don’t want to 
answer” 
P[you don’t answer] is 
consistent with D4 
D4: suspect’s 
volition 
5 “I want to ask you 
some questions” 
P[I ask you some 
questions] is consistent 
with D5 
D5: police 
institutional 
objectives 
 
These descriptions do not account for all semantic distinctions (for example 
between can and could in domain 3), though this should be possible with 
further refinement. However the difference between senses appears less critical 
to the meaning of the caution than what the modals are ‘about’. For example, it 
would be somewhat acceptable to swap the modal operators and say ‘tapes 
could be used in evidence’ and ‘it can get you in trouble if you talk’, whereas if 
                                                 
 
56 As I will discuss below at 4.1.3, this modal domain may also necessarily include the ‘legal 
process after the interview’. The fact that this is not intuitive is part of the problem identified in 
that analysis. 
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suspects are unable to identify the modal domains they are unlikely to have 
even an approximately accurate interpretation of the modal. Hearers must 
recover the identity of the modal domain pragmatically, and it should be a 
domain which “the speaker could reasonably have intended to be optimally 
relevant for the addressee” (Papafragou 2000:49). So hearers need some way of 
knowing which domains of context are under discussion. This analysis 
identifies domains which police could highlight to make interpretation of 
modals easier. 
I have repeatedly argued that it would be useful to clarify that the caution 
is about rules which will apply to the interview. This might provide some 
useful context for the interpretation of modals. The analysis above also implies 
that police distinguish on some levels between the caution speech event and the 
interview which follows it. In fact, the five modal domains represent a 
complicated mix of types of context including procedural or cultural 
information about police and legal institutions (domains 1, 2, 3, 5), speech 
events (domains 1 and 2), and volition (domain 4, probably not ‘factual’ 
context at all). If these contextual domains are required to explain the caution, 
then police could specify that they are under discussion. 
4.1.3 Source of compulsion: who does not require you to answer? 
Careful consideration of modality can also reveal deeper issues in the 
meaning of the caution and assumptions required to interpret it, and this helps 
to clarify the core content of the caution. 
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‘You don’t have to answer’ suggests the absence of requirement to 
answer. Don’t have to and related expressions can be expected to get their 
meaning by overturning a belief about compulsion that the hearer is likely to 
hold. This is predicted by Grice's (1989) ‘Maxim of Relation’, or by the 
presumption that the utterance is relevant (Sperber & Wilson 1995). There are 
many things a person doesn’t have to do, but most of them are not relevant and 
talking about them would require the hearer to do unjustified work processing 
the utterances. A speaker who says ‘you don’t have to answer’ must have a 
salient reason to think that the hearer might believe s/he must answer. 
As noted above, if utterances are described in terms of modal domains, 
the identity of the domain should be a domain which “the speaker could 
reasonably have intended to be optimally relevant for the addressee” 
(Papafragou 2000:49). An utterance can be relevant by affecting the hearer’s 
assumptions, including by contradiction an assumption the hearer holds.57 
However a speaker can only intend to talk about assumptions which the 
speaker is aware of. So the domain the speaker could reasonably have intended 
to be relevant should be one which speaker and hearer share some orientation 
towards. If it is not clear to the hearer what kind of compulsion the speaker has 
                                                 
 
57 Papafragou also argues that can and may (whose permissive meaning can be related to don’t 
have to) often achieve cognitive effect because the hearer’s context includes an assumption that 
a proposition is incompatible with some domain, and can or may contradict that assumption. 
(2000:56). Similarly, negative utterances “presuppose the existence in the immediately 
accessible context of their affirmative counterparts” (2000:56-7). 
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in mind, a don’t have to statement may not invoke any interpretation relevant 
to the hearer’s context. The possibility of no relevant interpretation was 
discussed following example (29) in 4.1.2.1. 
In the caution, the standard expression ‘you don’t have to say anything’ 
without additional context is ambiguous as to the type of compulsion it denies. 
If deontic modality is defined in terms of the actions of “morally responsible 
agents”, we should expect its meaning to be influenced by speakers’ 
(potentially cultural) beliefs about forces in the world which affect moral 
people’s behaviour. It is unlikely that suspects are not required in any possible 
way to answer the questions. For example, they may experience pressure from 
family members present or absent (Mildren 1997). In Mangaraka (1993:[23]), 
Martin CJ engaged with the question of whether persuasion by a family 
member is legally problematic: 
[T]he accused's mother told her to tell the truth. That may not ordinarily tell against 
admission of a confession made to police the voluntariness of which is not otherwise 
called in question. Persuasion from a person who is not in authority over the accused in 
the legal sense, does not of itself render a subsequent confession questionable on the 
ground that it is not voluntary, but when coupled with advice to the accused that the 
police were there to help her, may well have caused the accused to consider the 
purpose of the questioning was to obtain information about what had happened to her, 
as opposed to what she did to the deceased. 
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While it must be possible for persuasion by the suspect’s mother to diminish 
the ‘voluntariness’ of a confession, this was not ordinarily something the law 
sought to regulate.58 
As discussed at 1.1.1, many people may view silence in interaction as 
uncooperative or indicative of guilt. More specifically, Cooke (1998:187) 
reports that in Yolngu culture, silence when one is implicated in a crime is 
interpreted as a sign of shame or guilt. This suggests that suspects could use 
context from culture to try to interpret expressions involving don’t have to. A 
suspect may also experience pressure to answer from his/her conscience 
(perhaps context about sense of self). These types of context do not seem to be 
modal domains that police intend to call on (as described above). 
As discussed at 3.5, police often provide context using clauses like “if I 
ask you a question” (GP 2014), or even clearer, “I'm gonna ask you questions 
but you don't have to answer” (Todd 1995). These are both likely to orient 
participants to police asking questions as a source of compulsion, providing an 
accessible interpretation of don’t have to: that even if suspects think they ‘have 
to’ answer for other reasons, they should not feel they have to answer merely 
because police ask questions. Butcher said something like this explicitly:  
                                                 
 
58 The ambiguous role of the prisoner’s friend in an interview can make it unclear whether that 
person speaks with legal authority. Even more problematic is the possibility of persuasion by an 
interpreter, who would ordinarily be expected to be conveying a message from police (rather 
than advice from the interpreter) when explaining the caution to the suspect. Blurring between 
the roles of interpreter and prisoner’s friend (Cooke 2009a) further complicates this question. 
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Butcher: Okay Dominic you understand that by asking you that I'm not making you 
talk, okay. If you wanna' talk its gotta be your free choice, your own will. (Cumaiyi 
2003) 
Following her statement that “by asking you … I’m not making you talk”, 
Butcher’s second sentence about “your free choice, your own will” seems to 
suggest that in the absence of police compulsion Cumaiyi’s choice would be 
‘free’. It is not clear what Butcher meant by this, though it may reveal 
assumptions about liberal autonomy (see 4.2.2). Perhaps Butcher, focused on 
the interview procedure, did not consider the possibility of compulsion by other 
people, social norms, etc, or did not consider them inconsistent with free will. 
In any event, it is correct and important that suspects should not feel 
compelled by the asking of questions to answer them. However, police 
language contrasts with the law underlying the caution, which protects suspects 
from two kinds of compulsion. As discussed at 1.1.1, the law states clearly that 
a court cannot draw an unfavourable inference from a suspect’s refusal to 
answer police questions, effectively meaning a court cannot punish a suspect 
for remaining silent. The law states less clearly that police cannot compel the 
suspect to answer questions. Non-compulsion by the court and by police fit 
together if the legal process is viewed as a whole; the right to silence would be 
of little value if only one of them was guaranteed. 
The caution in practice consistently focuses on police coercion, which is 
secondary in the law. It appears that there is no legal requirement for the lack 
of adverse consequences in court to be mentioned, and it was not mentioned at 
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all by police in this study. Reflecting this situation, BM said the following in 
his interview: 
Extract (32): BM #2 (2014) 
1. Hall: Okay. Before either myself or Agent Adams speaks with you or ask you any 
questions, you must understand that you’re not obliged to say or do anything 
unless you wish to do so, okay. Now I said that to you earlier today, now can you 
explain to me what that means, that you’re not obliged to say or do anything 
unless you wish to do so, what does that mean to you? 
2. BM: Yeah, I don’t have to take orders from youse.59 
3. Hall: That’s right mate. … 
BM appears to have linked the impersonal “not obliged to” in line 1 with police 
compulsion. Hall refers to a conversation earlier that day, and BM may have 
been influenced by that as well as the reference to “myself or agent Adams” 
(the earlier conversation is discussed in Chapter 3). Using the above analysis of 
modal domains, perhaps BM is thinking about domain D2 (rules and projected 
roles in the interview), though it is not clear if BM distinguishes the interview 
from the caution as police do. BM’s answer was accepted and it is correct, but 
the protection from adverse consequences in court (domain D3) was never 
mentioned. 
                                                 
 
59 Line 2 appears to be excellent evidence about BM’s understanding because it is unlike police 
language, suggesting that BM expressed his thoughts ‘in his own words’ rather than merely 
reprocessing language. The question of what kind of questions police can use to most reliably 
elicit useful evidence requires further investigation beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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Contrasting with the right to silence part of the caution, police frequently 
elaborate the consequences of speaking (discussed at 4.3) by talking about 
sentencing options available to a judge. These consequences are typically 
presented as what will happen “if you do talk to me” (Anthony 1995). However 
police may also encroach on suggesting consequences of not speaking: 
Linsday: Now when the Judge listens to these tapes and he - that Judge will hear what 
you’re saying now. Now if he thinks that you’re guilty what can he do to you? (Dumoo 
1996) 
This suggests that the judge will hear what Dumoo is saying “now”, and then 
think about whether he is guilty. This could mean that if Dumoo exercised his 
right to silence (for example by saying ‘no comment’), those words could 
affect whether the judge thinks he is guilty. This is quite the opposite of 
explaining that the judge will not form any adverse inference if Dumoo 
remains silent (and is probably not the meaning Lindsay intended). A caution 
reported by Cooke (1998:105) included “by what we say here, it could mean 
you go to gaol or maybe not”, which is ambiguous about both the use of silence 
as evidence and the role of police in deciding whether suspects go to jail. These 
utterances may foreground modal domain D3 (expected legal process after the 
interview), but link it incorrectly with the right to silence. 
Rogers et al. (2010, 2008) found that 99.9% of US Miranda warnings 
failed to mention that silence could not be used as evidence against the suspect, 
and Godsey (2006:783–4) recommends adding this to the US Miranda 
warning: 
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If you choose to remain silent, your silence will not be used against you as evidence to 
suggest that you committed a crime simply because you refused to speak. 
Godsey argues that failure to explain this is a key reason suspects may feel 
compulsion to speak. Rogers et al. (2010) found that 30% of pretrial defendants 
thought silence could be used against them. Justice Mildren proposed this 
(1997:12) wording for the NT caution: 
Maybe you want to be quiet and not talk about that trouble. That’s all right. The 
magistrate won’t make trouble from that. 
The 1998 Djambarrpuyngu translation also makes the protection in court clear: 
Ga  yalala-ŋumirri-y  court-ŋur  bitjan   bili   dhu  magistrate 
And later-PROP-TIME court-LOC like.this COMPL FUT magistrate 
 
nhina  nyamir’yuna-miriw  ŋunhi   ŋayi    dhu 
sit  criticise-PRIV    when   3SG   FUT 
 
ŋäma  nhuna  mukthu-na-wuy-nydja  nhina-nha-wuy, 
hear   2SG.ACC be.quiet-IV-ASS-PROM sit-IV-ASS 
 
bili   nhe  bäyŋu  ŋula   waŋa-nha  bilitjuman-gal. 
because 2SG NEG  INDEF talk-IV police-OBL 
‘And later on in the court, the magistrate will just sit there without accusing you if 
he hears about you sitting there quietly, maybe you did not talk to the police.’ 
(translation in original) 
 
The above paraphrase and translation clarify that the permission to 
remain silent (also) extends to domain D3. Without reference by police to the 
legal process, it is possible but perhaps unlikely that suspects could infer the 
protection in court from the language of the caution. For some suspects, the 
circumstances of being in a police station or talking to police may suggest that 
what is under discussion is the legal process. In GP (2015:[17]), Barr J said 
that the suspect’s attempts to exculpate himself during the interview supported 
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the conclusion that he knew how the interview would be used in court. We do 
not know GP’s cultural background,60 however one study which consulted 
deeply with Yolngu people about their experiences of the justice system found 
that some thought police “acted in a lawless way towards Aboriginal people” 
(ARDS 2007:14) or that the non-Aboriginal legal system “had no proper legal 
processes” (ibid:15). Eades (2008) also discusses perceptions among 
Queensland Aboriginal people that police acted with impunity. When police 
make decisions about arrest, bail, and laying charges, these decisions are 
constrained by law, but this may not be apparent (Cunneen 2001) and it may 
appear that police are not governed by rules. 
This study reveals only two references to law by police. One was about 
the requirement to deliver the caution (discussed at 2.3), and the other tends to 
conflate law and police: 
Pfitzner: Do you understand that if a person – they might get in trouble with the law, 
with the police and then that person might end up in court and that’s that place where 
they go (Rankin #1 1998) 
Todd said this in his interview: 
Extract (33): Todd (1995) 
1. P2: ==what do you think will happen if you answer the questions? <2.6>  
do you think you might get in trouble?  
                                                 
 
60 GP was charged with sexual intercourse with an underage female child. In the (2015) published 
judgement about the admissibility of GP’s interview, the name of the community and language 
were suppressed, along with names of individuals, presumably to protect the privacy of that 
community and the alleged victim.  
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2. Todd: .. .i think so  
3. P2: who from/  
4. Todd: ==from the police,  
5. P2: yeah/  
anyone else?  
6. Todd: not really  
7. P2: ==you don't think you might get in trouble from the judge later on? .. or a 
magistrate? 
8. Todd: ==think so::/ 
A suspect who thinks that police make sentencing decisions or who does not 
know the police are governed by law may want to convince the police, rather 
than the court, not to punish him/her. There is a risk of circular reasoning here; 
suspects’ words may be taken as evidence consistent with knowledge about the 
law because that knowledge is assumed to be obvious. If some suspects are 
unaware there is a rule-governed process for determining punishment, they are 
unlikely to infer there is a protection against silence being used against them in 
that process. 
Of course, if a suspect is unaware of the connection between evidence 
and court outcomes, there may be no need for the caution to contradict this 
kind of compulsion to convince that suspect that silence is permissible. 
However, the use of the interview in evidence is also part of the caution, 
discussed at 4.3. 
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4.1.4 Conclusion 
There is a strong risk of modality, including don’t have to, being 
misinterpreted by Aboriginal suspects. Have to may be interpreted as 
conveying simple future meaning, and/or its negation may be understood 
inconsistently with SAE. This may make it more likely that suspects will adopt 
the incorrect interpretation that ‘do you have to talk’ questions are about 
whether suspects will talk. 
If don’t have to is correctly interpreted, applying it to context may also 
be difficult. Police modal language seem to invoke up to five different domains 
of obligation, and specifying that these are under discussion could make 
modals easier to interpret. The context police do provide tends to suggest 
(unsurprisingly, and somewhat accurately) that suspects should not think they 
have to answer questions merely because police ask them, and there is some 
evidence that suspects interpret impersonal ‘don’t have to’ statements as being 
about police authority as a domain of obligation. 
Meanwhile, the critical legal protection against the use of silence as 
evidence in court is not part of the standard caution text and is never mentioned 
by police. Discussion of the use of interviews in evidence may encroach on 
suggesting the opposite, that silence could be used as evidence of guilt. 
The consequences of silence could be stated simply by police and don’t 
have to could be avoided altogether. Other difficulties could perhaps be 
mitigated by providing better context to suspects. 
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4.2 Caution part 1: the right to silence 
4.2.1 Paraphrases of the right to silence 
The preceding discussion of modality shows serious difficulties with the 
dominant formulation of the right to silence which follows the legislation and 
relies on don’t have to for its central meaning. Other studies have shown how 
legislation constrains the language of cautioning (Heydon 2013), however in 
the Anunga framework, police do not seem to follow the text closely. In 
Cumaiyi’s case, it appeared that an unusual form of the caution was being used 
at Wadeye, though police could not remember why. Magistrate Blokland SM 
said this was “not perfect” but “still conveys, as a practical matter what the 
procedure will be and that the person has a choice”, suggesting that in the 
future the unusual caution may lead to exclusion of interviews on the grounds 
of non-compliance with Anunga (not because of divergence from the legislated 
text), and recommending the adoption of Mildren’s (1997) paraphrases.61 The 
flexibility of caution paraphrases likely reflects the difficulty of the task set for 
police by Anunga in ensuring understanding, and perhaps, uncertainty about 
what works. 
                                                 
 
61 Tudorstack v Chula [2004] NTMC 031 at [31]-[32]. As a decision of a magistrate (as Her 
Honour then was), this case is not authority but may be persuasive. Cumaiyi’s interview was 
excluded on the basis that he tried to exercise his right to silence (but police persisted in asking 
questions and he ended up making admissions), rather than because the caution was irregular or 
deficient. 
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Because this study involves numerous conversations, patterns emerge in 
police paraphrase, along with individual police creativity. Many police officers 
would have significant experience explaining the caution, so police paraphrases 
may reveal how police understand the meaning of the caution and how they 
respond to communication difficulties. 
My focus here is on the meaning(s) of the caution, however other aspects 
such as clause structure and the order of ideas can also be analysed (Rock 
2007; Gibbons 2001; Davis et al. 2011; Kurzon 1996). The structure of the 
caution is probably critical if it is written, or said once; however the number of 
police reformulations and the nature of spoken language in interaction mean 
that difficult structures, unless repeated systematically, may be less of a 
problem. For example, in extract (24) (Chapter 3) Lawrence responded 
correctly to the question “what could you say” embedded in a police utterance 
which could have been criticised as containing several ambiguous clauses. 
It appears from the range of reformulations and the foregoing discussion 
of modality that the central problem with the right to silence is expressing the 
permission it contains: that remaining silent is allowed and will not lead to 
negative consequences. A number of semantic themes emerge from police 
language, though they may overlap in the discourse, as shown by the following 
example which invokes wants, choices, rights, and permission to ‘sit quiet’ in a 
single turn. 
Butcher: … anything that I'm about to ask you, you do not have to answer if you don't 
want to. So if I ask you a question you got two choices. You can sit quiet or you can 
tell me your story. Your right to choose which one you want. (Cumaiyi 2003) 
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While it was possible to analyse at 4.1.2.1 how some suspects interpreted 
don’t have to, there is little direct evidence about the effect of other 
paraphrases on suspects, because they tend to be introduced later in the 
discourse, because of the nature of the questions they generate,62 and perhaps 
because police spend less time on each paraphrase. However it is possible to 
analyse police language, consider inferences which would be required to 
interpret it, and compare police language with translations. 
4.2.1.1 Hierarchy of wants 
Expressions in terms of ‘want’ (or ‘wish’) imply that different people 
want different things but some ‘wants’ prevail over others.  
Extract (34): Dumoo  (1996) 
1. Lindsay: Now Basil I want to talk to you about some grog, some liquor that was 
taken into the restricted area on Wednesday night. Do you understand that? 
2. Dumoo: Yeah. 
3. Lindsay: Before we go any further I’ll advise you that you don’t have to talk to 
me if you don’t want to. Do you understand that? 
“If you don’t want to” as a condition correctly suggests that the permission to 
remain silent is unconstrained. A limited permission might be, for example, 
                                                 
 
62 For example, talk about choice leads to questions like “whose choice is it, ... if they want to 
talk to me?” (Moonlight 1995). The ‘correct’ answer to this question is ‘mine’ or ‘me’, but the 
meaning of this answer depends on the suspect’s understanding of choice, among other things. 
The range of comprehension-checking strategies available to police requires separate systematic 
investigation. 
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‘you don’t have to answer if you don’t know the answer’. It is acceptable to say 
in SAE ‘you have to answer if you know the answer’, but it would be strange 
to say ‘you have to answer if you want to answer’, because the latter involves a 
conflict between volition and compulsion (discussed at 3.5), showing that the 
permission is unlimited. 
Ordinarily, it seems uncontroversial that police are in a position of power 
and have more ability to get what they ‘want’ than suspects, but the language 
above attempts to regulate who gets what they want. Formulations involving 
want (including (34)) usually involve an interaction between want and have to. 
There are three main relationships in the utterances below, which all express 
the core meaning of the caution, that it is acceptable to say nothing: 
1. you don’t have to talk to me if you don’t want to (Dumoo 1996) 
2. you don't have to answer our questions in relation to what we want to talk about 
(KR 2015)63 
3. you don't have to talk to me unless you want to (Anthony 1995) 
This language creates a hierarchy between the volition of different participants 
and the permissibility of answering. The examples above imply, if understood, 
that: 
1. Dumoo not wanting to talk is equivalent to or triggers his not having to. 
                                                 
 
63 This relationship is not usually expressed in a single sentence, possibly because it requires 
complicated syntax like “in relation to what”. However, there are many references to what “we 
want” or “I want” to talk about, so the two ideas in this sentence are likely to be linked by police 
discourse. 
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2. KR not having to answer is more important than police wanting to talk. 
3. Anthony’s potential wanting to talk would render irrelevant his not having to talk. 
At 3.5 I discussed evidence that some suspects appear to have 
misunderstood relationships between clauses, including the above example 
from Anthony’s interview, in conversation (26). Understanding these 
utterances requires interpreting conditional conjunctions (if and unless, also 
discussed at 3.4). Suspects must also understand the two modal propositions 
and compare their meanings. Suspects may be able to contextualise the modal 
operators (have to and want to) if they can link them to the domains discussed 
at 4.1.2.2. Successful interpretation of the modals and the clausal relationship 
would then imply a hierarchy between the modal domains: the rules for the 
interview (D2) protect the suspect’s volition (D4), even when that conflicts 
with police institutional objectives (D5). This is of course the crux of the 
caution, however the linguistic and contextual process required to understand it 
may be complex. 
It is possible to express the priority of suspect ‘wants’ while avoiding 
don’t have to, by licencing particular action: 
P: … so if you don’t wanna talk to me? 
.. then then you just tell me 
==you don’t want to talk to me/ (Anthony 1995) 
Lindsay: if you don’t want to answer my questions, or if you don’t want to answer one 
question, you tell me (Dumoo 1996) 
Unfortunately, the invitation to “tell me” does not make clear the consequences 
of saying ‘I don’t want to talk’, a speech act which might ordinarily be 
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confrontational. Only P’s use of “just” subtly diminishes the scale of this 
suggested action. 
Even if the hierarchy between suspect ‘wants’, caution rules, and police 
‘wants’ is understood by suspects, a remaining difficulty was identified by 
Cooke (1996:280) where it was “not suggested to [the suspect] why she might 
not want to answer a question or what can constitute reasonable grounds for an 
otherwise co-operative person to refuse to answer”. Below, James perhaps 
suggests that suspect wants are not required to be reasonable: 
1. James: Yeah, you can stay quiet or you can talk. 
2. Robinson: Yeah. yeah. 
3. James: Whatever you want. (Robinson 2008) 
However this unusual reference to unconstrained wants is still inexplicit. The 
volition offered to suspects by the language of wants remains meaningless 
unless they are sufficiently informed about the consequences of speaking and 
not speaking, and confident that acting in accordance with their ‘wants’ is a 
protected option. 
4.2.1.2 Alternative deontics 
Police use language other than don’t have to to express that silence is 
acceptable. This may indicate that police realise the need to avoid don’t have to 
when suspects do not seem to understand it. 
Extracts (35) 
Hodgson: … is that okay for you to be quiet and say nothing? (Thomas 2006) 
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Heymans: do you think you can say nothing about this trouble to me? (Mangaraka #1 
1993) 
Heymans: so are, are you allowed to say nothing about this trouble to me? (Mangaraka 
#1 1993) 
McKeown: So you don’t need to say anything to me or to any other police officer 
(Jarwarla 2006) 
McKeown: … so that’s why it’s okay for you to stay quiet if you just don’t want to 
talk about that ganga, that’s okay, alright? (Jawrarla 2006) 
Walters: … If I ask you a question you can sit quiet if you want to. (Lawrence #1 
2015) 
Pfitzner: Now, if you don’t wanna say anything to us, that’s perfectly all right, okay?  
You don’t have to say anything.  If you want to say your story, you can say your story 
too.  That’s okay as well.  (Rankin #1 1998) 
Lade: if you don’t want to that’s your business. (Inkamala #2 1995) 
Formulations like “it’s okay for you to stay quiet” make a deontic 
evaluation, suggesting the relevant action is permissible. “Stay quiet” or “sit 
quiet” also names the permissible action, unlike “don’t have to talk” which 
does not specify the alternative to talking. Some translations of the caution also 
express the deontic meaning of the right to silence using separate lexical items: 
manymak  ŋayi  dhu  bäyŋu     dhäwu  lakaram  
good  3SG FUT NEG     story tell 
 
nhanŋu-wuy  walalaŋ-gal biḻitjuman-gal 
3SG.DAT-ASS 3PL-OBL police-OBL 
‘It’s okay if (the suspect) doesn’t tell his/her story to the police.’ (my translation) 
(ARDS 2015) 
 
Lexical deontic formulations like those above may avoid problems with 
the interpretation of grammatical modality such as don’t have to. By using 
additional words to separate deontic meaning from grammatical function, they 
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may make the deontic meaning more marked.64 However these paraphrases 
leave open the question ‘okay according to whom?’; and an action that is 
merely ‘okay’ is not the same as a legally protected right. “That’s perfectly all 
right”, if understood, comes closer to expressing this. 
The 1998 Djambarrpuyngu translation conveys the permissive meaning 
of the caution explicitly using a metaphor of two ways or paths the suspect can 
follow, which may give the two options equal status: 
Waŋgany dhukarr,  nhe  dhu  ga   mukthun  nhina, bukubak-mara-nha-miriw. 
One        path    2SG FUT IMPV    be.quiet   sit       reply-CAUS-IV-PRIV 
‘One way is you won’t talk, you’ll sit without saying any words.’ 
 
Wiripu-ny      dhukarr, nhe   dhu   lakaranhamirr ŋunhi-ŋuwuy mari-puy. 
Other-PROM  path 2SG  FUT  discuss  TEXD-ASS  trouble-ASS 
‘Another way is to tell them about that trouble.’ (translation in original) 
 
Moonlight’s interview contains further evidence suggesting that police 
are aware of the importance of modality. One of several examples of police 
accommodation to Moonlight’s English (or to a variety of English that police 
think Moonlight speaks), below P adds “might be” to the SAE “may”. 
Extract (36): Moonlight  
1. P: ... so, ... whatever we talk about, ==that judge/ 
2. Moonlight: ==Mm 
3. P:  ==he may might be listen to this tape recorder, =ok?=  
                                                 
 
64 I am grateful to Denise Angelo for pointing this out, and for many other discussions about 
modality. 
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In line 3, ‘may’ would be a SAE way of expressing the possibility of the judge 
listening to the recording. Maitbi is an epistemic modal in Kriol, occurring 
outside the verb phrase (Angelo & Schultze-Berndt 2016:288; Nicholls 
2016:348). Eades (1983:271) reports that might (be) in Aboriginal English is a 
widespread “epistemic adverbial expression, indicating that the speaker is 
unsure of the truth of the proposition” and does not accept responsibility for its 
truth. Maitbi can also be seen, in clause-initial position and at the beginning of 
a sentence fragment, in the 1997 Kriol translation: 
lb yu     nomo  ensim  detlot  kwestjan  maitbi  dei    garra kipgon  
If  you   NEG   respond those  question  maybe  3PL   FUT  continue 
 
askim-bat  yu  ola  kwestjan  o  maitbi najing. 
ask-CONT you a.lot question  or maybe nothing 
‘If you don’t answer, maybe they will keep asking you questions or maybe not’ 
(my translation) 
 
This suggests that P’s use of might be in (36) was reasonably appropriate, and 
reflected awareness that modality is an area where meaning differs between 
SAE and Aboriginal Englishes. 
4.2.1.3 Your choice 
Police frequently talk about choice, especially emphasising that the 
choice ‘belongs’ to the suspect. Rock (2007:177) argues that “it’s up to you” 
stresses that the choice belongs to the suspect. 
Extracts (37) 
Lee: … you have a choice, … it’s your choice to talk to me. So you don’t have to talk 
to me. So you can sit there and be quiet and not say anything or you can choose to 
answer my questions. (Age #2 2010) 
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Miller: … So it’s your choice whether you say something on this recording today. 
(Lawrence #1 2015) 
P: whose choice is it, ... if they want to talk to me? (Moonlight 1995) 
P2: so this man .. might start asking you some questions about that trouble now / 
[cough] .. it’s up to you if you want to answer him/ (Todd 1995) 
Harris: The thing is, you don't have to talk about it with us if you don't want to.  
detective Heymans wants to ask you some questions and you can answer them if you 
wish or you could sit there and say nothing. It's up to you. It's completely up to you 
whether you decide to answer the questions asked by detective Heymans. So you can 
sit back there and say nothing or you can answer the questions.  You don't have to 
answer our questions. Do you understand that? (Mangaraka #1 1993) 
P2: this is yo-your decision and your decision .. only / [nod] ok? (Todd 1995) 
To infer the permissive meaning of the caution from this language, the hearer 
must perhaps reason that the person who ‘owns’ the choice is not to be 
constrained by anyone else’s choice, similar to the ‘hierarchy of wants’. 
However the word choice alone may not make this clear, as shown by this 
contrasting example: 
Miller: … ‘Cos the, the magistrate will hear the police story and he’ll hear your story. 
And he listens to both those stories and then he decides whether you’re guilty or not 
guilty. Ok? And he can give a fine or he can let you go free, or he could send you to 
prison, that’s the choices he has. Ok? (Lawrence 2015) 
The magistrate’s decision about sentencing is not a free choice, but is 
constrained by the law in many ways. (In fact this language is 
counterproductive, because suspects may not know that judicial officers’ 
decisions are supposed to be impartial and governed by rules). 
A more serious problem is that choice as a noun may be difficult to 
translate into Aboriginal languages. The translations in this study contain no 
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nouns similar to choice or decision, but several verbs with meanings like ‘think 
carefully’, ‘choose’ and ‘decide’. This may mean that the meaning discussed 
above, depending on ‘ownership’ of the choice, is less obvious to Aboriginal 
suspects. Finally, like wants, having a choice is not meaningful unless suspects 
understand the consequences of their options. 
4.2.1.4 Force 
Extracts (38) 
Richardson: Nothing that we can do can force you to tell us that story. (RR 2008) 
Baird: … Do you have to answer any of my questions if you don't want to? If you don't 
want to can I force you to answer any questions? (Echo 1996) 
P2: .. not this man,  
nor .. nor *me .. will force you to change your mind/ (Todd 1995) 
Heymans: ... If you want to answer my questions you can.  But no-one's going to force 
you, no-one's making you answer my questions, you don't have to. (Mangaraka #1 
1993) 
These paraphrases situate ‘forcing’ as something which cannot or will 
not happen. The first two formulations above involve the difficult modal can, 
perhaps meaning that it is impermissible or impossible for police actions to 
force RR and that police are not allowed to force Echo. The last two utterances 
are predictions or promises that ‘no-one will force you’. P2’s utterance is the 
formulation most likely to refer to a lack of forcing after a suspect refuses to 
answer. 
It is arguable that modal expressions are a metaphorical extension of the 
way entities interact with physical forces and barriers (Talmy 1988), and 
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paraphrases involving force could make this metaphor more explicit, replacing 
the deontic modality of have to. However as seen above, they sometimes 
introduce another modal to express that forcing is prohibited. This deontic 
prohibition is expressed metaphorically in the 2015 Djambarrpuyngu 
translation: 
‘The police cannot force you to say anything about that trouble. The police 
cannot force you to show them anything.’ (subtitles in original) 
 
Bäyŋu   ga   dhukarr ŋorra  ŋamakuḻi’ŋu-w walal  dhu  dhur’yun 
NEG     IMPV path    lie    police-DAT       3PL FUT push 
 
nhuna-ny   wo   gurukuryun  waŋa-nhara-w wo  milku-nhara-w  
2SG.ACC-PROM or    pressure talk-IV-DAT     or show-IV-DAT 
 
ŋula   nha-ku  ŋuru-kalaŋuwuy  mari-puy. 
INDEF what-DAT DIS-ASS  trouble-ASS 
‘There is no way for the police to force you to tell them or show them anything 
about this trouble’ (my translation). 
 
The expression ‘there is no way/path’ uses physical impossibility to imply 
deontic impermissibility. It is notable that the translators used extra language 
and imagery to encode the firmness of this prohibition. 
Force may mean overriding the ‘choice’ or ‘want’ which the suspect is 
entitled to exercise. Importantly, forcing formulations identify the speaker (or 
police generally) as the agent who will refrain from forcing. Courtroom 
evidence described by Eades (2008:140) involved a contest over the meaning 
of force: a 13 year old Aboriginal boy said that police “forced us” when “They 
told us to jump in the car”, but the lawyer representing police tried to label this 
as merely ‘telling’ or ‘saying’, and highlighted the absence of physical force. In 
(32) BM understood the caution to mean “I don’t have to take orders from 
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youse”, but what are the orders that he does not have to follow? To accurately 
convey the caution, forcing must be taken to include merely asking questions, 
which ordinarily creates an expectation of an answer (Heritage & Clayman 
2011), especially in a police interview (Heydon 2005). 
By saying ‘we can’t (or won’t) force you’ and going on to ask questions, 
which ordinarily might seem like forcing (Shuy 1997), police appear to call on 
language to alter the suspect’s future experience of ‘force’. To achieve this, the 
‘forcing’ language needs to specify that the illocutionary intent of future police 
questions must only be interpreted as non-forcing. This requires the content of 
police language to be adopted as context for the interview speech event. 
Police forcing language above clearly has the potential to inform suspects 
about the caution, as well as ensuring that a future watcher of the recording can 
see that rules were transparently laid out. However some police language also 
appears to assert the truth of a state of affairs in which the rules are followed. 
“Nothing that we can do can force you” may suggest that RR being forced is 
impossible. “No-one's going to force you, no-one's making you answer” 
implies that no forcing is happening or will happen. However these claims may 
not observably alter police behaviour; there is nothing about the questions that 
police go on to ask which marks them as ‘non-forcing’ questions. Rather, the 
information is for the suspect to apply: the suspect should not ‘feel forced’; and 
in a sense this transfers responsibility to the suspect. If the suspect does feel 
forced by the questions, which may not be obvious to anyone else, it is the 
suspect who will not be complying with the rules. 
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A number of translations include ‘the police can’t force you’ or similar 
language, as seen above. However the 1998 Djambarrpuyngu translation 
describes police behaviour in a way that police themselves do not: 
Ŋunhi nhe  dhu  ga  mukthun yan nhina waŋa-nha-miriw, 
If  2SG FUT IMPV be.quiet  just sit  talk-IV-PRIV 
 
ŋayi  dhu   bilitjuman-dhu-ny   yaka  nhuna  birrka’yun 
3SG FUT police-ERG-PROM NEG 2SG.ACC think 
 
yanbi    nhe  wurraŋatjarra  wo  yätjkurr. 
as.if    2SG irresponsible   or bad 
‘If you sit there without talking the police won’t think you are silly or bad.’ 
 
Ŋunhi  nhe   dhu  ga  nhina mukthun 
If   2SG  FUT IMPV sit be.quiet 
 
walal dhu  yaka  nhuŋu  maḏakarritj-thirr  bilitjuman-dja  walal. 
3PL FUT NEG 2SG.DAT be.angry-INCH police-PROM 3PL 
‘If you sit there quietly they won’t get angry with you.’ (translation in original) 
 
This information (in Djambarrpuyngyu, a Yolngu language) addresses the 
assumption Yolngu people are said to have that silence in the face of questions 
indicates shame or guilt (Cooke 1998:187). “Police won’t think you are silly or 
bad … or get angry with you” is a specific prediction, unlike police language, 
which uses force as a metaphor without specifying the future conditions or 
behaviour which will be free of forcing. 
Police paraphrases also do not clearly mention what suspects should 
expect after an exercise of the right to silence. In fact, it seems that police 
never refer specifically to suspect behaviour like the above translation which 
describes what will happen “if you sit there quietly”. While police produce 
many utterances about states of mind like “if you don’t want to answer” 
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(Lawrence #1 2015), police in this study never say ‘if you don’t answer’, ‘if 
you sit quiet’, or ‘if you stay silent’. This means police do not say what will 
happen if suspects act on their potential desire not to answer. It is not clear why 
police would avoid talking about these actions. 
The translation above seems to represent the most concrete and 
accessible way to contextualise the right to silence. Suspects need to 
understand the likely consequences of silence or speaking in order to be able to 
make a meaningful decision about their right to silence (Grisso 1986:120). 
Suspects could be told relatively concisely that if they stay silent, police will 
not react negatively,65 and neither will the judge (paraphrases addressing the 
latter were seen at 4.1.3). Even if suspects do not know why police allow 
silence, if it is sufficiently clear that silence will not be punished, they may see 
silence as a reasonable option. This would not be a perfect version of the 
caution, but may be a practical way to avoid calling on abstract and culture-
specific ideas to give sense to it. 
                                                 
 
65 While it is true that police should not react negatively in the interview or insist on answers to 
questions, it may be that police have some discretion to ‘punish’ a silent suspect by, for example, 
refusing bail or laying additional charges, even if this seems contrary to the spirit of the right to 
silence. If police told a suspect they were considering these actions, that would likely be an 
improper inducement to answer questions. However there may be situations in which lack of 
suspect cooperation is a legitimate consideration (whether made explicit or not) in police 
decisions. 
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4.2.1.5 Your rights 
Right are not part of the standard text of the right to silence, but police 
often use them in paraphrase. Like choices, rights belong to someone. 
Extracts (39) 
Miller: And you, what you’ve got is a, a right to silence. (Lawrence #1 2015) 
Mora: It's your rights, ok? So, you’re not obliged to say or do anything unless you 
wish to do so, alright anything you do say or do will be recorded alright and may be 
used as evidence later on (KR 2015) 
Hall: Alright. But if I ask a question, you don't have to answer me, you have the right 
to remain silent. Ok? (BM 2014) 
Trew: This is your choice it’s your right not to say anything or (inaudible). (Cotchili 
2005) 
Kelly: So you understand that you have a right to be silent and you don't have to 
answer questions from police? (Spencer #2 1998) 
McKeown: … But before we do that I need to make sure that you understand your 
right as a person, ok, very important, alright. Now first of all do you know we have 
three cassette tapes in this machine?... (Jawrarla 2006) 
Potts: If ah Jimmy has anything that he doesn’t understand you are perfectly entitled 
to um talk between the two of you if you’re not quite a hundred percent sure what I’m 
asking. (Marrmowa 1994) 
In a study of comprehension of Miranda warnings (based on US 
prisoners said to be ‘fluent in English’), right was among the more problematic 
words and said to be misunderstood by 55.9% of suspects, possibly because it 
is polysemous (Rogers et al. 2011). Different interpretations of ‘right’ are 
possible in police paraphrases: 
Butcher: … So if I ask you a question you got two choices. You can sit quiet or you 
can tell me your story. Your right to choose which one you want. (Cumaiyi 2003) 
VLING Thesis Alex Bowen u5989850 
 
 
165 
“Your right to choose” was transcribed in this case, however this use of right 
as an abstract noun may be difficult to distinguish orally from right as a 
predicative adjective in ‘you’re right to choose’ (meaning ‘it’s okay for you to 
choose’) except perhaps by prosody which is not transcribed here. If suspects 
adopt the second interpretation, it may remain undetected because it would be 
reasonably accurate, granting vernacular permission without calling on abstract 
ideas. This sense of right is seen in suspect language: 
Extract (40): BM #1 (2014) 
1. Hall: Do want any legal, Legal Aid contacted? 
2. BM: Nope. 
3. Hall: Ok. 
4. BM: Yep, I’m right. 
A deeper problem is that references to rights, and arguably other 
formulations of the caution, call on a body of knowledge about rights which 
may be unfamiliar to some Aboriginal suspects. 
4.2.2 The discourse of rights 
Hearers always call on a variety of context to interpret language (as 
discussed at 2.2). Hearing language usually calls to mind ideas which appear 
related, which can include things recently said in the conversation, other 
‘texts’, and ideas from speakers’ cultures. In the case of talk about rights, a lot 
has been said and written about them, and many Australians will be familiar 
with the idea of rights, to varying degrees, from sources such as news, 
education, and TV. Police probably draw on a degree of assumed knowledge 
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about rights when they explain the caution. Rock (2007:127) found that 
English/Welsh detainees looked outside the text of the caution(s), importing 
incorrect ‘common sense’ limitations or caveats onto rights, showing that other 
‘texts’ or ideas can affect affect interpretations of the caution. 
The analysis of ideas that hearers may use to interpret language can be 
part of an intertextual approach. ‘Prior texts’ can include canonical texts which 
are pervasive in one culture but not obvious to outsiders (Becker 1994). A body 
of talk which is less bounded than a text may be a discourse. Fairclough (1992) 
argues that text-oriented discourse analysis can consider Foucauldian 
discourses, investigating ‘interdiscursive’ (as well as intertextual) resources 
used in the production and interpretation of texts. For this purpose, discourse 
may mean “roughly, all that has been (or could be) said about some (widely 
defined) topic, in some particular culture-specific ways” (Linell 1998:147). 
I argue that there is a discourse about rights (and ‘human rights’), which 
is a diverse body of ideas, practices and debates, more or less familiar to non-
Aboriginal Australians and unfamiliar for some Aboriginal suspects. I am not 
concerned here with the desirability or cross-cultural validity of rights, but the 
possibility that ideas from this discourse are implicated in caution texts and 
required to interpret them. 
There is evidence that police call on a general body of knowledge to 
contextualise the specific right to silence. Mora’s plural “It’s your rights, ok?” 
(KR 2015) is notable given that a single right is under discussion. Mora may be 
referring to an assumed category of ‘your rights’. McKeown talks about “your 
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right as a person” (Jawrarla 2006), which could be a reference to the discourse 
of ‘human rights’. Plural rights can also be seen below. 
Extract (41): Todd (1995) 
1. P2:  ==alright/ 
 policeman's job is to a::sk .. people that have been arrested,  
 .. about trouble/  
 isn't that right?  
2. Todd: ==yeah 
3. P2:  ==ok/ .. but the people  
 that .. are sometimes *in trouble/  
 ... alright/ .. have rights too,  
 .. and *those *rights *are that they don't have to/  
 .. answer any questions that the policeman .. ask them/ ... ok?  
 .. now, .. you're in that situation now/ ok?  
 ... you've been arrested at..for some trouble at #place#,  
 .. in relation to #offence#/ .. [nod] alright?  
 .. our job is to ask you some questions about that trouble/ .. alright? dyu 
 understand that so far?  
4. Todd: ==yeah 
P2 describes the rights of a class of people who are “in trouble”, and says 
“those rights are” the right to silence. Even more explicitly, P2 asks Todd to 
move from general to specific by saying “you’re in that situation now, ok?”. 
This could be an invitation for Todd to relate the information under discussion 
to a general discourse. It could also be an appeal to see how the right to silence 
makes sense in a system where parties have different roles and protections. In 
that case, a different body of knowledge (about police objectives and the legal 
process, identified as domains of modal context at 4.1.2.2) would be required. 
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Critiques of the ‘human rights discourse’ have equated it with the 
attempted diffusion of the liberal political tradition (Mutua 1996). Holcombe 
(2015:432) argues that the human rights regime depends on an “individuated, 
mobile, outward-looking personhood”. Indeed, “traditional hands-off or 
negative rights” are argued to “lie at the heart of the liberal tradition's 
commitment to individual autonomy and choice, and hence to limited and 
controllable government” (Steiner 1988:81). Mutua (1996:596) argues that 
central tenets of the liberal tradition include checks and balances on 
government power, an independent judiciary, and “the formal declaration of 
individual civil and political rights”. The right to silence may be a “negative 
claim-right”, a right to non-interference like the “right not to be assaulted” 
(Jones 1994:15). The right to silence is given form by specific prohibitions (of 
the adverse use of silence in court, and coercion by police), like the prohibition 
on assault. A general view of some rights is that they involve “accredited ways 
of acting” and it is normally improper to interfere with someone who is acting 
in the accredited way (Martin 1993:36). Rights can also define a relationship 
between a “duty-bearer (principally the State)” and a “rights-holder” 
(Holcombe 2015:429). 
From these ideas, a suspect might infer that s/he is entitled to exercise a 
right without fear of punishment, and perhaps that this expectation is 
enforceable against the state. The standard caution may expect all suspects to 
make this inference. Godsey (2006:792) argues that the US court deciding 
Miranda (1966) expected suspects to infer that because their decision to remain 
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silent was a “right”, silence could not be used as evidence against them. 
Stuesser (2002:153) argues that using the word right would improve the 
Canadian caution: 
Ours is a rights based society. We understand what a right means. We speak in terms of 
rights… It would be a small, but important step to inform the accused of the right to 
remain silent. 
This may well be true of (non-Aboriginal) Canadian and Australian societies. It 
reveals a clear reliance not only on ‘understanding’ rights, but on rights as 
something we “speak in terms of”, in other words a discourse. 
Even when rights are not mentioned, police appear to call on liberal ideas 
to contextualise the caution: 
Extract (42): Cumaiyi (2003) 
Butcher: … If you wanna' talk its gotta be your free choice, your own will. 
Extract (43): Echo #2 (1996) 
1. Baird: … Do you have to answer any of my questions if you don't want to? If you 
don't want to can I force you to answer any questions? 
2. Echo: Yeah. 
3. Baird: Sorry. 
4. Echo: Yes. 
5. Baird: How can I do that? You’re your own man. You’re your own man and you 
give answers for yourself, is that right? 
6. Echo: Yeah. 
Line 5 suggests Baird could not imagine how police could ‘force’ Echo. 
Perhaps it was obvious to Baird that police power over Echo was regulated and 
limited: although Echo was on remand in police custody and had little tangible 
freedom, he was still ‘his own man’ and could speak for himself. In the 
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language of rights, he was autonomous, the author of his own actions (Jones 
1994). Personal autonomy may be valued highly by Aboriginal people 
(Morphy 2008), but acknowledged in different ways (Holcombe 2015). 
It is argued that rights, especially negative rights, implicate the political 
structure of society (Steiner 1988:84), consistent with Foucault's (1969) 
argument that discourse constitutes social objects. Rights can be seen as 
required by, and contributing to, human moral agency (Jones 1994:99; Gewirth 
1984). As I argue in relation to ‘deontic’ meaning, if rights invoke morality and 
social structure, their interpretation will necessarily be affected by society and 
world-view. Rights require a notion of personhood, because they reside in 
individuals (Holcombe 2015). Holcombe (2015) discusses the spiritual and 
relational nature of Anangu personhood, while (Morphy 2007:95) reports that 
compared with non-Aboriginal people, Yolngu people have “very different 
ideas” about “how the person is constituted as a thinking, feeling, acting and 
moral being, and about how the individual is nested in their social and physical 
universe and their culture”. 
None of the translations in this study use right. It is not part of the 
standard caution, but this also suggests that translators did not consider it a 
useful concept. Holcombe (2015) reports on translating aspects of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights into Pintupi-Luritja, finding that the 
‘morally good’ meaning of right resonated with speakers rather than the 
‘entitlement’ meaning. These are very different meanings, indeed in the liberal 
political tradition there is “no paradox in the suggestion that someone may 
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have a legal right to do an act that is morally wrong” (Waldron 1993:65). 
Formulations of the caution in terms of wanting and choice appear to be about 
decisions to be made by autonomous individuals and have nothing to do with 
doing the ‘right thing’. Pintupi-Luritja translations of (human) rights reveal a 
focus on “listening, social interaction and embeddedness” in addition to 
thinking (Holcombe 2015:434), suggesting a contrast with the individuality of 
liberal rights, which has also been shown to be unfamiliar for some Canadian 
Aboriginal people (Paine 1999). Kinship is a central social system for many 
Aboriginal people, and may create relationships involving kinds of 
‘entitlement’. However kinship structures may conflict with notions of equality 
(Holcombe 2015). Morphy (2008) describes inconsistency between Yolngu 
and non-Aboriginal ideas about ‘governance’, arguing that fairness, equality 
and democracy are not salient to Yolngu governance and instead, 
‘accountability’ is achieved through consensus. These values may sit 
uncomfortably for some people with the idea of entitlement rights exercised by 
autonomous individuals: the right to silence is not part of any relationship 
except that between the individual and the state. 
At 2.4.1 I argued that a possible interpretation of the caution activity is as 
a negotiation of consensus about whether the suspect will talk. However an 
accurate understanding of liberal rights includes the fact that no consensus is 
required: a suspect may decide whether to exercise a right without consulting 
anyone. Further, the suspect’s reasons for that decision are not important to the 
protection of the right. It could well be argued that it is morally right to confess 
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one’s criminal behaviour, but the right to silence does not take a moral position 
and allows suspects to avoid doing this. The discretionary nature of the right to 
silence is perhaps implied by language like: “you can stay quiet or you can talk 
… whatever you want” (Robinson 2008). 
Of course, many Aboriginal people have struggled for land rights and 
other rights, including by framing their demands in the language of liberalism, 
even to the point of using the language of individual rights and equality to 
project “a homogeneous modern and progressive nation” (Attwood 2003:174). 
This language may be politically effective, but this does not necessarily mean 
Aboriginal societies internalise these discourses, any more than the granting of 
land rights causes Aboriginal people to replace their deep connection to 
country with understanding in terms of liberal property rights (though see 
Rigsby & Hafner 2010; Harvey 2010). 
Another influence on interpretation of rights may be experience and 
perceptions of the justice system (also discussed at 4.1.3). Aboriginal people do 
not always experience “simply a neutral institution enforcing an impartial legal 
system” (Cunneen 2001:44). Aboriginal people’s perceptions may be affected 
by the complex and troubled history of Aboriginal–police relations (Cowlishaw 
2003; Foley 1984), including significant mistreatment at the hands of police 
inconsistent with the liberal view of policing as governed by the rule of law 
(Eades 2008; Atkinson 2008; Cunneen 2001). Of course, Aboriginal people 
also have positive experiences with police and often call police for assistance. 
VLING Thesis Alex Bowen u5989850 
 
 
173 
It is also relatively recent that Aboriginal people formally acquired 
democratic rights following the 1967 referendum. Prior to that in parts of the 
NT, Aboriginal people lived on missions where the superintendent: 
had the last word … on any issues of law and order, he was prosecutor and judge … he 
could hand out punishment to the people… These actions would be backed up by the 
full weight of the Welfare patrol officers, police and the law courts of the [non-
Aboriginal] justice system. (Aboriginal Resource and Development Services 1994:16–
17) 
It is unlikely that experiences of missions operating “with different levels of 
autocratic authority” (ibid) would encourage Aboriginal people to subsequently 
view state power as limited and rule-governed, especially if liberal political 
processes are not meaningfully discussed with them (ibid). 
Spencer had previous experience of police interviews, and he used rights 
to assert his agency, saying “I will talk with my own rights” and “I can speak 
for my rights”. In each case he appeared to mean he did not want the assistance 
of Legal Aid or an interpreter. Todd said this: 
1. P2:  what are what what things *can you do  
 in this interview/ 
 what are your rights/  
2. Todd: <4.4> I just talk up  
 for my rights, 
‘Speaking with (or for) my rights’ and suggests that Spencer and Todd thought 
rights gave them standing to speak as individuals (Spencer also said “I can 
speak with my own weight”). However it is unclear whether their 
interpretations of rights were consistent with the right to silence. The idea that 
rights are operationalised by speaking rather than silence seems problematic. 
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These suspects’ rights talk may represent partial adoption of language (rather 
than ideas) from previous experience. It is also possible to interpret Spencer’s 
confident performance in his interviews as a “vociferous, confrontational style” 
accommodating to SAE (Eades 1991:92), and assertive references to rights 
could be part of this accommodation. 
In Tudorstack v Chula (2004:[43]), it was argued there should be an 
explicit reference to right in the caution, however Blokland SM concluded “[i]f 
police had to explain the concept of a ‘right’, that would, in my view, lead to 
further confusion.” This is probably true; explaining rights would mean using 
abstract ideas to eventually get to specific ideas. But explaining the ideas in the 
‘discourse of rights’ is a serious problem for the caution whether the word right 
is used or not. 
The underlying content of the caution is legal guarantees against police 
coercion or judicial punishment of suspects who remain silent. I argued 
at 4.2.1.4 that the most concrete expression of the right to silence is the 
prediction that neither police nor judge will react negatively to suspect silence, 
and that it is difficult to say that suspects understand the caution if they do not 
understand this. 
Several implicatures are required for suspects to infer something like the 
above prediction from the language of the caution: the suspect must identify 
relevant agents, predict their behaviour and identify the scope of that 
prediction. Some formulations of the caution identify police as relevant agents, 
though none identify the judge, so the suspect must understand how the deontic 
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permission to remain silent, though addressed to the suspect, relates to police 
and judge as agents. Suspects must then infer that the caution predicts the 
behaviour of those agents in a particular set of circumstances: those where the 
suspect remains silent, regardless of the reasons for that silence or of 
judgements which might ordinarily attach to silence. The premises required for 
those inferences are in the discourse of rights: belief in orderly limits on state 
power, enforceability of rights against the state, the impropriety of interfering 
with an exercise of accredited behaviour, entitlement-rights residing in 
individuals, and individuals exercising autonomous, potentially amoral 
discretion in deciding how to act. 
For suspects to have confidence in the caution, it must not merely predict 
police and judge behaviour, but do so firmly. Liberman (1981:251) reports 
about rights in court that: 
Aboriginal people have some notion that there are some choices available to them in 
the court, but they are also aware that they could find themselves in trouble if they do 
not comply on other matters. Intimidated by the courtroom setting and its attendant 
police officers, they are hesitant about exercising legally guaranteed options. 
I argued at 4.2.1.4 that the caution seeks to affect the nature of power in the 
interview room by altering the illocutionary force of each police speech act in 
the interview speech event, removing the normal expectation that people 
should answer questions when asked. In terms of levels of context (see 2.2), 
this involves the content of police language establishing the context for a 
speech event. Expectations for the speech event may be established with 
greater authority if police can also call on context from a higher level, that of 
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culture. Foucault (1969) argues that discourses create social objects; and it 
does not seem far-fetched to argue that rights, despite being constituted by 
words, are ‘real’, at least for police. They are part of the fabric of Anglo-
Australian culture. This makes rights a powerful idea, perhaps establishing 
strong expectations that police will respect them in the interview – but only for 
suspects who have access to the context in this discourse. It appears that some 
Aboriginal suspects may not be familiar with the discourse of rights and/or that 
its ideas may conflict with values held by some Aboriginal societies. This is a 
problem deeply embedded in the caution. 
4.3 Caution part 2: consequences of speaking 
The standard text of the caution gives the consequences of speaking as 
‘anything you do say or do may be used in evidence’.66 However in many 
interviews, police mention recording as part of an initial statement of the 
caution,67 so in many cases the starting text is like the following: 
                                                 
 
66 The legislated texts are in the third person and differ in the verb relating to evidence: “anything 
the person does say or do may be given in evidence” (Police Administration Act (NT) s 140(a), 
emphasis added); “anything the person does say or do may be used in evidence” (Evidence 
(National Uniform Legislation) Act (NT) s 139(1)(c), emphasis added). 
67 It is not clear why police include recording, although it is useful as it is closely related to the 
interview’s use as evidence (Kurzon 1996). Police are separately required to inform suspects of 
their entitlement to a copy of the recording (Police Administration Act (NT) s 142(2)(a)), which 
would probably entail explaining what the recording is. Before beginning the caution, police 
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Mora: … anything you do say or do will be recorded alright and may be used as 
evidence later on (KR 2015) 
Recording does not seem to be a problematic concept provided the 
suspect has some awareness of recording equipment, usually visible in the 
interview room and pointed out by police, along with tapes or discs which are 
unwrapped in front of the suspect. It has been suggested that record could be 
confused with ‘criminal record’ (Kurzon 1996:14), but this seems unlikely in 
the oral cautions in this study, noting that syllable stress should distinguish 
record as a verb and noun. Police in this study talk about recording, recorder, 
record, machine, tapes and discs, and suspects with no experience of recording 
may nonetheless be familiar with playing DVDs (or historically, tapes). 
However understanding of recording does not seem to be tested by police in 
any way likely to detect two-audience awareness (understanding that the 
suspect’s words and gestures will be captured on a medium which can be 
replayed). Two-audience awareness is important to the caution (including the 
teaching–testing purpose, see 2.4) and the subsequent interview. 
Evidence on the other hand is the most complicated word in the standard 
caution, the only word with an overtly law-specific meaning. Wierzbicka 
(2010:144) classifies evidence as a key Anglo concept, lacking equivalents in 
other European languages, which may be “puzzling or even incomprehensible 
to cultural outsiders”. Unsurprisingly then, evidence seems difficult for police 
                                                 
 
generally explain the recording process, and refer to the unwrapping of tapes or discs in the 
suspect’s presence. 
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to explain. However its inclusion in the 25-word caution must have been 
intended to convey something to suspects, otherwise drafters could have 
substituted something like ‘played in court’, as police tend to. 
4.3.1 Police language about evidence 
Walters: … you don’t have to say anything. Anything you do say can be recorded and 
may be used in court at a later date (Age #1 2010) 
Replacing evidence with court, Walters does not say evidence at all in this 
conversation. Rock (2007:166) finds that court is (also) a word “packed with 
meaning in the caution”, and that English/Welsh police felt the need to identify 
its human referents: judge, magistrate, and/or jury. NT police seem to have 
similar intuitions: 
Extract (44): Cumaiyi (2003) 
1. Butcher: Okay. And Dominic if you do say anything what you say is gonna' be 
recorded on these tapes as I explained before. One of these tapes can be used as 
evidence in Court. Who might listen to that in court? Who would listen to the 
tape? 
2. Interpreter: (language) 
3. Cumaiyi: Magistrate 
4. Butcher: And what can a magistrate decide Dominic? What decisions can he 
make? 
5. Cumaiyi: Gaol 
6. Interpreter: (language) 
7. Cumaiyi: Bail 
8. Interpreter: (language) 
9. Cumaiyi: Community Service 
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10. Interpreter: (language) Fine 
11. Cumayai: Fine 
12. Butcher: So you say gaol, bail, community service or fine. Yeah? So you 
understand that what you say to me now on this tape can be played in front of that 
magistrate that can make those decisions. Do you understand that? 
13. Cumaiyi: Yeah 
In line 1, Butcher moves straight from “evidence in Court” to “who might 
listen”. After Cumaiyi correctly identifies magistrate,68 Butcher elicits (with 
possible assistance from the interpreter, see line 10) a list of sentencing 
options: gaol, community service, fine, and bail.69 The surprising emphasis on 
                                                 
 
68 The difference between magistrate and judge is probably marginal to a suspect’s 
understanding of the court process. From 2016 in the NT, all judicial officers are called ‘judges’ 
(Local Court Act (NT) s 85), so the word magistrate is no longer needed, removing a lexical 
complexity, and perhaps aligning better with some Aboriginal languages which include words 
derived from judge to refer to non-Aboriginal judges, for example Yolngu djätj (Greatorex & 
Charles Darwin University 2014). Even where the word magistrate is in use, ‘correctly’ 
answering this question would require irrelevant precision. At the time of the interview, it may 
not be obvious whether an alleged offence is serious enough to require a trial by judge and jury. 
In any event, charges which go before a judge almost always pass through the lower court first 
and may involve evidence being heard by a magistrate during preliminary examination 
(committal) proceedings. Clearly, expecting or requiring suspects to know this would be 
unrealistic. 
69 Bail is not a sentence but a conditional release of the suspect while court proceedings are 
incomplete. It is true that the existence of an interview can affect decisions about bail as it may 
affect the ‘strength of the case’ against the suspect (Bail Act (NT) s 24(1)(a)(iii)). However 
Butcher’s acceptance of bail in this list of sentences in line 12 could contribute to confusion 
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sentencing is seen in numerous police explanations of the court process in this 
study. 
Extract (45): Dumoo (1996) 
1. Lindsay: Who might listen to these tapes in court? 
2. Dumoo: Judge. 
3. Lindsay: Judge. Now when the Judge listens to these tapes and he - that Judge will 
hear what you’re saying now. Now if he thinks that you’re guilty what can he do 
to you? 
4. Dumoo: Lock me up. 
5. Lindsay: Yeah. What other sort of things can he do? Could he make you pay a 
fine? 
6. Dumoo: Yeah. 
7. Lindsay: Or make you do that work? 
8. Dumoo: Yeah. 
9. Lindsay: What’s that work called? 
10. Dumoo: (No reply). 
11. Lindsay: The community work? 
12. Dumoo: Community. 
Lindsay’s explanation of the court process at line 3 mentions that the judge will 
hear what Dumoo is saying, but does not dwell on this idea. The question “if 
he thinks that you’re guilty” skips over the issue of how the judge could reach 
this conclusion, and goes on to thoroughly test sentencing options. 
                                                 
 
given that some Aboriginal people may incorrectly view being ‘bailed out’ as concluding their 
court proceedings, like a sentence (Aboriginal Resource and Development Services 2007). 
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A possible explanation for naming judicial officers and sentencing 
options is the potential to elicit court-related language from suspects, building 
up some evidence that they know about the legal process, despite the fact that 
sentencing is procedurally distant from evidence. Some courts have accepted 
this explanation-by-naming. In Gaykamanu (2010:[39]), Olsson AJ was 
satisfied with an answer of “Maybe Judge”: 
When asked by the interpreter, in language, whether he understood that, if he did tell 
his story, where his voice would go from the tape and the TV, and who might look at 
and listen to it, the accused replied, "Maybe Judge". I am satisfied that, in so 
responding, the accused was not, as his counsel suggests, making some equivocal 
response. He was clearly stating his understanding that the record of any thing he said 
might be used in court before a judge. 
In GP (2015:[17]), Barr J found that telling the suspect that the recording might 
be heard “by the magistrate or jury” was an “obvious reference to criminal 
court proceedings”. 
Some suspects give discouraging answers to open questions about “what 
happens in court”. 
Extract (46): Moonlight 
1. P: now court,..  
=can= you .. tell me?  
2. M: =( yeah right)=  
3. P: .. what court is?  
<3.4>  
what happens in court/  
4. M: <1.2>(dunno) <1.7> judge? eh,  
5. P: ==yeah judge/  
and what can a judge do? 
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6. M: <1.2>u::m [ticking] 
<7.0>um  
7. P: ... can a judge,  
... oh::/  
... what what can a judge do/  
to someone that's done something wrong?  
what can a judge do for them?  
8. M: ah yeah, lock up// 
The general question at line 3 elicited an uncertain answer “judge” at line 4, 
which P diverted into a more specific question “what can a judge do?”. To 
further prompt an answer, P then reframes the question at line 7 as relating to 
“someone that’s done something wrong”, presupposing the conclusion of the 
evidentiary process and making the question largely irrelevant to understanding 
of how the interview could be used, but successfully eliciting the answer “lock 
up”. 
KR, aged 14, was asked “what can happen in court”: 
1. Mora: Um… What's your, what’s your understanding, um, what can happen in 
court? 
2. KR: Um… just… probably gonna get locked up and that (KR 2015) 
Many things ‘can’ happen in court, and this answer does not suggest any 
awareness of court processes. The most successful answer to “what happens in 
court?” in this study came from Spencer: 
Extract (47): Spencer #2 (1998) 
1. Kelly: Do you know what happens in court? 
2. Spencer: Yeah I know. They, the tape has to be shown to the judge. 
3. Kelly: Yep. 
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4. Spencer: And be recorded. 
5. Kelly: And it could get you in trouble if you say something. 
6. Spencer: Yeah. 
In line 2, possibly referring to his previous experience of the caution, Spencer 
answers the general question consistently with police explanations about the 
judge hearing the interview. Paraphrases in this study consistently focus on 
listening to or hearing the recording. Translations also focus on listening and 
deciding, for example the 2015 Kriol translations: 
So  detmob  plismen  gada  deigi  yu  stori  la    det   kot. 
So  those  police  will  take  2SG story to    that  court 
 
Detmob  jaj       en       najalot   pipul      la kot gada  
Those    judge     and  other     people  at court will    
 
irri  yu  stori  en  wani  yu  toktok. 
Hear 2SG story and what you talk 
‘Police might take your story to court and the judge and other people in court 
can listen to your story and hear you talking.’ 
 
 
Dei  gada  irri  yu  stori. 
They will hear 2SG story 
 
Det  jaj    gada jinggabat  if   yu     bin    breigi  det  lo  o najing. 
That judge   will   think  if   you   PST  break  that law or nothing 
‘They will listen to your words to decide if you did break the law or if you didn’t 
break the law.’ (subtitles in original) 
 
When police attempt to explain the evidentiary process this is often limited to 
listening (although McKeown below only mentions ‘going to court’ and 
‘proof’). 
Extracts (48) 
Mora: Yep so what happens is the magistrate can listen to what you say and, and 
everything else and they can make a decision on, about you, ok? (KR 2015) 
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Miller: … those disks then go to the courthouse, and the magistrate will listen to those 
disks, lawyers, and that’s the evidence. Ok? (Lawrence #1 2015) 
1. McKeown: but if you do, if you do answer my questions it’s going to be recorded 
and it will be evidence. Do you know what evidence is? 
2. Jawrarla: Mmmm. 
3. McKeown: Evidence is like when something goes to Court, it’s the proof, you can 
prove it, do you know what I mean? 
4. Jawrarla: Yeah. (Jawrarla 2006) 
Perhaps the most meaningful police explanation in this study is in 
Rankin’s interview, following another unsuccessful open question about “what 
a court does”: 
Extract (49): Rankin #1 (1998) 
1. Pfitzner: And they could be used against you in court. Do you know what a court 
is?  Do you know what a court does? 
2. Rankin: (No audible reply) 
3. Pfitzner: What does a court do? 
4. Rankin: Um - - - 
5. Pfitzner: Sorry? Have you been – you understand what the job of the court is? 
6. Rankin: No. 
7. Pfitzner: Do you understand that if a person – they might get in trouble with the 
law, with the police and then that person might end up in court and that’s that 
place where they go - - - 
8. Rankin: Yeah. 
9. Pfitzner: - - - and then the magistrate or the judge might hear what the police have 
to say and they might hear what the defence has to say, or the person, and then 
that magistrate or judge can make up his mind as to whether that person is guilty 
or innocent.  Do you understand that? 
10. Rankin: Yes. 
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11. Pfitzner: And then after that, then that magistrate or judge might, you know, 
sentence that person or let them go free or – depending on what’s been put before 
the court.  Do you understand that? 
Pfitzner’s explanation at lines 9 and 11 involves a judge hearing both sides, 
‘making up his mind’, and determining an outcome based on “what’s been put 
before the court”. This goes some way to explaining how evidence works. 
Similarly, Miller said “the magistrate will hear the police story and he’ll hear 
your story” (Lawrence #1 2015). This is true, but contrasting “the police story” 
with “your story” suggests that the interview may be evidence in the suspect’s 
favour, whereas in fact, if played, the interview is part of the prosecution 
evidence and usually incriminates the suspect.70 
In the cases of Cumaiyi (44), Dumoo (45) and Rankin (49) quoted above, 
courts did not discuss the question of whether the suspects understood how 
interviews could be used in evidence.71 
                                                 
 
70 In the minority of cases where, in the context of all the other evidence, an interview ends up 
being favourable for the suspect, the suspect has an arguable entitlement to have the interview 
played. This argument is based on the prosecutor’s duty to bring relevant evidence before the 
court, and requires that the interview is not wholly exculpatory: R v Rudd (2009) 23 VR 444; R 
v Helps [2016] SASCFC 154. 
71 There is no known court decision about Moonlight’s case (also quoted above). 
Cumaiyi’s interview was excluded from evidence on the basis that he attempted to exercise his 
right to silence. Tudorstack v Chula [2004] NTMC [20]-[26]. 
Kearney J agreed with Dumoo’s lawyer that Dumoo’s answer “Judge” (in line 2 of (45)) “did 
not establish that the appellant was aware of his right to remain silent when being questioned”, 
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4.3.2 Evidence against you 
Some descriptions of the use of interviews in evidence, including the 
standard US Miranda warning, say that the contents of the interview may be 
used against the suspect. An (apparently non-Aboriginal) NT suspect said this 
about his right to silence: 
I’ve watched a lot of TV shows and whatnot and I’ve seen people say the wrong things 
and it ends up turning on them later so I’d rather just wait. (R v CS 2012:[54]) 
In this study, police occasionally say against. In line 1 of (49), Pfitzner says 
“used against you in court”. Kelly says “used as evidence in, against you in 
court”, and in (47), “it could get you in trouble if you say something”. 
There is a risk that the language of ‘getting in trouble’ could confuse two 
stages of the process: the police decision to arrest someone, and the court’s 
decision about that person’s guilt (and potential sentence). Pfitzner uses this 
language at line 7 of (49) to refer to initial apprehension by police. In 
Nundhirribala’s interview, police said this: 
                                                 
 
but it is not clear why this was argued, given that that question related to the consequences of 
speaking, not the right to silence. Dumoo’s interview was excluded because breaches of Anunga 
guidelines made it improperly obtained evidence: Dumoo v Garner [1998] NTSC 8 
Justice Thomas found that at the end of Rankin’s first interview (which is quoted in (49)), she 
did not understand the caution; however this assessment seems to have been about understanding 
the right to silence. There was a second interview with an interpreter. Her Honour concluded that 
police failed to comply with the Anunga rules, but this was not reckless and the interview was 
admitted into evidence. R v Rankin [1998] NTSC. 
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1. Grant: … Have some boys from Numbulwar been to Court at Groote Elyandt? 
2. Nundhirribala: Yeah. 
3. Grant: And when they go to Court do they get into trouble from the Judge 
sometimes? 
4. Nundhirribala: Yeah. 
5. Grant: And what sort of trouble do they get in from him? … (Nundhirribala 1993) 
Justice Mildren considered this caution was acceptable, and concluded that: 
the accused is not so unsophisticated as to be unaware of either television or tapes and 
it is apparent from the record of interview that he was aware that the tapes would be 
listened to by a Magistrate or Judge and that Judges have the power to send people who 
are in trouble with the law to jail. (Nundhirribala 1994:[22], emphasis added) 
There is evidence that some suspects may lack understanding of the legal 
process and the distinction between police and court decisions. It is important 
to avoid confusing these two steps with overlapping language. This kind of 
confusion could explain Todd’s answer seen at 4.1.3. 
Extract (33): Todd (1995)  
1. P2:  ==what do you think will happen if you answer the questions? <2.6>  
 do you think you might get in trouble?  
2. Todd: .. .I think so  
3. P2:  who from/  
4. Todd: ==from the police, 
5. P2:  yeah/  
 anyone else?  
6. Todd: not really  
7. P2:  ==you don't think you might get in trouble from the judge later on? .. or a 
 magistrate? 
8. Todd: ==think so::/ 
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Line 4 appears to suggest that Todd would get in (more) trouble from the 
police after answering the questions, which suggests lack of awareness of the 
evidentiary process, but is perhaps consistent with the caution’s general focus 
on police as a domain of authority. 
‘Evidence against you’ or similar language may suggest that interviews 
can only be used against suspects, however interviews occasionally provide 
evidence in the suspect’s favour. In GP (2015:[17]) it was not necessary to 
explain that the interview could be “used against [GP] in evidence in the sense 
that a jury might use it to determine if he had done something wrong”. In 
Marrmowa, it was also not necessary to explain “that the evidence could be 
used against him in Court” (1995:[13], emphasis in original). However in R v 
Sharpe & Braedon (1996 NTSC, unreported, cited in Douglas 1998:45), an 
interview was excluded from evidence because the suspect did not understand 
the interview was “potentially contrary to their interest”. In interviews where 
suspects initially talk about being locked up, discussion of more lenient 
sentences may raise the possibility that the interview could change the outcome 
in their favour. 
4.3.3 A discourse of evidence? 
To avoid categorising the interview as for or against the suspect, we must 
return to the text of the caution and the meaning of evidence (which unlike 
rights is expressly included in the text). Evidence may invoke, for hearers 
familiar with Anglo-Australian culture, a number of related ideas which could 
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be considered a discourse (Wierzbicka 2010). While the ‘discourse of rights’ is 
about politico-legal rights consistent with the caution, evidence has non-legal 
meanings which may be more prominent for many Anglo-Australian speakers 
than its use in the legal process. 
The legal use of the term evidence may be related to the English 
empiricist idea that thinking is not enough for knowing, and sensory perception 
is needed (Wierzbicka 2010:97). So listening is indeed part of its meaning, as 
emphasised by police. While Wierzbicka describes evidence as being about 
‘truth’, courts use evidence to determine ‘facts’. Wierzbicka goes on to argue 
that there is a “discourse of evidence” which relates to “supporting what one 
says”, including claims, hypotheses and allegations, and “challenging what 
somebody else says” (2010:122). The use of evidence in court is thus 
adversarial, with two sides marshalling observations of the world to support 
and challenge claims. However, some Aboriginal people may be “unprepared 
for the adversarial basis of British jurisprudence” because in many cases 
“traditional Aboriginal deliberation operates by consensus” (Liberman 
1981:247). Another necessary feature of an adversarial courtroom is revealed 
by the Plain English Legal Dictionary: 
A judge is impartial. She is in the middle between the two sides in court. The judge 
will think like this, "it does not matter to me who wins, I only decide according to the 
law.” (Aboriginal Resource and Development Services et al. 2015), definition of judge. 
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The importance and non-obviousness of impartiality is also highlighted by 
ARDS's (2015) Yolngu translation of judge as ṉapuŋga'wuy, ‘middle person’,72 
contrasting with some police language such as “the boss man in the Court” 
(Nundhirribala 1993), which suggests authority but not impartiality. 
Impartiality may ensure evidence is scrutinised objectively. Wierzbicka 
argues that “in English, evidence can be expected to be critically examined 
rather than immediately assented to” (2010:97), reflected in critical weighing 
of competing evidence by judge or jury. Impartiality is also protected by 
transparency about which evidence courts base decisions on: 
The judge or jury can only decide about a court case using the evidence they hear and 
see in court. They cannot go and get other information outside of court or talk to people 
outside of court to help them decide. There are many rules about what kinds of things 
the lawyers can bring into court and show the judge or jury as evidence. (Aboriginal 
Resource and Development Services et al. 2015), definition of evidence. 
The requirement to bring evidence to court is affected by another 
fundamental principle, the presumption that suspects are innocent until proven 
guilty73 by evidence in court beyond a reasonable doubt.74 This includes the 
requirement to prove matters which might seem basic and obvious to suspects, 
such as the identity of accused and victim, and who was present at particular 
                                                 
 
72 The introduction to the same dictionary (ARDS 2015) also notes that the Yolŋu system of law 
includes (presumably metaphorical) “law chambers” (ŋärra) presided over by “people who are 
regarded as impartial”. 
73 Criminal Code (NT) s 5. 
74 Criminal Code (NT) s 440. 
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places and times. It is also frequently necessary to prove matters such as 
intention, which suspects may not realise are relevant separately from actions. 
Interviews often reveal suspects’ states of mind, and this can be difficult to 
prove in other ways. 
The use of the interview as evidence also contrasts with other statements 
which are not admissible as evidence, for example conversations with police 
which are not recorded and where the suspect was not cautioned.75 It is hard to 
see how any suspect would know this if not told, and Rogers et al (2010) found 
that 52% of (US) pretrial defendants thought ‘off the record’ comments could 
be used against them. A suspect might think s/he has already incriminated 
him/herself in another conversation with police, conclude the right to silence is 
of no value, and go on to repeat the same information in the recorded 
interview, actually incriminating him/herself. 
It is possible to imagine other ways in which a judge could listen to the 
interview, if we do not assume knowledge about the legal process. Davis et al’s 
(2011:94) Canadian participants (not actual suspects) waived their right to 
silence for reasons including: 
to show that they were cooperative or honest (46.2%), to explain their side of the story 
(23.1%), to convince the police to let them off easy (7.7%), and to fabricate a story that 
would get them out of the crime (7.7%). 
                                                 
 
75 Evidence of a confession by a suspect to police is generally not admissible unless recorded, or 
unless it is later confirmed by the suspect during a recorded interview: Police Administration Act 
(NT) s 142(1). 
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It is debatable whether these reasons reflect understanding of the purposes for 
which courts listen to interviews. There is minimal evidence in this study that 
suspects understand court processes, and some of them appear to think court 
means getting locked up. Aboriginal people also may not know what happens 
behind closed doors outside court. One might imagine, for example, that the 
judge has previously heard about the crime from police, and would normally 
believe them. The interview might be an opportunity for the judge to assess the 
suspect’s character, not to ascertain facts but to decide how harshly to punish 
him/her based on some set of values which may not be obvious to outsiders. 
A meaningful explanation of evidence should contradict possible 
assumptions like these. It should explain that the judge starts with no 
knowledge about the crime and needs to see or hear each part of the story in 
court. If there is not enough evidence in acceptable forms, the judge will have 
doubts and conclude the suspect is not guilty. An interview can be used to 
prove (or disprove) factual elements of the crime. Mildren’s (1997) paraphrase 
suggests that the interview could constitute evidence for or against the suspect: 
The magistrate will listen to your words and then maybe he will send you to gaol. 
Maybe the magistrate will listen to your words and he will be happy with your story, I 
don’t know what he will think. 
If police said “I don’t know what he will think”, this would also suggest 
independence between police and magistrate, and perhaps impartiality. 
Many ideas bound up in evidence are neatly embodied in the 
personification of Justice with blindfold (impartiality, presumption of 
innocence), scales (weighing of opposing evidence) and sword (punishment 
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according to law). This image is derived from the roman goddess Justitia and 
probably has origins in ancient Egypt (Curtis & Resnik 1987). Once again, 
premises implicated in a full interpretation of the caution can be found in a 
body of knowledge which seems to have deep roots in European culture. 
If evidence is not explained, diverging assumptions about the purpose of 
the interview could lead to inability to make meaningful decisions about 
silence, even if the suspect understands the right to silence and the (lack of) 
consequences of silence. However it seems clear that explaining evidence to a 
meaningful degree would be difficult and time consuming and may not be 
suited to the police interview room. Explaining that the interview can be ‘used 
against you in court’ could be a shortcut to reduce the need to explain 
evidence. It would tend to turn the caution into a warning, highlighting 
negative consequences and giving suspects the flavour of the information 
needed to decide about silence. 
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5 Conclusion 
Police sometimes appear to assume that the caution “might sound a little 
bit confusing but it’s basically fairly simple” (Todd 1995). They may start 
caution conversations hoping that the caution will be readily understood, and in 
many cases it probably is. The conversations in this study also show that police 
sometimes make a lot of effort to explain the caution, but may not use effective 
strategies for suspects in this study. It should be clear that the caution, and the 
way it is required by Anunga to be delivered, is anything but simple. This study 
suggests that caution processes may be unsuccessful for a range of Aboriginal 
suspects and for a range of (often overlapping) reasons. 
The caution procedure has evolved from a series of decisions and 
assumptions by many people: legislators, judges, police, lawyers and others. 
The recognition of the right to silence, the requirement to deliver a caution, the 
Anunga requirement to test understanding, the requirement to record cautions 
and interviews, and the increasing use of interpreters and recordings are all 
steps in the evolution of a policy. Presumably, each step seemed be a 
reasonable way to achieve a reasonable objective. However parts of the caution 
may rest on insecure foundations. 
Caution conversations (and translations) can be seen as textual evolutions 
with their origin in legislated texts (though those texts themselves have deeper 
roots). Some problems with the caution can be traced to these texts, for 
example the inclusion of “does not have to” in the standard text, and the fact 
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that the text mentions the consequences of speaking but leaves the (lack of) 
consequences of silence to be inferred. 
Most communication problems are probably related to the amount of 
context available to suspects about what is happening during the caution, the 
caution’s relationship with the following interview, and the potential role of the 
interview in court. Police could frame the caution more meaningfully and 
provide more context, and many useful ways of presenting the caution have 
already been revealed by paraphrases and translations of it. 
Specific linguistic issues which cause problems for the caution include 
the ambiguity of conditional clauses and the complexity of modals. While it 
may be impractical to avoid conditional clauses, their role might be clarified by 
better context. Modals can sometimes be avoided and police sometimes replace 
them with other language. However don’t have to should be avoided altogether 
(which has been recommended before). 
Police should aim to explain the caution in a clear way the first time it is 
mentioned, rather than relying on increasingly complex sequences of 
reformulation whose discursive effectiveness is doubtful. I argue that the most 
concrete way to explain the right to silence is by predicting that if the suspect 
stays silent, neither police nor judge will react negatively. 
Even if language is successfully processed, caution texts appear to 
require significant contextual knowledge for suspects to derive meaningful 
interpretations. Rights and evidence are two culture-specific areas of 
knowledge which are embedded in the caution. Attempting to clarify what the 
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caution ‘means’ reveals that it is not always clear how much information it is 
intended to communicated, and this may require clarification of policy. 
Where suspects need access to bodies of knowledge which may be 
unfamiliar to them, attempting to explain this in the current caution format 
would extend conversations beyond their already large scope. It seems 
impractical to give individual suspects lessons in the interview room when they 
are stressed, police have a crime to investigate and there may be time pressure. 
These problems could be addressed by education of the community generally 
about rights and the legal system, and there are methodologies to do this with 
Aboriginal people in the NT (Grimes 2012; ARDS 1994). Education about 
subjects including the right to silence, rights generally, and evidence could 
improve suspect understanding, reduce police communication workload, 
improve fairness of the system and perhaps improve the reliability of interview 
evidence. 
Many aspects of caution conversations could be investigated further. 
Separate psycholinguistic testing of comprehension processes could assist the 
development of better caution language. Further analysis from the present data 
set could include analysis of comprehension testing strategies, evaluation of the 
caution’s effects on individuals, and examination of possible suspect attempts 
at exercising the right to silence and how these are dealt with by police in the 
Anunga process. 
While this study has primarily considered the effectiveness of police 
communication in English, a further question is the effectiveness of police 
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caution language when interpreted into other languages by a live interpreter. 
This study has also not sought to evaluate recorded translations of the caution 
which are currently in use, because that would require observation of how they 
are used in practice. The effectiveness of recordings in the interactional reality 
of the interview room is a question for further research, as there is significant 
potential for recorded cautions to improve understanding of the caution but 
research may also reveal ways that this process can be developed further. 
This study explores some of the ways the caution goes wrong in cases 
which have already been identified (by lawyers and courts) as problematic. 
There are some patterns in how the caution can be misunderstood, and 
addressing identified problems may avoid some miscommunication in the 
future. Currently, there is a risk that the caution accentuates inequality by 
failing to give some Aboriginal people (especially those who are not proficient 
speakers of English and not familiar with Anglo-Australian legal ideas) equal 
awareness of their rights. This may cause them to incriminate themselves and 
perhaps just as importantly, to feel confused and disempowered in the legal 
process. 
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6 Appendices 
6.1 Abbreviations and glossary 
Anunga guidelines: guidelines for police conducting interviews with 
Aboriginal suspects, established by the NT Supreme Court in R v Anunga, R 
v Wheeler (1976) 11 ALR 412. 
D2: second dialect 
L1: first (native) language 
L2: second language  
NNS: non-native speaker 
NS: native speaker (in the context of the caution, meaning native speaker of 
Standard Australian English) 
NT: The Northern Territory of Australia, the jurisdiction which is the focus of 
this study. 
s 140: refers to section 140 of the Police Administration Act (NT). The 
expression “section 140” is often used to refer to a conversation, containing 
the right to silence caution, which police usually deliver to suspects shortly 
after arrest and record on a handheld recorder. 
SAE: Standard Australian English 
Abbreviations used in Djambarrpuyngu glosses (following Wilkinson 1991): 
ACC: Accusative 
ASS: Associative 
CAUS: Causative 
COMPL: Completive 
DAT: Dative 
DIS: Distal (demonstrative) 
ERG: Ergative 
I, I, III, IV: verb conjugations 
IMPV: Imperfective 
INCH: Inchoative 
INSTR: Instrumental 
OBL: Oblique 
PERL: Perlative 
PRIV: Privative 
PROM: Prominence 
PROX: Proximal (demonstrative) 
TEXD: Text deictic 
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6.2 Transcription conventions 
From McLaughlin (1996:29), for Todd, Anthony and Moonlight, which are 
transcripts from that study. 
Symbol Significance 
// Final fall 
/ Slight final fall indicating temporary closure 
? Final rise 
, Slight rise as listing intonation (eg. more is expected) 
– Truncation (eg. what ti- what time is it/) 
_ Level ending 
.. Pauses of less than .5 second 
… Pauses of greater than .5 second (unless precisely timed) 
<2> Precise units of time (= 2 second pause) 
= To indicate overlap and latching of speaker’s utterances: 
spacing and single = before and after the appropriate 
portions of the text to indicate overlap; turn-initial double = 
to indicate latching of the utterance to the preceding one. 
Ex.  R: so you understand =the requirements?= 
 B:                               =yeah, I understand them/= 
 R: so you understand =the requirements?= 
 B:==yeah, I understand them/ 
:: Lengthened segments (eg. wha::t) 
~ Fluctuating intonation over one word 
* Extra prominence 
{[ ]} Non-lexical phenomena, both vocal and non-vocal, that 
overlay the lexical stretch (eg.,{[lo] text//} 
[ ] Non-lexical phenomena, both vocal and nonvocal, that 
interrupt the lexical stretch (eg. text [laugh] text//) 
[gesture] Gesture 
( ) Unintelligible speech 
di(d) A good guess at an unclear segment 
(did) A good guess at an unclear word 
(xxx) Unclear word for which a good guess can be made as to 
how many syllables were uttered, with each x equal to one 
syllable 
# # Use cross-hatches when extratextual information needs to 
be included within the text (eg. R: did you ask M 
#surname# to come? Also used in this data where sames, 
places etc have been deleted but are still transcribed so as 
not to interrupt the flow 
Intervals are measured in interactional seconds. 
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6.3 Caution source documents 
Suspect name Source Interview date, location Suspect age, L1 Charge(s) Court decision 
about caution 
Age, Steven The Queen v Age [2011] 
NTSC 104 
#1 (s 140)76: 8 December 
2010 
Adult, English 
(also Alyawarra?) 
Aggravated assault Interview rejected 
#2: 9 December 2010 Murder (the same 
incident) 
Anthony McLaughlin (1996) 1995, Katherine Region 22, Kriol unknown Not decided in court: 
charges dropped by 
prosecutor following 
a report by linguist 
Denise Angelo. 
                                                 
 
76 ‘s 140’ means that this caution was part of a ‘section 140’ conversation rather than an interview. This is explained at 1.4.1. 
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Suspect name Source Interview date, location Suspect age, L1 Charge(s) Court decision 
about caution 
BM R v BM [2015] NTSC 73 #1 (s 140): 2014 20 or 21, Tiwi Sexual intercourse 
with child under 16 
Interview rejected 
#2: 2014 
Cotchilli R v Cotchilli [2007] 
NTSC 52 
31 December 2005, 
Alice Springs 
24, Kukatja? Murder Interview rejected 
Cumaiyi, 
Dominic 
Tudorstack v Chula 
[2004] NTMC 013 
23 August 2003, Wadeye Adult, Murrinh-
Patha? 
Dangerous act, 
firearms offences? 
Interview rejected 
because of attempted 
exercise of the right 
to silence 
Dumoo, Basil Dumoo v Garner [1998] 
NTSC 8 
25 October 1996, Port 
Keats 
Adult, Murrinh-
Patha? 
Bring liquor into 
restricted area 
Interview rejected (on 
appeal) 
Echo, Howard R v Howard Echo [1996] 
NTSC 177 
#1: 31 May 1996, 
Borroloola 
20, Garawa Interview rejected 
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Suspect name Source Interview date, location Suspect age, L1 Charge(s) Court decision 
about caution 
#2: 31 May 1996, 
Katherine 
Attempt sexual 
intercourse without 
consent 
Interview rejected 
Gaykamanu, 
Phillip Dharul 
R v Gaykamanu [2010] 
NTSC 12 
17 August 2006, 
Maningrida 
29, Gupapuyngu? Arson Interview accepted 
GP R v GP [2015] NTSC 53 20 October 2014, 
location suppressed 
20, language 
suppressed 
Sexual intercourse 
with underage female 
child 
Interview accepted 
Inkamala, Robert R v Robert Rufus 
Inkamala [1996] NTSC 
18 
#1 (s 140): 21 January 
1995 
Adult, Luritja Murder Interview rejected 
#2: 21 January 1995 
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Suspect name Source Interview date, location Suspect age, L1 Charge(s) Court decision 
about caution 
Jako, Emily R v Emily Jako, Theresa 
Marshall and Mavis 
Robinson [1999] NTSC 
46 
6 November 1997, Alice 
Springs 
Adult Robbery, unlawful 
use of motor vehicle, 
murder 
Interview rejected 
because Jako 
attempted to exercise 
her right to silence 
Jawrarla, Gerard Police v Gerard Jawrarla 
[2006] NTMC 043 
Date unknown, 
Maningrida 
Adult Possess and supply 
cannabis 
Interview rejected 
KR Police v KR [2015] 
NTMC 020 
23 March 2015 14, unknown77 unknown Interview rejected 
Lawrence, Shaun R v Lawrence [2016] 
NTSC 65 
#1: 15 July 2015, 
Katherine 
30, from Bulman 
or Beswick 
Problems with 
caution not enough to 
                                                 
 
77 This case was heard in the Youth Justice Court at Katherine, and the location of the court appears to be the only public information about the 
origin of the case. 
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Suspect name Source Interview date, location Suspect age, L1 Charge(s) Court decision 
about caution 
#2: 21 August 2015, 
Katherine 
Assault, sexual 
intercourse without 
consent 
justify exclusion. 
Interviews rejected 
for other reasons. 
Mangaraka, 
Sarah 
R v Sarah Mary 
Mangaraka [1995] NSTC 
29 
#1: 15 February 1993, 
Alice Springs 
29, Western 
Arrente 
Murder Interview rejected 
#2: 16 February 1993, 
Alice Springs 
Interview rejected 
Marrmowa, 
Jimmy 
R v Jimmy Marrmowa 
[1996] NTSC 89 
19 August 1994 22, unknown unknown Interview rejected 
Moonlight McLaughlin (1996) 1995, Katherine Region 25, names 
traditional L1 but 
likely Kriol 
unknown Not clear that any 
decision made about 
caution or interview. 
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Suspect name Source Interview date, location Suspect age, L1 Charge(s) Court decision 
about caution 
Nundhirribala, 
Roderick 
R v Nundhirribala [1994] 
NTSC 28 
8 November 1993 
Katherine 
About 18, 
Nunggubuyu 
and/or Kriol 
Murder Interview accepted 
(parts excluded for 
reasons other than the 
caution) 
Rankin, 
Bronwyn 
R v Rankin [1998] NTSC #1: 22 September 1998, 
Katherine 
Adult, Kriol Manslaughter Interview accepted 
#2: 22 September 1998, 
Katherine 
Robinson, Jason R v Jason Robinson 
[2010] NTSC 09 
15 November 2008 Adult, 
Ngaanyatjarra 
Murder Interview accepted 
(parts excluded for 
reasons other than the 
caution)  
RR R v RR (2009) 25 NTLR 
92 
27 July 2008 Adult, 
Anindilyakwa? 
Murder Interview accepted 
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Suspect name Source Interview date, location Suspect age, L1 Charge(s) Court decision 
about caution 
Spencer, Bryce R v Spencer [2000] NTSC 
44 
#1: 3 September 1998, 
Alice Springs 
Adult, Warlpiri78 Murder Interview accepted 
#2: 4 September 1998, 
Alice Springs 
#3: 4 September 1998, 
Alice Springs 
Thomas, Angus R v Thomas [2006] NTSC 
87 
30 March 2006, Darwin Adult, unknown Attempt sexual 
intercourse, deprive 
liberty 
Interview accepted 
Todd McLaughlin (1996) 1995, Katherine Region 27, names 
traditional L1 but 
likely Kriol 
unknown Not clear that any 
decision made about 
caution or interview. 
                                                 
 
78 Spencer’s Warlpiri background is referred to in an appeal decision not related to the caution: Bryce Jabaltjari Spencer v The Queen [2005] NTCCA 3. 
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6.4 Translation and paraphrase sources 
Translation Source Available from 
1997 Kriol Djiwurruwurru-jaru 
Aboriginal Corp. Preamble to 
the Administration of the 
Police Caution 
Unpublished 
1998 Djambarrpuyngu Cooke, Michael. 
Djambarrpuyngu Version of 
Preamble to the Police 
Caution 
Unpublished 
2015 Djambarrpuyngu not in 
custody 
Aboriginal Interpreter Service 
(NT) 
Transcript by Michael Cooke 
used in this thesis 
Recordings: https://dhcd.nt.gov.au/community-development/aboriginal-
language-police-cautions-aboriginal-interpreter-service 
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2015 Kriol not in custody Aboriginal Interpreter Service 
(NT) 
Transcript by Denise Angelo 
used in this thesis 
English subtitles: 
https://dhcd.nt.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0015/413232/ENG001b-
Standardised-Audio-Police-Caution-SAPC-not-in-custody.pdf 
Accessed 26.4.17 
2015 Djambarrpuyngu in 
custody 
Aboriginal Interpreter Service 
(NT) 
Transcript by Michael Cooke 
used in this thesis 
Recordings: https://dhcd.nt.gov.au/community-development/aboriginal-
language-police-cautions-aboriginal-interpreter-service 
English subtitles: 
https://dhcd.nt.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/413231/ENG001a-
Standardised-Audio-Police-Caution-SAPC-in-custody.pdf 
Accessed 26.4.17 
2015 Kriol in custody Aboriginal Interpreter Service 
(NT) 
Transcript by Denise Angelo 
used in this thesis 
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Other sources which include paraphrases, front-translations or 
translations relating to the caution: 
 
Aboriginal Resource and Development Services (2015). Legal Dictionary: 
English-Yolngu Matha. Online: 
https://ards.com.au/resources/downloadable/legal-dictionary-
djambarrpuyngu/; accessed 14 March 2016. 
Aboriginal Resource and Development Services; North Australian Aboriginal 
Justice Agency; & Aboriginal Interpreter Service (NT) (2015). The 
Plain English Legal Dictionary (Northern Territory Criminal Law). 
Online: 
http://www.ards.com.au/365_docs/attachments/protarea/The%20-
4249a55b.PDF; accessed 23 April 2016. 
Cooke, Michael (1998). Anglo/Yolngu Communication in the Criminal Justice 
System. PhD Thesis. University of New England. 
Courier-Mail (1935). Police Talk in ‘Pidgin English’. Brisbane. Online: 
http://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/35859824? 
Gibbons, John (2001). Revising the language of New South Wales police 
procedures: Applied linguistics in action. Applied linguistics 22(4):439–
469. 
Mildren, Dean (1997). Redressing the Imbalance Against Aboriginals in the 
Criminal Justice System. Criminal Law Journal 21:7–22. 
  
VLING Thesis Alex Bowen u5989850 
 
 
210 
Legal sources 
Cases 
Collins v R (1980) 31 ALR 257 
Bryce Jabaltjari Spencer v The Queen [2005] NTCCA 3 
Dumoo v Garner [1998] NTSC 8 
Gudabi v R (1984) 52 ALR 133 CS 
MacPherson v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 512  
McDermott v R (1948) 76 CLR 501 
Miranda v Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 
Police v Gerard Jawrarla [2006] NTMC 043 
Police v KR [2015] NTMC 020 
R v Anunga, R v Wheeler (1976) 11 ALR 412 
R v Age [2011] NTSC 104 
R v BM [2015] NTSC 73 
R v BL [2015] NTSC 85 
R v Cotchilli [2007] NTSC 52 
R v CS [2012] NTSC 94 
R v Emily Jako, Theresa Marshall and Mavis Robinson [1999] NTSC 46 
R v Gaykamanu [2010] NTSC 12 
R v GP [2015] NTSC 53 
R v Helps [2016] SASCFC 154 
R v Howard Echo [1996] NTSC 177 
R v Jason Robinson [2010] NTSC 09 
R v Jimmy Marrmowa [1996] NTSC 89 
R v Lawrence [2016] NTSC 65 
R v Lee (1950) 82 CLR 133 
R v Nundhirribala [1994] NTSC 28 
R v Rankin [1998] NTSC 
R v Robert Rufus Inkamala [1996] NTSC 18 
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R v RR (2009) 25 NTLR 92 
R v Rudd (2009) 23 VR 444 
R v Sarah Mary Mangaraka [1995] NSTC 29 
R v Sharpe & Braedon (1996 NTSC, unreported, cited in Douglas 1998:45) 
R v Spencer [2000] NTSC 44 
R v Szach (1980) 2 A Crim R 321 
R v Thomas [2006] NTSC 87 
Tudorstack v Chula [2004] NTMC 013 
WA v Gibson [2014] WASC 240 
Legislation and other 
Bail Act (NT) 
Criminal Code (NT) 
Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act (NT) 
Evidence Ordinances 1939 (NT) 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res 2200A (XXI), 
UN GAOR, UN Doc A/6316 (1966), entered into force 23 March 1976 
Interpretation Act (NT) 
Local Court Act (NT) 
NSW Police Force (2015) Code of Practice for CRIME (Custody, Rights, 
Investigation, Management and Evidence), available from 
http://www.police.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/108808/Code_
of_Practice_for_Crime.pdf, accessed 14 May 2017. 
Police Administration Act (NT) 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (UK) 
Youth Justice Act (NT) 
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